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Given two random variables X and Y , how much information does Y “leak”
about X? An operational approach is undertaken to answer this question, which
is fundamental to the study of communication security. The resulting measure
L(X→Y) is called maximal leakage, and is defined as the multiplicative increase,
upon observing Y , of the probability of correctly guessing a randomized func-
tion of X, maximized over all such randomized functions. A closed form expres-
sion forL(X→Y) is given for discrete X and Y , and it is subsequently generalized
to handle a large class of random variables. The resulting properties are shown
to be consistent with an axiomatic view of a leakage measure, and the definition
is shown to be robust to variations in the setup.
Moreover, the guessing framework is used to give operational definitions to
commonly used leakage measures, such as Shannon capacity, maximal correla-
tion, and local differential privacy. Counter-intuitively, it is shown that Shannon
capacity underestimates leakage. Furthermore, a variant of the Shannon cipher
system is studied, in which performance of an encryption scheme is measured
using maximal leakage. A single-letter characterization of the optimal limit of
(normalized) maximal leakage is derived and asymptotically-optimal encryp-
tion schemes are demonstrated.
The Shannon cipher system is also studied when there is a known distor-
tion function up to which the adversary is interested in X, in which case the
relevant metric is the (exponent of the) probability of a successful guess. A
single-letter characterization of the highest achievable exponent is provided,
and asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the primary user and the adver-
sary are demonstrated.
Finally, the sample complexity of estimating maximal leakage from data is
studied. It is shown that the task is possibly only if the minimum strictly posi-
tive probability of a source symbol, θ, is known. In that case, O
( |Y| log |X|
θ
)
samples
are sufficient, and Ω(|Y|1−η/θ) samples, for any η > 0, are necessary.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Any modern communication system has to satisfy strict security guarantees. In-
deed, as communication networks proliferate and are frequently used to trans-
mit sensitive information (such as banking information, medical data, private
correspondences, etc.), security concerns become more central to the design of
such systems, especially as attacks become more and more sophisticated. These
concerns have traditionally been addressed by the cryptography community
that made significant advances with cryptographic protocols such as the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the RSA algorithm.
However, cryptography misses a salient feature of communication systems
that proves highly compromising of the purported security guarantees: the ex-
istence of side-channels. A side-channel is an unconventional type of communi-
cation channel, which is defined to be any process that unintentionally and in-
evitably leaks information to an unauthorized user. Examples of side-channels
are:
• When using the Secure Shell (SSH), after the initial handshake, each
keystroke is sent immediately to the remote machine, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.1. When communicating over a wireless network, an eavesdropper
can observe the timing of the packets and hence also the timing of the
keystrokes, which are correlated with the input of the user (e.g., the inter-
keystroke interval when typing ‘a’ followed by ‘k’ is significantly smaller
1
Figure 1.1: The Secure Shell: each keystroke is sent immediately to the re-
mote machine
than when typing ‘k’ followed by ‘9’).
• Consider an on-chip network that has several processes running simul-
taneously, one of which is malicious. Because resources such as memory
and buses are shared on the chip, the timing characteristics observed by
the malicious application are affected by the behavior of the remaining ap-
plications. Similar phenomena occur when users share links or buffers in
a communication network.
• In some implementations of RSA, the time needed to perform private key
operations depends on the value of the key. A receiver that can observe
the completion time of the algorithm can therefore glean some information
about the key.
• The power consumption in some cryptographic devices depends on the
value of the key. This is also true for the device’s electromagnetic emis-
sions. A receiver that can observe either of these can therefore acquire
information about the key.
• Wiretap channels.
Although at first glance such side-channels may seem innocuous, many works
have shown that they in fact pose a significant security threat [9,24–27,46,52,
59]. For instance, Zhang and Wang [59] show how to use the keystroke timing
(in SSH) to reduce the search space for passwords by a factor of at least 250.
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Kocher [26] shows how to break (early implementations of) the RSA encryption
using timing information. Ristenpart et al. [37] show how secret keys can be
extracted from co-resident virtual machines on production Amazon EC2 servers
through microarchitectural timing channels.
As these vulnerabilities exist at the physical layer level, information theory,
as opposed to cryptography, is best suited to address them. For example, SSH is
considered secure from a cryptography point of view (in fact, an improvement
over FTP), which is oblivious to the existing side-channel. However, informa-
tion theory has offered relatively little prescriptive advice for minimizing infor-
mation leakage in side-channels, especially when compared with the success
that the field has experienced in suggesting practical schemes for conventional
communication systems. These successes include the use of multiple-antennas
(MIMO), low-density parity-check codes (LDPCs), polar codes, orthogonal-
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), multiuser interference, and oppor-
tunistic communication.
The main difficulty in side-channel analysis is summarized by the following
question: how does one quantify how much information is “leaked” through a side-
channel? In mathematical terms, given two random variables X and Y , where
X represents sensitive information and Y represents information available to an
adversary:
How much information does Y leak about X?
If X and Y are independent, then the only reasonable answer is zero. Often
in practice, Y cannot be made independent of X [28,30,31,35,46,47,49,52,57], in
which case the answer is not obvious. One might be tempted to use mutual in-
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formation as a leakage measure, as Shannon and many subsequent researchers
have indeed done [10,18,20,28,39,43,57]. This choice, however, overlooks the
context in which mutual information arises. In particular, the goal in security
problems is different from compression and transmission problems, in which
mutual information arises. It is also worth noting that in the latter contexts, mu-
tual information arises as part of a computable characterization, not as part of
the operational formulation of the problem. That is, the rate of transmission (or
compression) is defined in terms of an operational engineering problem, and
its computation involves mutual information. To adopt the latter as a leakage
measure is to include it in the very formulation of the problem. As such, even
though mutual information is not an unreasonable choice, there is no cogent,
operational justification for its adoption in this context either.
1.2 Contributions
We describe a specific threat model and give an operational definition of leak-
age that is motivated by the setup of a guessing adversary. More specifically,
upon observing Y , the adversary tries to guess a (possibly randomized) func-
tion of X. Leakage for a specific function is considered to be the logarithm of the
ratio of the probability of a correct guess when Y is observed, to the probability
of a correct guess when it is not (i.e., a blind guess). Maximal leakage, which
we denote by L(X→Y), is then defined as the maximum leakage over all such
randomized functions (cf. Definition 1). This maximization, which is formally
over discrete random variables U for which the Markov chain U − X − Y holds,
represents a worst-case analysis on the function of interest U, and models sce-
narios in which the conditional distribution PU |X is unknown. It is also inspired
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by the strong data processing constant [4].
Although the maximization is an infinite-dimensional problem, L(X→Y) ad-
mits a simple form (cf. Theorem 1). It turns out to equal the Sibson mutual
information of order infinity I∞(X;Y) [44,50] (cf. Corollary 1), endowing it with
an operational significance. The resulting properties (cf. Corollary 2) are consis-
tent with an axiomatic view of a leakage measure: it is zero if and only if X and
Y are independent, it is not symmetric, it satisfies the data processing inequality,
and it is additive over independent pairs {(Xi,Yi)}. Significantly, it is shown that
L(X→Y) ≥ I(X;Y), signifying that mutual information underestimates leakage
(we further explore this fact in Chapter 3). Moreover, L(X→Y) is convex in PY |X
for a fixed PX, and depends on PX only through its support.
Furthermore, we show that the definition of maximal leakage is robust in
several respects. In the definition of L(X→Y), we allow the adversary one guess
only. A natural extension would be to allow for, say, k guesses for some inte-
ger k. This is particularly relevant for privacy problems. For example, if U is a
password to some system, then an adversary is typically allowed several incor-
rect guesses before he/she is possibly locked out. We call the modified measure
k-maximal leakage, and denote it by L(k)(X→Y). We show that, in fact, the two
definitions are equivalent for all k (cf. Theorem 2). We also consider the case in
which the adversary only needs the guess to be within a certain distance of the
true function value, according to an arbitrary distance metric. We call this mod-
ified measure maximal locational leakage, and we denote it by LU(X→Y). We
show that LU(X→Y) ≤ L(X→Y), and equality holds under an unboundedness
condition on the metric spaceU (cf. Theorem 3).
We further extend the notion of maximal leakage in two directions. We gen-
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eralize the formula for maximal leakage to cover a large class of random vari-
ables (cf. Theorem 4), which includes point processes. Moreover, we propose
a conditional form of maximal leakage, which attempts to answer the question:
how much does Y leak about X when Z is given? We again provide an oper-
ational definition in the guessing framework (cf. Definition 4), and derive a
simple form for L(X→Y |Z) (cf. Theorem 5). Both the general and the condi-
tional form retain the axiomatic properties of a leakage measure, and are lower-
bounded by mutual information and conditional mutual information, respec-
tively.
To summarize, we develop a measure of information leakage that is opera-
tionally motivated, simple to compute, robust to variations in the threat model,
and lower-bounded by mutual information. Proofs and discussions of these
results are the subject of Chapter 2.
Leakage Metrics in the Guessing Framework
Chapter 3 explores the connection between maximal leakage and existing met-
rics, with particular emphasis on mutual information, capacity, maximal cor-
relation, local differential privacy, as well as rate-distortion-based metrics. We
show that the threat model we consider illuminates important features of the
given metrics.
We show that Shannon capacity corresponds to an adversary that is inter-
ested in functions of X that can be reliably recovered (cf. Definition 5 and Theo-
rem 6). As such, capacity is upper-bounded by maximal leakage. As for maximal
correlation, we show that it captures the change in the variance of functions of
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X, after observing Y , as opposed to probabilities of correct guessing (cf. Defini-
tion 6 and Theorem 7). Local differential privacy captures the multiplicative in-
crease of the guessing probability of functions of X, maximized over realizations
of Y and over distributions PX (cf. Theorem 9), hence it upper-bounds maxi-
mal leakage. Moreover, maximizing over realizations of Y for a fixed PX yields
a valid leakage measure, which is equal to the maximum information rate (cf.
Theorem 8). We also propose a “dual” notion of maximal leakage in which an
adversary attempts to minimize a (positive) cost function, rather than maximize
a (positive) gain functions (cf. Definition 10 and Theorem 11). Finally, we reveal
inadequacies of rate-distortion based approaches by considering them in an op-
erational framework.
Application: Shannon Cipher System
Having established maximal leakage as the proper information leakage metric,
we study an instance of a secrecy system using maximal leakage as performance
metric. In particular, we consider the Shannon cipher system, shown in Fig-
ure 1.2. It consists of a transmitter and a legitimate receiver that are linked by
a public noiseless channel and share a common key, and an eavesdropper who
has access to the public channel and is aware of the source statistics and the
used encryption schemes. The encryption schemes must allow the legitimate
receiver to reconstruct the source sequence up to a fidelity constraint.
The objective, in this case, is to minimize the (normalized) maximal leakage
between the source Xn and the public message M. We also introduce the infor-
mation blurring system, which considers the case in which R is large and r = 0
and thus represents a stylized model of a side-channel. It is shown that rate-
7
Figure 1.2: The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication.
distortion codes are asymptotically optimal, and the optimal limit is derived (cf.
Theorems 13 and 14). Moreover, memoryless schemes are proven to be strictly
suboptimal (cf. Lemma 6). One can interpret this result as: “maximal leakage
favors quantization over adding noise”. This is noteworthy since, in practice,
many schemes resort to adding independent noise to guarantee privacy.
Finally, we consider a more “traditional” setup. That is, we assume the
eavesdropper is interested in the source up to a known distortion function. We
study this setup when the figure of merit is the (exponent) of the probability of
a successful guess (i.e., a guess satisfying the distortion constraint). We show
that the problem is related to source coding with side information, in which the
transmitter’s goal is to provide the eavesdropper with the “worst” side informa-
tion. For a discrete memoryless source, we derive a single-letter characteriza-
tion of the optimal exponent (cf. Theorem 16), and demonstrate asymptotically-
optimal strategies for both the primary user and the eavesdropper.
Learning Complexity
In the final chapter of this dissertation, we consider the following natural ques-
tion: can we estimate maximal leakage from data? In particular, how many
samples do we need to estimate L(X→ Y) up to -accuracy, for a given  > 0?
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We show that this task is only possible if we know the minimum strictly positive
probability of a symbol x ∈ X. That is, let θ = minx∈X:PX(x)>0 PX(x). Then, we show
that the number of needed samples, n, satisfies n ≥ Ω(|Y|1−η/θ), for any η > 0 (cf.
Theorem 18). In particular, the lower bounds goes to infinity if θ goes to zero.
The techniques to prove the lower bound draw heavily on the work of Renyi
entropy estimation [1]. On the other hand, we show that O
( |Y| log |X|
θ
)
samples are
sufficient (cf. Theorem 17).
1.3 Literature Overview
The literature on leakage and privacy measures is vast, spanning the fields of
information theory, computer science, and computer security. The closest to our
work comes from computer security [2,3,7,16,45]. In particular, Smith [45] de-
fines leakage from X to Y as the logarithm of the multiplicative increase, upon
observing Y , of the probability of guessing X itself correctly, neglecting that the
adversary might be interested in certain functions of X. Braun et al. [7] consider
a worst case modification of the metric, and maximize the previous quantity over
all distributions on the alphabet of X (while PY |X is fixed). The resulting quan-
tity turns out to equal L(X→Y). In the computer security literature, it is denoted
by ML(PY |X), and its properties were further studied by Alvim et al. [3] and Es-
pinoza and Smith [16]. The formula for maximal leakage is also derived in a
different work [2]. Instead of looking at the (normalized) probability of guess-
ing X, a gain function g : X × Xˆ → [0, 1] is introduced, and the normalized
maximal gain is considered. Maximizing over g, for a fixed PX, is shown to
yield maximal leakage [2]. However, this threat model still focuses on X itself.
In fact, this result was included merely as an additional computable formula,
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and was de-emphasized by the authors [2].
Another connected line of work stems from cryptography, and in particular
from the notion of semantic security [17] which considers the security of encryp-
tion schemes. First, Goldwasser and Micali [17] introduce the notion of “ad-
vantage” for a given function of the messages. It is the additive increase, upon
observing the encrypted message (i.e., the ciphertext), of the probability of cor-
rectly guessing the value of the function. Semantic security then requires that,
for an adversary that can work only for a polynomial (in the length of the mes-
sage) amount of time, the advantage is negligible for all deterministic functions
that are computable in polynomial time, and for all input distributions. Note
that, in our framework, “advantage” is defined as the multiplicative increase.
Since one is typically interested in securing hard-to-guess functions for which
the probability of a correct guess is small, the multiplicative increase is arguably
more descriptive of the change. It is also the more natural choice when viewing
leakage in terms of leaked bits.
There are several variants of semantic security. In particular, entropic secu-
rity [12,38] drops the computational bounds (on the adversary and the consid-
ered functions), but restricts its attention to input distributions with high min-
entropy. Bellare et al. [6] introduce semantic security to the wiretap channel,
and do not restrict it to computationally bounded adversaries, nor determin-
istic polynomial-time computable functions. For a given encryption scheme,
they then upper and lower-bound the advantage of semantic security in terms
of—what the authors call—mutual information security advantage, which is de-
fined as the maximum, over all input distributions, of the mutual information
between the message and the output of the channel whose input is the encryp-
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tion of the message. Moreover, for discrete random variables X and Y , Calmon
et al. [8] upper-bound the advantage over all deterministic functions in terms of
their maximal correlation, which inspired Li and El Gamal [29] to use the latter
quantity as a secrecy metric. Calmon et al. [8], inspired by the correspondence
analysis literature [19], also generalized maximal correlation to k-correlation,
which is defined as the sum of the k largest principal inertial components of the
joint distribution PXY .
Finally, other approaches to leakage metrics can be found in the information-
theoretic literature. However, similarly to the choice of mutual information,
they merely “borrow” information-theoretic metrics developed in other con-
texts, such as rate-distortion theory. As such, they lack a clear operational mo-
tivational, and in some cases, label obviously insecure systems as secure (see
Section 3.6 for more details). These include expected distortion [58] incurred at
the eavesdropper, expected minimum distortion in a list [41], expected number
of guesses needed to satisfy a distortion constraint [33], the probability of sat-
isfying the constraint [22,54], etc. Although the particular metrics differ among
those works, they all assume that there is a priori known distortion function
up to which the adversary is interested in the sensitive information X. For fur-
ther discussion of privacy metrics, we refer the reader to Wagner and Eckhoff’s
work [51], which categorizes over eighty such metrics.
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CHAPTER 2
MAXIMAL LEAKAGE
2.1 Threat Model and Definition
We give an operational definition of leakage that is motivated by the setup of a
guessing adversary. More specifically, the adversary is interested in a (possibly
randomized) function of X, called U. The distribution PU |X is unknown to us,
and upon observing Y , the eavesdropper wants to guess U. To further illustrate
this, consider the SSH example. Let X represent the actual keystroke timings,
and Y represent the (perturbed) timings observed by the eavesdropper. The
question we aim to answer is: how much information does Y leak about X? We
will assume that the adversary is not interested in the keystroke timings them-
selves, but rather is interested in the input, which might represent a password,
that generated those timings. Let U denote the password, and assume that the
Markov chain U − X − Y holds. It is reasonable to assume that the adversary has
a verification mechanism for his/her guess Uˆ of the password, e.g., s/he could
try logging in as the user. The quantity of interest is then the chance that the ad-
versary guesses the password correctly after observing Y , namely Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)),
where Uˆ(Y) is the best estimator of U given Y . The operational meaning of this
quantity is clear: it is the chance that the adversary can break into the account
(with one guess; the case of multiple guesses will be discussed later). Then, to
understand the leakage due to Y , we should compare this quantity before and
after observing Y , i.e., Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)) and maxu Pr(U = u). Since for U’s of inter-
est (such as passwords) maxu Pr(U = u) is small, we consider the ratio of these
two quantities to be the appropriate description of the change (i.e., we consider
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geometric gain instead of additive gain). Taking log2 of the ratio then yields
an answer in bits: a leak of ` bits corresponds to a multiplicative increase in
the correct guessing probability of 2`. The final, and key, step is to realize that
the conditional distribution PU |X (i.e., the distribution of the passwords given
the timings in this example) is not known. Therefore, we define maximal leak-
age as the mentioned ratio maximized over all PU |X. This maximization can also
be viewed as modeling the scenario in which we do not know which variable
U is of interest to the adversary, and is inspired by the strong data processing
inequality [4].
Definition 1 (Maximal Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and
Y, the maximal leakage from X to Y is defined as
L(X→Y) = sup
U−X−Y−Uˆ
log
Pr
(
U = Uˆ
)
maxu∈U PU(u)
, (2.1)
where the supremum is over all U and Uˆ taking values in the same finite, but arbitrary,
alphabet.
2.2 Main Result
The optimization problem in (2.1) is infinite-dimensional, and it is not clear a
priori that it is computable. In fact, one can show that it is impossible to bound
the cardinality of the alphabetU in terms of the cardinalities of the alphabets X
and Y. Nonetheless, we can show that, maximal leakage is indeed computable
and actually takes a simple form.
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Theorem 1 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y, the maximal
leakage from X to Y is given by
L(X→Y) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X:
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x).
Before proving the theorem, we investigate some of its consequences. First, it
reveals two of the more useful aspects of maximal leakage from an engineering
perspective: minimizing L(X→Y) over PY |X, for a fixed support of PX, amounts
to minimizing a convex function, and L(X→Y) depends on PX only through its
support. The latter fact is very useful because in practice PX is typically compli-
cated and outside our control. PX is also typically used to model the adversary’s
prior knowledge of X, which is not necessarily known to us.
Moreover, the right-hand side of Theorem 1 is I∞(X;Y) [44,50], The Sibson
mutual information of order infinity. Sibson’s Iα(X;Y) (α ≥ 0) is an extension of
the concept of Renyi entropy Hα(X) (itself an extension of entropy) and Renyi
divergence Dα(P||Q). Although there are other possible extensions, Verdu [50]
argues for the adoption of Sibson’s definition. By endowing I∞(X;Y) with an op-
erational meaning, our result could be seen as also supporting that claim (more
recently, I∞(X;Y) has been used as a complexity measure in the study of com-
munication complexity [34]). This equivalence is quite useful, so we state it as a
separate Corollary.
Corollary 1 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y,
L(X→Y) = I∞(X;Y),
where I∞(X;Y) is the Sibson mutual information of order infinity.
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For binary-valued X, say X = {0, 1}, Sibson [44] showed that
I∞(X;Y) = log2
(
1 +
1
2
‖PY |X(·|1) − PY |X(·|0)‖
)
= 1 + log2
(
1
2
+
1
4
‖PY |X(·|1) − PY |X(·|0)‖
)
,
where ‖.‖1 is the L-1 distance. The term inside the log2 is the probability of suc-
cess in binary hypothesis testing, which sheds light on why I∞(X;Y) arises as
maximal leakage. The following corollary summarizes some useful properties
of L(X→Y).
Corollary 2 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y,
1. (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds for a discrete
random variable Z, then L(X→Z) ≤ min{L(X→Y),L(Y→Z)}.
2. L(X→X) = H0(X) = log |{x : PX(x) > 0}|.
3. L(X→Y) ≤ min{log |X|, log |Y|}.
4. L(X→Y) ≥ I(X;Y).
5. L(X→Y) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
6. L(X→Y) is not symmetric in X and Y .
7. (Additivity) If {(Xi,Yi)}`i=1 are mutually independent, then
L(X`1→Y`1) =
∑`
i=1
L(Xi→Yi).
8. exp{L(X→Y)} is convex in PY |X for fixed support of PX.
Proof: Properties 1) through 4), and 7) are shown for I∞(X;Y) [44,50]. 5) follows
from the definition and 4). That is, if X and Y are independent, L(X→Y) = 0 fol-
lows straightforwardly from the definition. Otherwise, we note that L(X→Y) ≥
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I(X;Y) > 0. 6) is clear and is illustrated in Example 9 below. 8) follows from the
fact that, for each y ∈ Y, maxx PY |X(y|x) is convex in PY |X. 
Note that properties 1), 5), and 7) can be regarded as axiomatic for a leak-
age measure, reinforcing the choice of maximal leakage. Moreover, Property 6)
reveals a “weakness” in some suggested leakage metrics, including mutual in-
formation. In particular, there is no reason to expect a priori that X leaks about
Y as much as Y leaks about X. Therefore, metrics that are symmetric by design
miss that fact.
Property 4) is crucial and shows that a small maximal leakage is a more strin-
gent requirement than a small mutual information. Since L(X→Y) depends on
PX only through its support, it follows that maximal leakage is at least the Shan-
non capacity of the channel PY |X when X has full support, and this inequality can
be strict. This justifies the claim in the introduction that the Shannon capacity
of a side-channel does not necessarily upper-bound its leakage. The maximiza-
tion in the definition of maximal leakage hints at the reason why. In particular,
Shannon capacity is concerned with (the size of) message sets that can be reli-
ably reconstructed at the receiver, i.e., Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)) ≥ 1 −  for some small .
Leakage, on the other hand, is concerned with the advantage in guessing, with-
out any notion of reliability. This observation is made mathematically precise in
Section 3.1. It is also worth noting that maximal leakage is upper bounded by
local differential privacy [13], which is known to be too pessimistic (e.g., [13]).
This is further discussed in Section 3.4.
Property 8) shows that minimizing maximal leakage, for a fixed support of
PX, amounts to minimizing a convex function. That is, one can efficiently solve
the problem of finding the randomization mechanism PY |X that minimizes max-
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imal leakage, subject to a convex constraint.
We evaluate L(X→Y) for some special cases.
Example 1 If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BSC with parameter p,
0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, then L(X→Y) = log(2(1 − p)).
Example 2 If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BEC with parameter ,
0 ≤  < 1, then L(X→Y) = log(2 − ), and L(Y→X) = log 2.
Example 3 For any deterministic law PY |X, L(X→Y) = log |{y : PY(y) > 0}|.
Finally, as will be seen in the proof, it is worth noting that the conditional dis-
tribution PU |X that achieves the supremum in (2.1) depends on PXY only through
its X−marginal, PX. In particular, PU |X is such that: for distinct x’s, the supports
of PU |X=x’s are disjoint, and each PU |X=x effectively “shatters” the atom x into
(almost) uniformly distributed u’s to get an (almost) uniform marginal PU . A
special case to consider is the uniform PX, in which case PU |X is simply the iden-
tity map. In light of this, one might wonder if there is always a deterministic
map PU |X that achieves L(X→Y). This is, however, not true in general. Suppose
PXY satisfies the following condition: there exists x? ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y,
PX|Y(x?|y) ≥ 1/2. Then, for any deterministic function f , f (x?) is always the opti-
mal choice for the adversary, with and without the observation of Y . The above
condition, however, is not sufficient for X and Y to be independent. That is, we
can construct PXY such that L(X→Y) > 0, whereas observing Y does not affect
the probability of guessing any deterministic function of X.
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2.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that PX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. To show that
L(X→Y) ≤ I∞(X;Y), consider any U satisfying U − X − Y . Let
L(X→Y)[U] = log
∑
y∈Ymaxu∈U PUY(u, y)
maxu∈U PU(u)
, (2.2)
so that L(X→Y) = supU:U−X−Y L(X→Y)[U]. Then,∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
PUY(u, y) =
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x) max
x′∈X
PY |X(y|x′)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x′∈X
PY |X(y|x′)
)
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) max
u∈U
PU(u).
Therefore, L(X→Y)[U] ≤ I∞(X;Y) for all PU |X, hence L(X→Y) ≤ I∞(X;Y).
For the reverse inequality, we construct a PU |X for which L(X → Y)[U] =
I∞(X;Y), which we will call the “shattering” PU |X. To that end, let p? =
minx∈X PX(x). For each x ∈ X, let k(x) = PX(x)/p?, and let U =⋃
x∈X{(x, 1), (x, 2), . . . , (x, dk(x)e)}. For each u = (iu, ju) ∈ U and x ∈ X, let PU |X(u|x)
be:
PU |X((iu, ju)|x) =

p?
PX(x)
, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
1 − (dk(x)e−1)p?PX(x) , iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu , x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
(2.3)
Remark 1 It is easy to check that if bk(x)c = dk(x)e, then the corresponding formulas
are equal.
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Then, for each ((iu, ju), x) ∈ U × X,
PUX((iu, ju), x) =

p?, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
PX(x)−(dk(x)e− 1)p?, iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu , x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
(2.4)
As mentioned earlier, the supports of PU |X=x are disjoint for distinct x’s, and each
x is effectively shattered into shards of probability p?. Now, note that
max
u∈U
PU(u) = max
(iu, ju)∈U
PUX((iu, ju), iu) = p?. (2.5)
Now, consider any (u, y) ∈ U × Y. We have
PUY((iu, ju), y) =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X((iu, ju)|x)PY |X(y|x) (2.6)
= PX(iu)PU |X((iu, ju)|iu)PY |X(y|iu) (2.7)
=

p?PY |X(y|iu), 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(iu)c,
(PX(x)−(dk(x)e− 1)p?)PY |X(y|iu), ju = dk(iu)e.
(2.8)
Then, for a given y ∈ Y,
max
(iu, ju)∈U
PUY((iu, ju), y) = max
(iu,1)∈U
p?PY |X(y|iu) = max
x∈X
p?PY |X(y|x). (2.9)
Finally, we get
L(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y)[U] = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x),
where the inequality follows from the definition, and the equality follows from
equations (2.2), (2.5), and (2.9). 
2.3 Robustness of Maximal Leakage
We consider two natural variations on the definition of maximal leakage. The
first allows the adversary multiple guesses, and the second allows for U’s that
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are continuous, in which case the adversary wants only to approximate U. In
both cases, the resulting metric is unchanged.
2.3.1 Multiple Guesses
The definition of maximal leakage (Definition 1) allowed the adversary one
guess. However, an adversary might be able to make several guesses in some
practical scenarios. For example, if the adversary is trying to guess a pass-
word U of some system, s/he can typically try several passwords before s/he is
locked out. We can modify the definition to allow for k guesses, for some integer
k, as follows.
Definition 2 (k-Maximal Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on finite alpha-
bets X and Y, and a positive integer k, the k-maximal leakage from X to Y is defined
as
L(k)(X→Y) = sup
U−X−Y−(Uˆi)ki=1
log
Pr
(∨k
i=1U = Uˆi
)
maxS⊆U
|S |≤k
PU(S )
.
Theorem 2 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabetsX andY, and any k ∈ N,
L(k)(X→Y) = L(X→Y).
Proof: To show L(k)(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y), we consider an arbitrary PU |X and
construct PV |X such that L(k)(X→Y)[V] = L(X→Y)[U]. In particular, for a given
PU |X and associated alphabetU, let
V =
⋃
u∈U
{(u, 1), (u, 2), . . . , (u, k)}, and PV |X(v|x) = PV |X((av, bv)|x) = PU |X(av|x)/k.
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Then, the probability of correctly guessing V with k guesses after observing Y is:
sup
X−Y−(Vˆi)ki=1
Pr(V = Vˆ1 ∨ · · · ∨ V = Vˆk) =
∑
y∈Y
max
v1,v2,...,vk
vi,v j,i, j
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
k∑
i=1
max
vi,v1,...,vi−1
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x)
(a)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
u
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x), (2.10)
where (a) follows by setting vi = (u?, i), where
u? = argmax
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x).
Now, note that (2.10) is simply the probability of guessing U correctly with a
single guess after observing Y . A similar argument shows that, with no Y ob-
servation, the probability of guessing V correctly with k guesses is equal to the
probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess, hence L(k)(X→Y)[V] =
L(X→Y)[U], which establishes L(k)(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y).
It remains to show L(X→Y) ≥ L(k)(X→Y). For any PV |X, we construct PU |X
such that L(X→Y)[U] = L(k)(X→Y)[V]. So let PV |X be given, with associated
alphabetV, and let ` , |V| ≥ k. Now, let
U = {S ⊂ V : |S | = k}, and PU |X(u|x) = c
∑
v∈u
PV |X(v|x),
where c = 1/
(
`−1
k−1
)
. Then, observing Y , the probability of guessing U correctly
with a single guess is
sup
X−Y−Uˆ
Pr(U = Uˆ) =
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
∑
v∈u
PV |X(v|x)PY |X(y|x)c
= c
∑
y∈Y
max
v1,v2,...,vk
vi,v j,i, j
∑
x∈X
k∑
i=1
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x),
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which is the probability, normalized by c, of guessing V correctly with k guesses
after observing Y . A similar argument shows that, with no Y observation, the
probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess is equal to the probability,
normalized by c, of guessing V correctly with k guesses, hence L(X→Y)[V] =
L(k)(X→Y)[U], which establishes L(X→Y) ≥ L(k)(X→Y). 
2.3.2 Approximate Guessing
We consider the case in which the adversary only needs the guess to be within a
certain distance of the true function value, according to a given distance metric.
As such, the random variable U, over which we are optimizing, now lives in a
given metric spaceU and is no longer restricted to be discrete. We call this mod-
ified measure maximal locational leakage. The term “locational” is motivated
by the scenario in which the variable of interest U is a geographical location.
Definition 3 (Maximal Locational Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on fi-
nite alphabets X and Y, and a metric space U (with its associated Borel σ-field), the
maximal locational leakage from X to Y is defined as
LU(X→Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y∃u:Pr(U∈B(u))>0
log
supuˆ(.) Pr(U ∈ B(uˆ(Y)))
supuˆ Pr(U ∈ B(uˆ))
, (2.11)
where B(u) is the closed unit ball centered at u ∈ U.
Theorem 3 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabetsX andY, and any metric
spaceU,
LU(X→Y) ≤ L(X→Y),
with equality ifU has a countably infinite subset S such that no pair of its elements can
be contained in a single unit ball.
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Proof: Consider any U and uˆ(Y) in the maximization of (2.11):
Pr(U ∈ B(uˆ(Y)) ≤
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
P(U ∈ B(u),Y = y)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
∑
x∈X
P(U ∈ B(u), X = x,Y = y)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
∑
x∈X
P(U ∈ B(u))P(X = x|U ∈ B(u))PY |X(y|x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
P(U ∈ B(u)) sup
x∈X
pY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
pY |X(y|x)
 sup
u∈U
P(U ∈ B(u)).
Therefore,
LU(X→Y) ≤ log
∑
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) = L(X→Y).
IfU satisfies the given condition (e.g.,U is unbounded), then exact guessing of
discrete functions can be simulated by choosing S to be the support of U. Hence
LU(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y), which implies the equality. 
2.4 Extensions
We extend the notion of maximal leakage in two ways. We generalize the for-
mula for maximal leakage, beyond the discrete case, to cover a larger class of
random variables, including point processes. Moreover, we investigate a con-
ditional version of the problem. That is, we consider the question: how much
does Y leak about X when Z is known?
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2.4.1 General Formula
Note that the definition of maximal leakage (Definition 1) is not restricted to
discrete X and Y , but Theorem 1 is. Moreover, the input and output of side-
channels is not necessarily discrete, as in the SSH and microarchitectural timing
channels in which the input is better modeled as a point process. Hence, a more
general form is needed.
Before stating the theorem, we introduce the following notation. For a given
probability distribution PX, and a measurable function f : X → R, we define the
essential supremum of f with respect to PX as follows:
ess-supPX f (x) = inf{α : PX({x : f (x) > α}) = 0}. (2.12)
Equivalently,
ess-supPX f (x) = sup{β : PX({x : f (x) > β}) > 0}. (2.13)
To verify the equivalence, let A be the set on the right-hand side of (2.12) with
a = inf A, and B be the set on the right-hand side of (2.13) with b = sup B. It
follows immediately from the definitions of the sets that a ≥ b. Now consider
r > b. Then, r < B ⇒ PX({x : f (x) > r}) = 0 ⇒ r ∈ A ⇒ r ≥ a. As such,
r > b⇒ r ≥ a, which implies b ≥ a. Hence, a = b.
Theorem 4 Let (X × Y, σXY , PXY) be a probability space with associated probability
spaces (X, σX, PX) and (Y, σY , PY).
1. If PXY  PX × PY and σX is generated by a countable set, then
L(X→Y) = log
∫
Y
ess-supPX f (x, y)PY(dy), (2.14)
where f (x, y) = dPXYd(PX×PY ) (x, y).
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2. If absolute continuity fails, then L(X→Y) = +∞.
We defer the proof to the end of the section and discuss some implications and
examples of the theorem. As in the discrete case, the general formula satisfies
the desirable properties of a leakage measure, and is lower-bounded by I(X;Y).
Corollary 3 Let (X × Y, σXY , PXY) be a probability space with associated probability
spaces (X, σX, PX) and (Y, σY , PY). Assume PXY  PX × PY and σX is generated by a
countable set. Then,
1. (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds for a random
variable Z, then L(X→Z) ≤ min{L(X→Y),L(Y→Z)}.
2. L(X→Y) ≥ I(X;Y).
3. L(X→Y) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
4. (Additivity) If {(Xi,Yi)}ni=1 are mutually independent, then
L(Xn1→Yn1 ) =
n∑
i=1
L(Xi→Yi).
Proof: The data processing inequality follows directly from the definition (as
shown in Lemma 1 below). To verify 2), consider the following.
I(X;Y) = E[log f (X,Y)]
(a)≤ logE[ f (X,Y)]
= log
∫
Y
∫
X
f 2(x, y)PX(dx)PY(dy)
≤ log
∫
Y
(ess-supPX f (x, y))
∫
X
f (x, y)PX(dx)PY(dy)
(b)
= L(X→Y),
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) follows from the fact∫
X f (x, y)PX(dx) = 1. 3) follows from the definition and 2). 4) follows from the fact
that, if (X1,Y1) is independent of (X2,Y2), then f (x1, x2, y1, y2) = f (x1, y1) f (x2, y2).

Note that Theorem 4 cover all the combinations of discrete, countable, or con-
tinuous random variables X and Y .
Corollary 4 If X and Y are jointly continuous real random variables,
L(X→Y) = log
∫
R
sup
x:pX(x)>0
pY |X(y|x)dy, (2.15)
where pX and pY |X(.|.) are the marginal pdf of X and the conditional pdf of Y given X,
respectively.
Example 4 If X and Y are jointly Gaussian, then
L(X→Y) =

0, if X and Y are independent,
+∞, otherwise.
Example 5 Suppose X is real and its pdf satisfies pX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R. Let Y = X+Z,
where Z is a continuous real random variable independent of X. Let z0 = argmax pZ(z).
Then,
L(X→Y) = log
∫
R
sup
x∈R
pY |X(y|x)dy = log
∫
R
sup
x
pZ(y − x)dy = log
∫
R
pZ(z0)dy = +∞.
The above examples suggest that “adding independent noise” is not necessarily
secure in the maximal leakage sense. A similar phenomenon will be seen in the
context of the Shannon cipher system (cf. Section 4.5), in which quantization
arises as an optimal mechanism, whereas memorylessly adding noise is shown
to be strictly suboptimal. The following example further illustrates the point.
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Example 6 Fix T ∈ R+. Let ΩT be the set of all counting functions on [0,T ] and let
{Ft}Tt=0 be the filtration over ΩT generated by the mapping ω 7→ ωt. Let XT0 be a Poisson
process of rate λ. Let YT0 be the output of an (initially empty) exponential server queue
with rate µ and input XT0 . Then,
1
T
L(XT0→YT0 ) = µ.
Proof: Let P0 be the probability measure on (ΩT ,FT ) under which the output is
distributed as a Poisson process of rate one. It is known that, for (x, y) ∈ ΩT ×ΩT ,
dPXY
dPX × P0 (x, y) = exp
[∫ T
0
log(µI(xt > yt−))dyt +
∫ T
0
(1 − µI(xt > yt))dt
]
=: L(x, y).
Now, note that,
dPXY
dPX × PY dPY =
dPXY
dPX × PY
dPX × P0
dPX × P0
dPY
dP0
dP0 = LdP0,
so that
L(XT0→YT0 ) =
∫
ΩT
ess-supPXL(x, y)P0(dy).
It is easy to check that the first term in L(x, y) is equal to yT log µ, and the second term
can be made arbitrarily close to T under the sup. By noting that yT is distributed as
Poi(T ) under P0, we get
1
T
L(XT0→YT0 ) =
1
T
log
∫
ΩT
exp
[
yT log µ + T
]
P0(dy) =
1
T
log exp[T (elog µ − 1) + T ] = µ.

Proof of Theorem 4: Proof of 1): To show that the left-hand side upper-
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bounds the right-hand side, fix any PU |X, and consider the following
sup
Uˆ(Y)
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)) =
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)PXY(dxdy)
=
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x) f (x, y)PX(dx)PY(dy)
≤
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)(sup
PX
f (x, y))PX(dx)PY(dy)
=
∫
Y
(sup
PX
f (x, y))
(
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)PX(dx)
)
PY(dy)
= (max
u∈U
PU(u))
∫
Y
(sup
PX
f (x, y))PY(dy).
To show the reverse direction, we will show it first for discrete X, and ex-
tend the result by discretizing more general X’s. The argument uses the data
processing inequality, which we need to prove at the outset.
Lemma 1 If the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds, then L(X → Z) ≤
min{L(X→Y),L(Y→Z)}.
Proof: Consider any U such that U − X − Z holds. Then, by marginalizing over
X, we can construct V such that V − Y − Z holds and PUZ = PVZ. Hence, L(X→
Z) ≤ L(Y→Z). Moreover, we can construct W such that W − X − Y − Z holds and
PWXZ = PUXZ. Clearly, Pr(W = Wˆ(Y)) ≥ Pr(W = Wˆ(Z)). Since Pr(W = Wˆ(Z)) =
Pr(U = Uˆ(Z)), we get L(X→Z) ≤ L(X→Y). 
Now, suppose X has finite alphabet. Note that, in this case, σ(X) is gen-
erated by a finite set, and PXY  PX × PY since I(X;Y) ≤ H(X) < ∞. With-
out loss of generality, suppose X has full support. Consider the “shattering”
PU |X. Recall: p? = minx∈X PX(x). For each x ∈ X, let k(x) = PX(x)/p?, and let
U = ⋃x∈X{(x, 1), (x, 2), . . . , (x, dk(x)e)}. For each u = (iu, ju) ∈ U and x ∈ X, let
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PU |X(u|x) be:
PU |X((iu, ju)|x) =

p?
PX(x)
, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
1 − (dk(x)e−1)p?PX(x) , iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu , x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
Then,
sup
Uˆ(Y)
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)) =
∫
Y
max
(iu, ju)∈U
∑
x∈X
PU |X((iu, ju)|x) f (x, y)PX(x)PY(dy)
=
∫
Y
max
(iu,1)∈U
p? f (iu, y)PY(dy)
= p?
∫
Y
max
x∈X
f (x, y)PY(dy).
The proof for the discrete case is completed by noticing that p? = maxu PU(u).
Now, consider the more general case. Let {An}∞n=1 be a countable collection
of sets generating σ(X). We will prove the result by considering a series of dis-
cretizations of X, each of which is a refinement of the previous one. To that end,
let Sn be a collection of sets such that
σ(Sn) = σ
 n⋃
i=1
Ai
 , and for all S i, S j ∈ Sn, i , j, S i ∩ S j = ∅.
In particular, every finite sigma algebra is generated by a finite partition. So let
Sn be the finite partition generating σ(∪ni=1Ai). It can be readily verified that Sn+1
is a refinement of Sn. Let Nn = |Sn|, Sn = {S n,1, S n,2, · · · , S n,Nn}, and define
Un(X) =
Nn∑
i=1
i I{X ∈ S n,i}.
Then, we get L(X → Y) ≥ L(Un → Y) since Un − X −Y is a Markov chain, and the
data processing inequality holds by Lemma 1. By the previous result for finite
X, we get
L(Un → Y) = log
∫
Y
sup
u:PUn (un)>0
fn(un, y)PY(dy),
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where fn(un, y) =
dPUnY
d(PUn×PY ) . We need to find fn(un, y). Let A ⊆ Un × Y, then
PUn,Y(A) =
∫
Y
∑
un
I{(un, y) ∈ A}
∫
X
PUn |X(un|x) f (x, y)PX(dx)PY(dy)
=
∫
Y
∑
un
I{(un, y) ∈ A}
(∫
S n,un
f (x, y)PX(dx)
)
PY(dy)
=
∫
Y
∑
un:PUn (un)>0
I{(un, y) ∈ A}

∫
S n,un
f (x, y)PX(dx)∫
S n,un
PX(dx)
 PUn(un)PY(dy),
so that
fn(un, y) =
∫
S n,un
f (x, y)PX(dx)∫
S n,un
PX(dx)
.
Let S n(x) be the set in Sn containing x. Then, we can view fn(un, y) as a function
of (x, y):
fn(x, y) =
∫
S n(x)
f (x, y)PX(dx)∫
S n(x)
PX(dx)
.
We can rewrite fn(x, y) = E[ f (X, y)|X ∈ S n(x)], so that
fn(X, y) = E[ f (X, y)|σ(Sn)]. (2.16)
Since Sn’s are refinements, then fn(X, y) is a martingale process, and it follows by
Levy’s upward Theorem [56, Theorem 14.2] that
fn(X, y)
a.s.→ E [ f (X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Si)] . (2.17)
Then,
E
[
f (X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Si)] = E [ f (X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Ai)] = E [ f (X, y)|σ (X)] a.s.= f (X, y). (2.18)
Moreover,
L(X → Y) ≥ lim
n→∞L(Un → Y) = limn→∞ log
∫
Y
sup
u:PUn (un)>0
fn(un, y)PY(dy) (2.19)
= lim
n→∞ log
∫
Y
sup
x:PX(S n(x))>0
fn(x, y)PY(dy). (2.20)
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Since Sn+1 is a refinement of Sn, the integrand is increasing. Therefore, by the
monotone convergence theorem,
L(X → Y) ≥ log
∫
Y
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(S n(x))>0
fn(x, y)PY(dy). (2.21)
Then, it remains to show that
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(S n(x))>0
fn(x, y) ≥ ess-supPX f (x, y). (2.22)
To that end, let B = {N : PX( f (X, y) > N) > 0}. Consider r ∈ B and let Er = {x :
f (x, y) > r}. Then, PX(Er) > 0. Therefore, by (2.17) and (2.18), fn(X, y) converges
almost everywhere to f (X, y) on Er. By Egoroff’s Theorem [5, Theorem 7.12],
for every δ > 0, there exists E′δ such that fn converges uniformly to f on Er\E′δ.
Call the latter set Er\δ. So fix δ > 0 small such that PX(Er\δ) > 0. For each n, let
Sn(Er\δ) be a collection of sets inSn satisfying: ∪S∈Sn(Er\δ) ⊇ Er\δ and S ∈ Sn(Er\δ)⇒
S ∩ Er\δ , ∅. Then there must exist S ∈ Sn(Er\δ) satisfying P(S ) > 0. Denote the
latter set by S n(Er\δ). Hence,
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(S n(x))>0
fn(x, y)
(a)≥ lim
n→∞ supx∈S n(Er\δ)
fn(x, y) (2.23)
(b)≥ lim
n→∞ infx∈Er\δ
fn(x, y) (2.24)
(c)
= inf
x∈Er\δ
f (x, y) (2.25)
≥ r, (2.26)
where (a) follows from the fact that PX(S n(Er\δ) > 0, (b) follows from the fact that
S n(Er\δ)∩Er\δ , ∅, and (c) follows from the fact that fn(x, y) converges uniformly
to f on Er\δ. Finally, since r was chosen arbitrarily from B, we get
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(S n(x))>0
fn(x, y) ≥ sup B = ess-supPX f (x, y), (2.27)
as desired. 
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Proof of 2): Note that if absolute continuity does not hold, I(X;Y) = +∞.
Then, there exists a sequence of discretizations (Xn,Yn) such that I(Xn;Yn)→ +∞.
The result then follows by noting that L(X → Y) ≥ L(Xn → Yn) ≥ I(Xn;Yn). 
2.4.2 Conditional Maximal Leakage
We consider a natural extension of maximal leakage. In particular, how much
does Y leak about X when Z is known? We define conditional maximal leakage
analogously to Definition 1.
Definition 4 (Conditional Maximal Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXYZ on
alphabets X, Y and Z, the conditional maximal leakage from X to Y given Z is
defined as
L(X→Y |Z) = sup
U:U−X−Y |Z
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
, (2.28)
where U takes values in a finite, but arbitrary, alphabet, and Uˆ(Y,Z) and U˜(Z) are the
optimal (i.e., MAP) estimators of U given (Y,Z) and Z, respectively.
Remark 2 The Markov chain U − X − Y |Z is equivalent to U − (X,Z) − Y .
In the remainder, assume, without loss of generality, that X and Z have full
support.
Theorem 5 Given a joint distribution PXYZ on finite alphabets X, Y and Z, the con-
ditional maximal leakage from X to Y given Z is given by
L(X→Y |Z) = log
maxz ∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)
 . (2.29)
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In other terms, L(X→Y |Z) = maxzL(X→Y |Z = z), where the latter term is
interpreted as the unconditional maximal leakage evaluated with respect to the
joint PXY |Z=z.
Proof: To show that the left-hand side is upper-bounded by the right-hand
side, fix PU |XZ and consider the following.
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
=
∑
z p(z)
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z)∑
z p(z) maxu p(u|z) ≤ maxz
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z)
maxu p(u|z) .
Then, by noting that term being maximized is exp{L(X→Y |Z = z)}, we get
sup
U:U−(X,Z)−Y
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
≤ max
z
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z).
To get the lower bound, let n = 1/n for n ∈ N, z? ∈ argmax∑ymaxx:PX|Z (x|z)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z),
and p? = minx:p(x|z?)>0 p(x|z?). Construct PU |XZ as follows. If Z = z?, then PU |X,Z=z?
is the “shattering” conditional with respect to the distribution PX|Z=z? . If Z , z?,
then U ∼ Uni f ([n]), independently of X. We get
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
=
∑
z,z? p(z)
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z) + p(z?)∑y p(y|z?) maxu p(u|y, z?)∑
z,z? p(z) maxu p(u|z) + p(z?) maxu p(u|z?)
=
∑
z,z? p(z)n + p(z?)p?
∑
ymaxx:PX|Z (x|z?)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z?)∑
z,z? p(z)n + p(z?)p?
=
(1 − p(z?))n + p(z?)p? ∑ymaxx:PX|Z (x|z?)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z?)
(1 − p(z?))n + p(z?)p?
Letting n→ ∞ (i.e., n → 0) yields our lower bound. 
The following corollary summarizes important properties of conditional
maximal leakage.
Corollary 5 Given a joint distribution PXYZ on finite alphabets X, Y andZ,
1. (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X−Y−V |Z holds for a discrete
random variable V , then L(X→V |Z) ≤ min{L(X→Y |Z),L(Y→V |Z)}.
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2. L(X→Y |Z) ≤ min{log |X|, log |Y|}.
3. L(X→Y |Z) ≥ I(X;Y |Z).
4. L(X→Y |Z) = 0 iff X − Z − Y holds.
5. L(X→Y |Z) is not symmetric in X and Y .
6. (Additivity) If {(Xi,Yi,Zi)}`i=1 are mutually independent, then
L(X`1→Y`1 |Z`) =
∑`
i=1
L(Xi→Yi|Zi).
7. If Z − X − Y holds, then
L(X→Y |Z) ≤ L(X→Y),
with equality if, for some z, the support of PX|Z=z is the same as the support of PX.
8. L(X→(Y,Z)) ≤ L(X→Z) +L(X→Y |Z).
Similarly to maximal leakage, properties 1), 2), 4) and 6) can be seen as ax-
iomatic for a conditional leakage metric. Property 3) is analogous to the re-
lationship between maximal leakage and mutual information. Property 7) is
interesting in that it exhibits a behavior similar to mutual information. Indeed,
if Z − X − Y holds, then I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y). Property 8) is a form of a chain
rule. An interesting consequence of 7) and 8) is that: if Z − X − Y holds, then
L(X→ (Y,Z)) ≤ L(X→Z) + L(X→Y). This can be interpreted as follows. If an
adversary has access to side information Z, which is not known to us (which is
the case in practice), then minimizing L(X→Y) (irrespective of Z) is the right
objective.
Proofs: Property 1) follow directly from the definition. Property 2) follows
from Theorems 1 and 5. Property 4) and 6) also follow straightforwardly from
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the theorem.
Proof of 3): I(X;Y |Z) ≤ maxz I(X;Y |Z = z) ≤ maxzL(X→Y |Z = z) = L(X→Y |Z). 
Proof of 7):
L(X→Y |Z) = log
maxz ∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)

= log
maxz ∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |X(y|x)

≤ log
∑
y
max
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
 = L(X→Y),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that supp(X) ⊇ supp(X|Z = z) for
any z. 
Proof of 8):
L(X→(Y,Z)) − L(X→Z) = log
∑
z,ymaxx:PX(x)>0 PYZ|X(y, z|x)∑
zmaxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
≤ logmax
z
∑
ymaxx:PX(x)>0 PYZ|X(y, z|x)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
= logmax
z
∑
ymaxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)PY |XZ(y|x, z)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
(a)
= logmax
z
∑
ymaxx:PX|Z (x|z)>0 PZ|X(z|x)PY |XZ(y|x, z)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
= logmax
z
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z) PZ|X(z|x)maxx′:PX(x′)>0 PZ|X(z|x′)
≤ logmax
z
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z (x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z) = L(X→Y |Z),
where (a) follows from the fact that PX|Z(x|z) = 0 and PZ(z) > 0 implies that
PZ|X(z|x) = 0, so that the maximum is achieved outside this set. 
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CHAPTER 3
LEAKAGE METRICS IN THE GUESSING FRAMEWORK
In the following, we investigate the connections between maximal leakage
and mutual information, maximal correlation, and local differential privacy in
the guessing framework. The analysis will naturally lead us to define an infor-
mation metric that is intermediate between maximal leakage and local differen-
tial privacy, which we call maximal realizable leakage (cf. Section 3.3). More-
over, we introduce a “cost”-based notion of leakage in Section 3.5. Finally, we
analyze rate-distortion based metrics in the guessing framework.
3.1 Mutual Information and Capacity
Shannon justifies the choice of mutual information by arguing that “From the
point of view of the cryptanalyst [i.e., the adversary], a secrecy system is almost
identical with a noisy communication system” [43]. This argument is not per-
suasive, however, because a noisy communication system (the rate of which is
governed by mutual information) relies on coding, of which there is generally
none in the leakage setting. One could argue that Shannon is simply taking a
“pessimistic” view by upper-bounding leakage by assuming that the transmit-
ter is a cooperative participant and thus willing to code. However, as mentioned
before, the key observation is that coding is concerned with (the size of) mes-
sage sets that can be reliably reconstructed at the receiver, whereas leakage does
not impose such a constraint. This inspires the following definition.
Definition 5 (Recoverable Leakage) Given  > 0 and a joint distribution PXY on
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finite alphabets X and Y, the recoverable leakage from X to Y is defined as
LC (X→Y) = sup
(U,X):U−X−Y
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y))
maxu PU(u)
, (3.1)
where the support of U is finite but of arbitrary size, and Uˆ(Y) is the MAP estimator.
Remark 3 LC (X→Y) depends on PXY only through PY |X.
Theorem 6 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
LC (Xn→Yn) = C(PY |X), (3.2)
where (Xn,Yn) is distributed i.i.d according to PXY , and C(PY |X) is the capacity of the
channel PY |X.
To compare with maximal leakage, say X has full support. Then,
L(X→Y) (a)= lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
L(Xn→Yn)
(b)
= lim
→0
lim
n→∞ sup(U,Xn):
U−Xn−Yn
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y))
maxu PU(u)
≥ lim
→0
lim
n→∞ sup(U,Xn):
U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y))
maxu PU(u)
= C(PY |X),
where (a) follows from the additivity of maximal leakage, and (b) follows from
the fact that L(X→Y) depends on PX only through its support. One can readily
verify that the inequality can be strict.
Example 7 Say X ∼ Ber(p), p ∈ (0, 12 ). If Y is the output of a BEC() ( ∈ (0, 1)) with
input X, then L(X→Y) = log(2 − ) > (1 − ) log 2 = C(PY |X).
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Proof of Theorem 6: To show that the left-hand side upper-bounds the
right-hand side, consider
LC (Xn→Yn) = sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y))
maxu PU(u)
≥ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
U∼uniform
log |U|+log(1 − ). (3.3)
Note that the right-hand side of the above equation is exactly the channel coding
setup: U is the uniform message, PXn |U is the (stochastic) encoding map, PY |X is
the memoryless channel, and  is the allowed average probability of decoding
error. Therefore, for any δ > 0, any U with |U| < 2n(C−δ) is feasible for large
enough n, yielding the lower bound. For the reverse direction, consider the
following.
LC (Xn→Yn) = sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y))
maxu PU(u)
≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
log
1
2−H∞(PU )
= sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
H∞(PU)
(a)≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
I(U; Uˆ) + 1
Pr(U = Uˆ)
≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Yn
Pr(U=Uˆ(Yn))≥1−
nC(PY |X) + 1
1 −  ,
where (a) follows from [21, Theorem 5]. Taking the limit as n → ∞ and  → 0
yields the upper bound. 
Clearly, if C(PY |X) underestimates leakage, then so does I(X;Y). Neverthe-
less, one might ask: under what conditions are maximal leakage and mutual
information equal? The answer is given by the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 L(X→Y)= I(X;Y) if and only if
1. If PXY(x, y) > 0 and PXY(x′, y) > 0, then PY |X(y|x) = PY |X(y|x′).
2. For all y, y′ ∈ supp(Y),
∑
x:PXY (x,y)>0
PX(x) =
∑
x′:PXY (x′,y′)>0
PX(x′).
Remark 4 If X has full support, then L(X→Y) = I(X;Y)⇒ L(X→Y) = C(PY |X).
Proof: Consider the following chain of inequalities.
I(X;Y)
=
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
PXY(x, y) log
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
=
∑
x∈X,y∈Y:
PX(x)PY (y)>0
PXY(x, y) log
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
(a)≤ log
∑
x∈X,y∈Y:
PX(x)PY (y)>0
PXY(x, y)
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
= log
∑
x∈X,y∈Y:
PX(x)PY (y)>0
PX|Y(x|y)PY |X(y|x)
(b)≤ log
∑
x∈X,y∈Y:
PX(x)PY (y)>0
PX|Y(x|y) max
x′∈X:
PX(x′)>0
PY |X(y|x′)
= log
∑
y∈Y:
PY (y)>0
max
x∈X:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
(c)
= log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x) = L(X→Y),
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (c) follows from the fact that
PY(y) = 0 implies that maxx∈X:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x) = 0.Now, note that (b) can be turned
into equality if and only if condition 1) holds. Given condition 1), it can be
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seen that condition 2) is necessary and sufficient for (a) to become equality (by
expanding PY(y) =
∑
x:PXY (x,y)>0 PX(x)PY |X(y|x)).
3.2 Maximal Correlation
Recall that, given a joint distribution PXY , maximal correlation ρm(X;Y) is de-
fined as
ρm(X;Y) = sup
f ,g:
E[ f ]=E[g]=0
E[ f 2]=E[g2]=1
E[ f (X)g(Y)]. (3.4)
Li and El-Gamal [29] proposed maximal correlation as a secrecy metric. A
main motivation for such choice is the result of Calmon et al. [8], which bounds
in terms of ρm(X;Y) the additive increase in the probability of correctly guessing
any deterministic function of X, assuming X is uniformly distributed. We posit
that maximal correlation is actually capturing the change in variance. That is,
we define variance leakage as follows.
Definition 6 (Variance Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and
Y, the variance leakage from X to Y is defined as
Lv(X→Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y
var(U)>0
log
var(U)
E[(U − E[U |Y])2] . (3.5)
Theorem 7 For any joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y, the variance leakage
from X to Y is given by
Lv(X→Y) = − log(1 − ρ2m(X;Y)), (3.6)
where ρm(X;Y) is the maximal correlation.
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As such, maximal correlation is capturing the multiplicative decrease in vari-
ance. If the U of interest is discrete, which is often the case in practice (e.g., U is
a password, a social security number, etc.), the probability of correct guessing is
arguably the more relevant quantity.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we can restrict the optimization in (3.5) to
U’s that satisfy E[U] = 0, and E[U2] = 1. So, we rewrite
Lv(X→Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y
E[U]=0, E[U2]=1
log
1
E[U2] − E[E[U |Y]2]
= sup
U:U−X−Y
E[U]=0, E[U2]=1
− log
(
1 − E
[
E[U |Y]2
])
. (3.7)
Also, we can rewrite maximal correlation using Renyi’s equivalent characteri-
zation [36]:
ρm(X;Y) = sup
f :E[ f (X)]=0
E[ f 2(X)]=1
√
E
[
E[ f (X)|Y]2]. (3.8)
Now, note that
ρ2m(X;Y) = sup
f : E[ f ]=0, E[ f 2]=1
E
[
E[ f (X)|Y]2
]
(a)≤ sup
U:U−X−Y
E[U]=0, E[U2]=1
E
[
E[U |Y]2
]
≤ sup
U:U−X−Y
E[U]=0, E[U2]=1
sup
h: E[h(U)]=0,
E[h2(U)]=1
E
[
E[h(U)|Y]2
]
= sup
U:U−X−Y
E[U]=0, E[U2]=1
ρ2m(U;Y)
(b)≤ ρ2m(X;Y), (3.9)
where (b) follows from the fact that maximal correlation obeys the data process-
ing inequality [8, Theorem 2]. Therefore (a) is in fact an equality. Plugging it
in (3.7) yields our desired result. 
41
3.3 Maximal Realizable Leakage
We now consider a variation of the definition of maximal leakage, which cap-
tures a different scenario of interest. It will be also useful for interpreting local
differential privacy in the guessing framework (cf. Section 3.4).
In particular, maximal leakage considers the average guessing performance of
the adversary, Pr(U = Uˆ(Y)), for each U satisfying U−X−Y . As such, realizations
y of Y that lead to a high probability of correct guessing are “tolerable” if the
corresponding probabilities PY(y)’s are very small. For scenarios in which such
small probability events are still unacceptable (e.g., U is highly classified data),
we need to consider the maximum instead of the average performance. This
leads to the following definition.
Definition 7 (Maximal Realizable Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on fi-
nite alphabets X and Y, the maximal realizable leakage from X to Y is defined as
Lr(X→Y)= sup
U−X−Y
log
maxy∈Ymaxu∈U PU |Y(u|y)
maxu∈U PU(u)
, (3.10)
where the support U is finite but of arbitrary size.
Theorem 8 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y, the maximal
realizable leakage from X to Y is given by
Lr(X→Y) = max
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x,y)>0
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
. (3.11)
As opposed to maximal leakage, maximal realizable leakage is symmetric
in X and Y (since PY |X(y|x)/PY(y) = PX|Y(x|y)/PX(x)). It is equal to the maxi-
mum information rate (the latter is the random variable the expectation of which
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is mutual information). It follows straightforwardly from the definitions that
Lr(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y). Moreover, Lr(X→Y) cannot be bounded in terms of |X| and
|Y|: in Example 7, Lr(X→Y) = log(1/p) p→0−−−→ ∞.
Furthermore, Lr(X→Y) exhibits desirable properties of a leakage metric: it
satisfies the data processing inequality, it is zero if and only X and Y are inde-
pendent, and it is additive over independent pairs {(Xi,Yi)}. The proofs of these
facts are similar to previous derivations and are omitted.
Remark 5 The fact that using the max in (3.10) and the average in (2.1) both lead
to quantities with desirable properties suggests that we could also consider weighted
averages, i.e., replace the numerator by
(∑
y PY(y) maxu PαU |Y(u|y)
)1/α
, for some α > 0.
Proof of Theorem 8: Without loss of generality, assume X and Y have full
support. To show the upper bound, consider the following.
max
y∈Y
max
u∈U
PU |Y(u|y) = max
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PU |X(u|x)PX|Y(x|y)
= max
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PU |X(u|x)PX(x)PY |X(y|x)PY(y)
≤ max
y∈Y
max
x′∈X
PY |X(y|x′)
PY(y)
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PUX(u, x)
= max
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
max
u∈U
PU(u).
For the reverse direction, we again consider the shattering PU |X (cf. equa-
tion 2.3). It is a simple exercise to check that this choice yields the desired lower
bound. 
43
3.4 Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy [13] adapts that notion to the setting of a given condi-
tional distribution PY |X. It is defined as:
Ldp(X→Y) = max
y∈Y,
x,x′∈X
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x′) . (3.12)
Local differential privacy is known to be pessimistic [13]. It is indeed very strict:
in Example 7, Ldp(X→Y) = ∞. Interestingly, we also noted in the previous section
that limp→0Lr(X→Y) = ∞.
So what operational problem is local differential privacy solving? Simi-
larly to maximal realizable leakage, local differential privacy is concerned with
worst-case analysis over the realizations of Y . Moreover, being a function of PY |X,
it is robust against the worst-case distribution PX. This yields the following def-
inition.
Definition 8 Given a conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y, where X and Y are
finite alphabets, let
Ldp(X→Y) = sup
PX
sup
U−X−Y
log
maxymaxuPU |Y(u|y)
maxu PU(u)
= sup
PX
Lr(X→Y). (3.13)
Theorem 9 For any conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y, where X and Y are
finite alphabets,
Ldp(X→Y) = Ldp(X→Y). (3.14)
Clearly, Ldp(X → Y) ≥ Lr(X → Y) ≥ L(X→Y). Theorems 8 and 9 imply
that Ldp(X → Y) = Lr(X→Y) if and only if X and Y are independent. Thus,
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Ldp(X→Y) = L(X→Y) if and only if X and Y are independent. Moreover, an
interesting implication of (3.13) is that one could incorporate information about
the marginal PX by restricting the optimization set of the sup.
Proof: By Theorem 8, we can rewrite (3.13) as
Ldp(X→Y) = sup
PX
max
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x,y)>0
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
.
The upper bound thus follows from the fact that PY(y) ≥ minx PY |X(y|x). For the
lower bound, consider the following. Let y? be an element achieving the max
in (3.12). Let x0 ∈ argminx PY |X(y?|x) and x1 ∈ argmaxx PY |X(y?|x). Finally, for a
given α > 0, let PX(x0) = 1 − α and PX(x1) = α. Then,
Ldp(X→Y) ≥ log maxx PY |X(y
?|x)
PY(y?)
= log
PY |X(y?|x1)
(1 − α)PY |X(y?|x0) + αPY |X(y?|x1)
α→0−−−→ log PY |X(y
?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0) = L
dp(X→Y). 
We also provide another equivalent definition of local differential privacy.
More specifically, for any given U : U − X − Y , maximal leakage compares the
average probabilities of correct guessing before and after observing Y . Another
approach would be to compare, for each y, the performance of an adversary
who sees y and thus acts according to PU |Y(u|y), and another who doesn’t see y
and thus acts according to PU(u). Let u? = argmaxu PU(u) (suppose it is unique,
for now). So for each y, we are interested in
maxu PU |Y(u|y)
PU |Y(u?|y) . (3.15)
If u? is not unique, then we reformulate as follows. Let U? = argmaxu PU(u). We
give the informed adversary maximum advantage by considering
maxu PU |Y(u|y)
minu∈U? PU |Y(u|y) . (3.16)
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We also consider the best case for the informed adversary over y, yielding the
following definition.
Definition 9 For any joint distribution PXY , define
Ldi f f (X → Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y
logmax
y
maxu PU |Y(u|y)
minu∈U? PU |Y(u|y) . (3.17)
Theorem 10 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y,
Ldi f f (X → Y) = logmax
y,x,x′
PY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x′) . (3.18)
Proof:
To show that the left-hand side is upper-bounded by by the right-hand side,
fix any U satisfying U − X − Y , and fix y ∈ Y. Then,
maxu PU |Y(u|y)
minu∈U? PU |Y(u|y) =
maxu
∑
x PU |X(u|x)PX|Y(x|y)
minu∈U?
∑
x PU |X(u|x)PX|Y(x|y) =
maxu
∑
x PU |X(u|x)PXY(x, y)
minu∈U?
∑
x PU |X(u|x)PXY(x, y)
=
maxu
∑
x PUX(u, x)PY |X(y|x)
minu∈U?
∑
x PUX(u, x)PY |X(y|x)
≤
(
maxx PY |X(y|x))maxu ∑x PUX(u, x)(
minx PY |X(y|x))minu∈U? ∑x PUX(u, x) = maxx,x′ PY |X(y|x)PY |X(y|x′) .
For the reverse direction, consider the “shattering” PU |X, given by (2.3). Now,
note that, for a given y
PU |Y((iu, ju)|y) =
∑
x
PX|Y(x|y)PU |X((iu, ju)|x)
= PX|Y(iu|y)PU |X((iu, ju)|iu)
= PX|Y(iu|y).

p?
PX(iu)
, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(iu)c,
1 − (dk(iu)e−1)p?PX(iu) , ju = dk(iu)e.
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Therefore,
max
u
PU |Y((iu, ju)|y) = max
(iu,1)
PX|Y(iu|y) p
?
PX(iu)
= max
x
p?PX|Y(x|y)
PX(x)
= max
x
p?PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
.
(3.19)
Furthermore, U? =
⋃
x∈X{(x, 1), (x, 2), . . . , (x, bk(x)c)}. Therefore,
min
u∈U?
PU |Y((iu, ju)|y) = min
(iu,1≤ j≤bk(iu)c)
PX|Y(iu|y) p
?
PX(iu)
= min
x
p?PX|Y(x|y)
PX(x)
= min
x
p?PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
.
(3.20)
Combining (3.19) and (3.20), we get, for a given y,
maxu PU |Y(u|y)
minu∈U? PU |Y(u|y) =
maxx PY |X(y|x)
minx PY |X(y|x) = maxx,x′
PY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x′) , (3.21)
as desired. 
3.5 Maximal Cost Leakage
In this section, we introduce a leakage metric that is dual to maximal leak-
age. Whereas maximal leakage considers the maximum gain that the adversary
achieves, we could alternatively consider the maximum reduction in cost s/he
incurs.
Definition 10 (Maximal Cost Leakage) Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets
X and Y, the maximal cost leakage from X to Y is defined as
Lc(X→Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y
Uˆ, d:Uˆ×U→R+
log
inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)]
infUˆ:X−Y−Uˆ E[d(U, Uˆ)]
, (3.22)
where Uˆ is a finite alphabet, and 00 = 1 by convention.
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Maximal cost leakage also admits a simple form for discrete X and Y , given
in the following theorem. We defer the proof to Appendix A.1.
Theorem 11 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y, the maximal
cost leakage from X to Y is given by
Lc(X→Y) = − log
∑
y∈Y
min
x∈X:
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x). (3.23)
The following corollary, the proof of which is given in Appendix A.2, sum-
marize useful properties of Lc(X→Y).
Corollary 6 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y,
1. (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds for a discrete
random variable Z, then Lc(X→Z) ≤ min{Lc(X→Y),Lc(Y→Z)}.
2. For any non-trivial deterministic law PY |X (i.e., |{y : PY(y) > 0}| > 1), Lc(Y→
X) = +∞.
3. Lc(X→Y) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
4. Lc(X→Y) ≤ Ldp(X→Y).
5. Lc(X→Y) is not symmetric in X and Y .
6. (Additivity) If {(Xi,Yi)}`i=1 are mutually independent, then
Lc(X`1→Y`1) =
∑`
i=1
Lc(Xi→Yi).
7. Lc(X→Y) is convex in PY |X for fixed PX.
We evaluate Lc(X→Y) for some examples.
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Example 8 If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BSC with input X and
parameter p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, then Lc(X→Y) = − log(2p).
Example 9 If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BEC with input X and
parameter , 0 ≤  < 1, then Lc(X→Y) = − log(), and Lc(Y→X) = +∞.
Example 10 If X is not deterministic, Lc(X→X) = +∞.
Remark 6 One can note that in each of the examples above,Lc(X→Y) ≥ L(X→Y). This
is always true when |X| = |Y| = 2, but it is not necessarily true in general. As a counter
example, say X has full support and PY |X =

0.2 0.5 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.3
0.2 0.4 0.4
. Then exp{L(X→Y)} = 1.2
and exp{L(X→Y)} = 1/0.9 = 1.1¯.
Maximal Realizable Cost
Similarly to the modification of maximal leakage to maximal realizable leakage,
we could consider the minimum cost incurred at the adversary, instead of the
average cost. We show next that this yields the maximum of the negative of
the information rate. Maximizing it over the input distribution also yields local
differential privacy.
Definition 11 (Maximal Realizable Cost) Given a joint distribution PXY on alpha-
bets X and Y, the maximal realizable cost from X to Y is defined as
Lrc(X→Y) = sup
U:U−X−Y
Uˆ, d:Uˆ×U→R+
log
inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)]
miny∈supp(Y) inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)|Y = y]
, (3.24)
where Uˆ is a finite alphabet, and 00 = 1 by convention.
49
Theorem 12 For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y, the maximal
realizable cost from X to Y is given by
Lrc(X→Y) = − log min
x,y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
= log max
x,y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PY(y)
PY |X(y|x) . (3.25)
Corollary 7 For any conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y, where X and Y are
finite alphabets,
max
PX
Lrc(X→Y) = Ldp(X→Y). (3.26)
The proofs are given in Appendices A.3 and A.4, respectively.
3.6 Rate-Distortion Based Approaches
As mentioned in the overview, all rate-distortion based approaches basically
assume that the adversary is only interested in a deterministic function of X
and that we know what that function is. Nevertheless, it is worth examining
some common approaches.
For ease of comparison, we will consider the setup of the Shannon cipher
system with lossy communication, shown in Figure 3.1. It consists of a trans-
mitter and a legitimate receiver that are linked by a public noiseless channel and
share a common key, and an eavesdropper who has access to the public chan-
nel and is aware of the source statistics and the used encryption schemes. The
encryption schemes must allow the legitimate receiver to reconstruct the source
sequence up to a fidelity constraint.
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Figure 3.1: The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication.
3.6.1 Expected Distortion
Suppose we use the expected distortion of the eavesdropper’s best reconstruc-
tion as the leakage metric [58]. A standard example, discussed and generalized
in [40], shows why this metric is inadequate: Suppose Xn is a sequence of in-
dependent and identically distributed bits with Xi ∼ Ber(1/2), the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver have access to one common bit K ∼ Ber(1/2), and
the distortion function is the Hamming distance. The transmitter then sends
the sequence Xn as is if K = 0, and flips all its bits if K = 1. The induced ex-
pected distortion at the eavesdropper is then equal to 1/2, which is also the
maximum expected distortion that the eavesdropper can possibly incur, since
it is achievable even if the public message is not observed. However, this “op-
timal” scheme in fact reveals a lot about the true source sequence, namely, it
is one of only two possible candidates. Indeed, a simple computation shows
that, L(Xn→M) = n log |X| − 1, which is exactly describing that Xn is completely
revealed except for one bit.
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3.6.2 Expected Distortion in a List/with Feedforward
To overcome this limitation of expected distortion, Schieler and Cuff [41,42] al-
low the eavesdropper to generate an exponentially-sized list of estimates and
propose the expected minimum distortion over the list as a secrecy metric. It
is not clear, however, how to operationally interpret a list of exponential size.
Moreover, this metric leads to a degenerate trade-off between the key rate r, the
allowed list exponent RL, and the expected minimum distortion in the list De.
For example, if the legitimate receiver must reconstruct Xn losslessly, one of two
cases must occur (see [41, Theorem 1]): either the public message M is made
completely useless to the eavesdropper when r > RL, and De is then given by
the distortion-rate function at RL; or, when r ≤ RL, the eavesdropper can trivially
find the exact sequence by listing all the possible keys.
Another approach to overcome this limitation is to consider expected distor-
tion with feedforward [40]. That is, at time i, the adversary has access to the
public message M as well as the first i − 1 symbols of the source, Xi−1. Again, it
is not clear what is the operational motivation of such a setup.
3.6.3 Expected Number of Guesses to Satisfy the Constraint
Merhav and Arikan [33] proposed a more direct approach: they consider an i.i.d.
source and they measure secrecy by the expected number of guesses that the
eavesdropper needs to make before finding the correct source sequence, which
they denote by E[G(Xn|M)], where G(.|m) is a “guessing” function defined for
each possible public message m (this can be modified to allow a certain level
of distortion instead of exact guessing). This is intended to capture the sce-
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nario in which the eavesdropper has a testing mechanism to check whether or
not his/her guess is correct. Such mechanism exists, for example, if the source
message is a password to a computer account. When the source is discrete and
memoryless, and the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to nr
purely random common bits (where r is the key rate), the optimal exponent of
E[G(Xn|M)] is found to be [33, Theorem 1]:
E(P, r) , lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(Xn|M)] = max
Q
{min{H(Q), r} − D(Q||P)} , (3.27)
where P is the source distribution and D(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence. Two issues arise with this metric. First, even if a testing mechanism ex-
ists, any practical system would only allow a small number of incorrect inputs.
Thus, it is not clear how to interpret an exponentially large number of guesses.
Second, and more importantly, because expected behavior can be quite different
from typical behavior, it turns out that even highly-insecure systems can appear
to be secure under this metric. Indeed, by modifying the asymptotically-optimal
scheme proposed in [33], we can construct a scheme for the primary user that
allows the eavesdropper to find the source sequence correctly with high prob-
ability by the first guess, and yet achieves the optimal exponent in (3.27). The
scheme proposed in [33] operates on the source sequences on a type-by-type
basis, and it yields:
E
[
G(Xn|M)∣∣∣Xn ∈ TQ] ≥ 2nmin{r,H(Q)}−o(n), (3.28)
where o(n)/n → 0 as n → ∞, and TQ is the type class of a given type Q, i.e.,
the set of sequences with empirical distribution Q. Averaging over the proba-
bilities of {TQ} yields the exponent in (3.27) (as a lower bound). However, this
means that it is enough to apply the proposed scheme to the type class TQ that
achieves the maximum of [min{H(Q), r} − D(Q||P)], whereas sequences belong-
ing to other type classes can be sent with no encoding whatsoever with no effect
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on the exponent. Therefore, only a set with vanishing probability is encoded,
whereas sequences outside that set are immediately known by the eavesdrop-
per1. On the other hand, a simple calculation shows that such a scheme yields
limn→∞ 1nL(Xn→ Yn) = 1, which is exactly describing that Xn is completely re-
vealed asymptotically.
1Merhav and Arikan actually characterize, for any ρ > 0, the exponent of E[Gρ(Xn|M)]. This
more general result can still yield large exponents for systems that are highly insecure, although
one could potentially address this issue by requiring schemes that yield large exponents simul-
taneously over a range of ρ values.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SHANNON CIPHER SYSTEM
4.1 Overview
The main goal in quantifying information leakage is to enable the design of
mechanisms to mitigate it. As an application, we study a (traditional) secrecy
setup known as the Shannon cipher system [43]. The setup consists of a trans-
mitter and a legitimate receiver that are linked by a public noiseless channel and
share a common key, and an eavesdropper who has access to the public chan-
nel and is aware of the source statistics and the used encryption schemes. The
encryption schemes must allow the legitimate receiver to perfectly reconstruct
the source sequence.
Figure 4.1: The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication: the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to a com-
mon key K, which consists of nr purely random bits, where r
is called the key rate. The transmitter encodes Xn using K, and
sends a message M through a noiseless public channel of rate R.
Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are allowed
a certain level of distortion. The legitimate receiver generates
the reconstruction Yn based on M and K, whereas the eaves-
dropper has access to M only to produce an estimate Vn.
Shannon showed that perfect secrecy (i.e., making the public message M and
the source sequence Xn statistically independent) requires a key rate that is at
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least as large as the message rate, which is typically not possible in practice. It
is necessary then to quantify imperfect or partial secrecy.
Therefore, in this chapter, we use maximal leakage to assess the best partial
secrecy that can be obtained in the Shannon cipher system, for any encryption
scheme. Moreover, we allow for lossy communication by introducing a dis-
tortion function d at the legitimate receiver, as shown in Figure 4.1. For a given
distortion level D, we require that the probability of violating the distortion con-
straint decays as 2−nα, for a given α > 0. Then, for a given D and α, we study the
asymptotic behavior of the normalized maximal leakage.
For a discrete memoryless source (DMS), we derive the optimal (i.e., mini-
mal) limit of the normalized maximal leakage. The scheme we propose for the
primary user (i.e., the transmitter–legitimate receiver pair) operates on a type-
by-type basis. With each type, we associate a good rate-distortion code. The
codebooks are then divided into bins, and the key is used to randomize, within a
bin, the choice of codeword associated with a particular source sequence. How-
ever, types with low enough probability are discarded, i.e., a dummy message
is associated with all the source sequences belonging to such types. We also
derive the optimal limit when the requirement of a decaying probability of vi-
olating the distortion constraint is replaced with an expected distortion con-
straint. We further show that, even in this setup, memoryless schemes are not
optimal. Other works have considered the Shannon cipher system allowing for
lossy compression [23,41,53,58], although they differ from the present chapter
in how they measure partial secrecy.
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4.2 Problem Setup and Statement of Result
Let X and Y be the alphabets associated with the transmitter and the legiti-
mate receiver, respectively. The transmitter and the legitimate receiver are con-
nected through a noiseless channel of rate R, and share common randomness
Kn ∈ Kn = {0, 1}nr, where Kn is uniformly distributed overKn, and r > 0 is the rate
of the key. The transmitter observes an n-length message Xn = (X1, X2, · · · , Xn),
independent of Kn, and wants to transmit a quantized version of it. Let f and
h be, respectively, the transmitter’s encoding and the receiver’s decoding func-
tions. The transmitter then sends a message Mn = f (Xn,Kn), Mn ∈ Mn = {0, 1}nR,
and the receiver generates a reconstruction Yn = h(Mn,Kn). Note that we al-
low the functions f and h to be randomized (beyond the randomness in Kn).
For a given distortion function d : X × Y → R+, distortion level D, and dis-
tortion excess probability α, we require that Pr(d(Xn,Yn) > D) ≤ 2−nα, where
d(Xn,Yn) = 1n
∑n
i=1 d(Xi,Yi).
An eavesdropper intercepts the message M. We assume s/he knows the
source statistics as well as the encoding and decoding functions, but does not
have access to the key Kn.
The primary user aims to minimize the maximal leakage to the eavesdropper
L(Xn →Mn). We characterize the asymptotically-optimal normalized maximal
leakage under the following assumptions1:
(A2) The alphabets X and Y are finite.
(A1) The source is memoryless and has full support.
1Note that it is necessary to have R ≥ maxQ:D(Q||P)≤α R(Q,D) for the primary user’s problem to
be feasible.
57
(A3) The distortion function d is bounded, i.e., there exists Dmax such that, for
all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, d(x, y) ≤ Dmax. Moreover, D ≥ Dmin, where Dmin =
maxx∈Xminy∈Y d(x, y).
(A4) R > maxQ:D(Q||P)≤α R(Q,D), where R(Q,D) is the rate distortion function for
source distribution Q.
We denote the optimal limit by L(P,D,
−→
R , α), where P is the source distribution,
and
−→
R = (R, r):
L(P,D,
−→
R , α) = lim
n→∞min{ fn}
1
n
L (Xn→ f (Xn,Kn)) ,
where { fn} is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the feasibility of the
primary user’s problem.
Theorem 13 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any DMS P, and distortion function
d with associated distortion level D ≥ Dmin and distortion excess probability α > 0:
L(P,D,
−→
R , α) = max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
[R(Q,D) − r]+ bits, (4.1)
where [a]+ = max{0, a}.
Note that the case α = ∞ (i.e., when the distortion constraint is imposed al-
most surely) is included in the theorem. Moreover, in that case, the theorem
holds even if the source is not memoryless, as long as the support of Xn is Xn.
This follows from the fact that L(Xn→Mn) and the constraint, when imposed
almost surely, depend on the distribution of Xn only through its support. There-
fore, solving for any specific distribution on that support is equivalent to solving
for all distributions on the same support.
We set some notation for the remainder of the chapter. In the following,Z is
an arbitrary discrete set, and Z is a random variable overZ.
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- For a sequence zn ∈ Zn, Qzn is the empirical PMF of zn, also referred to as
its type.
- QnZ is the set of types inZn, i.e., the set of rational PMF’s with denominator
n.
- For QZ ∈ QnZ, the type class of QZ is TQZ , {zn ∈ Zn : Qzn = QZ}.
- EQ[·], HQ(·), and IQ(·; ·) denote respectively expectation, entropy, and mu-
tual information taken with respect to distribution Q.
- Throughout this chapter, logarithms and exponentials are taken to the
base 2.
4.2.1 Special Case: Information Blurring System
Consider the special case in which R = log2 |Y| and r = 0, shown in Figure 4.2.
We refer to it as the information blurring system (IBS). This is a special case of
Figure 4.2: Information blurring system: both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper are allowed a certain distortion level.
interest as it is intended as a stylized model of a side channel. For example, con-
sider the SSH side channel. Then, Xn corresponds roughly to the original timing
vector, and it is mapped to a sequence Yn that corresponds to the perturbed tim-
ings and is observed by both the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. The
mapping must satisfy a distortion constraint, which corresponds to some qual-
ity constraints imposed by the network (e.g., delay constraints). At this point,
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we do not require the mapping to be causal as the intent is to provide fundamen-
tal limits for a simplified version of the information leakage problem. In broad
terms, the transmitter wants to blur the information in Xn (hence the name), so
that it is no longer useful for the eavesdropper. For example, one approach is to
artificially add noise to the input sequence. In that sense, the problem is related
to methods for ensuring differential privacy, in which a curator wants to publicly
release statistical information about a given population without compromising
the privacy of its individuals [14,31].
4.3 Achievability Proof of Theorem 13
We will slightly abuse notation and shorten L(P,D,
−→
R , α) to L in the following.
We now show that the right-hand side of (4.1) upper-bounds L.
Consider any  > 0 and let n be large enough such that we can construct a
rate-distortion code CnQX , for each type QX ∈ QnX, satisfying the following: each
sequence xn ∈ TQX is covered and |CnQX | ≤ 2n(R(QX ,D)+). Such construction is guar-
anteed by the type covering lemma (Lemma 2.4.1 in [11]). We divide the code-
book CnQX into
⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉ bins, each of size 2nr, except for possibly the last one.
We denote by CnQX (i, .) the ith partition of the codebook, and by CnQX (i, j) the jth
codeword in the ith partition. For each xn ∈ TQX , let ixn and jxn denote, respec-
tively, the index of the partition containing the codeword associated with xn and
the index of the codeword within the partition (Note that if more than one code-
word can be associated with xn, we fix any one of them arbitrarily). Finally, let
m(QX, i, j) be a message consisting of the following:
•
⌈
log2 |QnX|
⌉
bits to describe the type QX.
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•
⌈
log2
⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉⌉ bits to describe the index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉.
•
⌈
log2
∣∣∣CnQX (i, .)∣∣∣⌉ bits to describe the index j, where 0≤ j≤exp2⌈log2 ∣∣∣CnQX (i, .)∣∣∣⌉−1.
Now, for any δ ∈ R, let Q(α, δ) = {QX : D(QX ||P) ≤ α + δ}, Qn(α, δ) = {QX ∈ QnX :
D(QX ||P) ≤ α + δ}, and consider the following lemma.
Lemma 3
lim
δ→0
max
QX∈Q(α,δ)
R(QX,D) = max
QX∈Q(α,0)
R(QX,D).
Proof: This follows directly from Propositions 22 and 23. 
Now let δ > 0 be such that maxQX∈Q(α,δ) R(QX,D) < R (Such δ exists by Lemma 3
and (A4)). Finally, for each sequence xn, let s(xn) =
⌈
log2
∣∣∣CnQX (ixn , .)∣∣∣⌉, and let Ks(xn)
be the first s(xn) bits of Kn. The transmitter encodes as follows. Given xn, if
Qxn ∈ Qn(α, δ), then
f (xn,Kn) = m
(
Qxn , ixn , jxn ⊕ Ks(xn)) , (4.2)
where the XOR-operation is performed bitwise. Note that, in this case, the le-
gitimate receiver can retrieve the type of the transmitted sequence and the in-
dex of the bin from the first two parts of the message, and the index of the se-
quence within the bin using the last part of the message and the key Kn, so that
h(Mn,Kn) = CnQxn (ixn , jxn). Now, consider an m0 ∈ Mn that has not been used by the
previous encoding (Assumption (A4) and the choice of δ ensures the existence
of such m0). Then, for all xn such that Qxn < Qn(α, δ),
f (xn,Kn) = m0. (4.3)
Remark 7 To verify that the suggested scheme satisfies the excess distortion probability
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constraint, consider the following:
Pr(d(Xn,Yn) > D) ≤
∑
QX<Qn(α,δ)
P(Q) ≤
∑
QX<Qn(α,δ)
2−nD(QX ||P) ≤ (n + 1)|X|2−n(α+δ) < 2−nα,
where the last inequality holds for large enough n.
Effectively, we are leaking the first two parts of the message QXn and iXn ,
and hiding completely the last part jXn . Since there are only polynomially many
types, the first part does not affect the normalized leakage. The second part,
however, consists roughly of R(Q,D) − r bits, whenever R(Q,D) > r; otherwise,
i.e., when R(Q,D) ≤ r, there is only one bin and there is no information to be
leaked.
For a more rigorous analysis, let P f be the induced joint probability distribu-
tion of (Xn,Mn). Then, for xn satisfying Qxn ∈ Qn(α, δ), we get from (4.2):
P f
(
m(Qxn , ixn , j)
∣∣∣xn)=2−s(xn), 0 ≤ j ≤ 2s(xn)−1.
Let S (xn) = 2s(xn). Note that we can equivalently denote S (xn) by S (Qxn , ixn), since
the dependence on the sequence is only through the type and the index of the
62
bin. Therefore, we get
exp2{L(Xn→Mn)} =
∑
m∈Mn
max
xn∈Xn
P f (m|xn)
= max
xn∈Xn
P f (m0|xn) +
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
⌈
|CnQX |/2
nr
⌉∑
i=1
S (QX ,i)−1∑
j=0
max
xn∈Xn
P f (m(QX, i, j)|xn)
= 1 +
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
⌈
|CnQX |/2
nr
⌉∑
i=1
S (QX ,i)−1∑
j=0
S (QX, i)−1
≤ 1 +
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
(2n(R(QX ,D)+−r) + 1)
≤ 1 + 2
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
2nmax{R(QX ,D)+−r,0}
≤ 4(n + 1)|X| exp2{n maxQX∈Qn(α,δ)[R(QX,D) +  − r]
+}. (4.4)
Taking the limit as n tends to infinity, and noting that  and δ were arbitrary, we
get that
L ≤ max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
[R(Q,D) − r]+,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the following lemma, the sim-
ple of proof of which is omitted.
Lemma 4
lim
n→∞ maxQ∈QnX:D(Q||P)≤α
R(Q,D) = max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
R(Q,D).
4.4 Converse Proof of Theorem 13
We now show that L is lower-bounded by the right-hand side of (4.1). To that
end, consider any valid encoding function f . To lower-bound L(Xn→Mn), we
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consider a specific PU |Xn . In particular, we consider the “shattering” PU |Xn given
in (2.3). Recall
PU |Xn((iu, ju)|xn) =

p?
P(xn) , iu = x
n, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(xn)c,
1 − (dk(xn)e−1)p?P(xn) , iu = xn, ju = dk(xn)e,
0, iu , xn, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
Remark 8 The given PU |Xn achieves the supremum in the definition of L(Xn→Mn),
although this is not needed here.
Therefore, maxu∈U PU(u) = p?. We will also consider a sub-optimal guessing
function for U. The scheme is as follows: the eavesdropper first tries to guess
the key Kn by choosing an element uniformly at random from {0, 1}nr. We denote
this guess by K˜n. Then, proceeding by assuming that the key guess was correct,
s/he tries to guess the sequence xn using a guessing function given by Lemma 5
below. We denote this stage by g1. Finally, again proceeding by assuming that
the source sequence guess was correct, the eavesdropper attempts to guess U
by using the MAP rule. We denote this stage by g2, and we get for each xn ∈ Xn,
g2(xn) = (xn, 1), and Pr(g2(xn) = Un|xn) = p?/P(xn). (4.5)
Lemma 5 There exists a function g1 : Yn → Xn such that, for all (xn, yn) satisfying
d(xn, yn) ≤ D, Pr (xn = g(yn)) ≥ cn2−n(HQxn (X)−R(Qxn ,D)), where cn = (n + 1)−|X||Y|(|X|+1).
Proof: This is an application of Lemma 5 in [23]. In particular, we set in
Lemma 5 V to be X, de to be the Hamming distortion function, and De to be
zero. Then, IP?n (Qxnyn )(X;V |Y) (as defined in [23]) satisfies:
IP?n (Qxnyn )(X;V |Y) = HQxnyn (X|Y) = HQxn (X) − HQxn (X) + HQxnyn (X|Y)
≤ HQxn (X) − R(Qxn ,D). 
64
To analyze the above scheme, fix  > 0, and let P f denote the induced joint
probability on (Xn,Kn,Mn). Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can as-
sume that the decoding function h is a deterministic function of Mn and Kn. Fi-
nally, define
MD(xn, k) = {m ∈ Mn : d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D}, xn ∈ Xn, k ∈ Kn, (4.6)
andA = {(xn, yn)∈Xn×Yn :d(xn, yn)>D}. (4.7)
Letting g be the concatenation of the two stages, we get
Pr(U = g(M))
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈Mn
P(xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)P(u = g(m)|xn,m, k)
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P(xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)P(u = g(m)|xn,m, k)
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P(xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)P(K˜n = k).
P(g1(h(m, k)) = xn)P(g2(xn) = u|xn)
(a)≥ cn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P(xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)2−nr2−n(HQxn (X)−R(Qxn ,D))p?/P(xn)
= cnp?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P(xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)2−n(HQX (X)−R(QX ,D))/P(xn)
= cnp?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P(xn)PKn(k)P f (m|xn, k)2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P))
= cnp?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P))P f (Ac ∩ TQX ), (4.8)
where (a) follows from Lemma 5, (4.5), and (4.52). Now, note that for any Q,
P f (Ac|TQ) = 1 − P f (A|TQ) ≥ 1 −min{1, P f (A)/P(TQ)}
≥ 1−min{1, 2−n(α−D(Q||P)− |X|n log2(n+1))}
=max{0, 1−2−n(α−D(Q||P)− |X|n log2(n+1))}.
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Then, continuing (4.8), we get
Pr(U = g(M))
≥ cnp?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P))P(TQX ) max{0, 1 − 2−n(α−D(QX ||P)−
|X|
n log2(n+1))}
(a)≥ c′np?2−nr
∑
QX∈Qn(α,−)
2nR(QX ,D)(1 − 2−n(α−D(QX ||P)− |X|n log2(n+1)))
(b)≥ c′np?2−nr
∑
QX∈Qn(α,−)
2nR(QX ,D)(1/2)
≥ (c′np?/2) max
QX∈Qn(α,−)
exp2{n(R(QX,D) − r)}, (4.9)
where (a) and (b) hold for large enough n, and c′n = (n + 1)−|X|cn. Finally taking
the ratio of Pr(U = g(M)) and maxu PU(u), and taking the limit as n tends to
infinity, and noting that  is arbitrary, we get
L ≥ max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
R(Q,D) − r,
where the inequality follows from Lemmas 3 and 4. Since L is positive by defi-
nition,
L ≥ [ max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
R(Q,D) − r]+ = max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
[R(Q,D) − r]+.
4.5 Expected Distortion Constraint
We discuss a variation of the above problem. Instead of requiring a decaying
probability of violating the distortion constraint, we could require that the dis-
tortion constraint holds only in expectation—as is common in many works in
the literature. In that case, we modify assumption (A4) to be:
(A4’) R > R(P,D).
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Then, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 14 Under assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (A4’), for any DMS P, and distortion
function d with associated distortion level D ≥ Dmin:
L(P,D,
−→
R ) = [R(P,D) − r]+ bits. (4.10)
The achievability argument follows by a similar manner as the one given
in Section 4.3. However, instead of encoding on a type-by-type basis, we sim-
ply use a good rate-distortion code that satisfies the expected distortion require-
ment. As above, we divide the codebook into bins of size 2nr, except for possibly
the last one. Then, an analysis similar to (4.4) yields L(P,D,
−→
R ) ≤ [R(P,D)−r]+. As
for the lower bound, we use the fact that I∞(X;Y) ≥ I(X;Y) [50]. This problem,
with mutual information replacing maximal leakage, has already been solved
by Schieler and Cuff [40]. More specifically, Corollary 5 of [40] yields that the
optimal normalized mutual information is indeed given by [R(P,D) − r]+.
4.5.1 Suboptimality of Memoryless Schemes
With the expected distortion constraint, one might venture that a memoryless
scheme, in which the encoder simply passes the source through i.i.d. copies of
the optimal test channel, is optimal. Counter to this common intuition, we show
that this is not the case when the objective is maximal leakage.
To that end, consider the information blurring system, and suppose the
source is binary and the distortion constraint is the Hamming distance. We first
derive the “optimal test channel” with respect to maximal leakage. More specif-
ically, let 0 ≤ D ≤ p ≤ 1/2, and let X ∼ Ber(p). We want to minimize leakage
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from X to an output Y subject to a Hamming distortion constraint:
minimize L(X → Y) (4.11)
subject to Pr(X , Y) ≤ D.
We show in Appendix B that for the optimal mechanism P?Y |X, we get
L(X → Y?) = log2(2 − D/p) bits. (4.12)
Now, consider a source Xn that is i.i.d Ber(p), and let
Ln = min
PYn |Xn :PYn |Xn=
∏n
i=1 P
(i)
Yi |Xi
1
n
L(Xn→Yn) (4.13)
subject to E[d(Xn,Yn)] ≤ D.
The minimization only considers product distributions, that is, it corresponds
to schemes that can be implemented memorylessly.
Lemma 6
Ln = 1 − D/p bits.
On the other hand, Theorem 14 implies that the optimal normalized limit is
R(P,D) = H(p)−H(D). Since H(p)−H(D) < 1−D/p (where the inequality can be
checked using elementary calculus), memoryless schemes are suboptimal.
Proof: For any PYn |Xn in the minimization, let Di = E[d(Xi,Yi)]. Without loss
68
of generality, we can assume Di ≤ p. Then,
L(Xn→Yn) =
n∑
i=1
L(Xi → Yi)
(a)≥
n∑
i=1
log2(2 − Di/p)
=
n∑
i=1
log2
(
2 − (Di/p)p + (1 − Di/p)0
p
)
(b)≥
n∑
i=1
(Di/p) log2(1) + (1 − Di/p) log2(2)
=
n∑
i=1
(1 − Di/p)
(c)≥ n(1 − D/p),
where (a) follows from (4.12), (b) follows from the fact that log2(2 − D/p) is con-
cave in D, and (c) follows from the constraint in (4.13). Note that the lower-
bound can be achieved by sending n(1 − D/p) bits as is, and sending zeros for
the remaining nD/p bits. 
4.6 Known Distortion Function
4.6.1 Overview
Suppose the eavesdropper wants to estimate the source Xn up to a distortion
function that we know a priori, which is the classical setup in the literature. In
that case, the relevant metric is the probability that the eavesdropper’s guess
is successful, i.e., the distortion it incurs is below a given level. The primary
user (i.e., the transmitter legitimate-receiver pair) aims then to minimize that
probability. Since computing the exact probability is quite difficult, this section
will be mainly concerned with asymptotic analysis: we will derive the rate of
decay (i.e., the exponent) of the probability of a successful guess.
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We first study the information blurring system, as it more closely resembles
the side channel mitigation problem (cf. Section 4.2.1). For a discrete memo-
ryless source (DMS), we provide a single-letter characterization of the optimal
exponent. We show that the problem is related to source coding with side infor-
mation. Essentially, the eavesdropper first attempts to guess the joint type of Xn
and Yn. S/he, then, “pretends” that Yn is received through a memoryless chan-
nel the probability law of which is the conditional probability P(Y |X) induced
by the joint type. The problem can be viewed at this point as compression with
side information, so the eavesdropper picks a codeword from an optimal rate-
distortion code. The primary user’s objective, therefore, is to supply the “worst”
side information. Moreover, we demonstrate asymptotically-optimal universal
schemes for both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The schemes are
universal in the sense that they do not depend on the source statistics.
Next, we extend the study to the full setup of the Shannon cipher system.
The eavesdropper has full knowledge of the encryption system, except for the
realization of the key and the realization of Xn. Since the transmitter is subject to
a rate constraint, we allow the primary user to violate the distortion constraint,
but restrict the probability of such event to be exponentially decaying. We again
derive a single-letter characterization of the optimal exponent (cf. Theorem 16),
and demonstrate asymptotically-optimal strategies for both the primary user
and the eavesdropper. In particular, similarly to the previous setting, the trans-
mitter operates on a type-by-type basis and associates with each type a rate-
distortion code, the construction of which is based on the conditional probabil-
ity law that provides the worst side information and satisfies the rate constraint
(however, types with low enough probability are discarded, by associating a
dummy messsage to all the source sequences belonging to such types). To make
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use of the shared key, we (randomly) generate many instances of such codes,
and use the secret key to randomize the choice of the code selected for encoding
Xn. We also investigate conditions under which the resulting codes are optimal
rate-distortion codes. As for the eavesdropper, we show that one of the follow-
ing two schemes is optimal. The first consists of generating a blind guess, i.e.,
completely ignoring the public message. The second consists of guessing the
value of the key to reproduce the reconstruction at the legitimate receiver, and
then applying the strategy developed in the first part of the paper.
We note that Theorem 16 subsumes Theorem 15 by setting the key rate to
be zero, and the channel rate to be high enough. We nevertheless present them
separately for two reasons. We believe the information blurring system to be of
independent interest, as it corresponds to problems different from the Shannon
cipher system (e.g., the SSH timing attack). As such, Theorem 15 can serve as a
baseline for future refinements of this model (say, by requiring the encoding to
be causal). Moreover, it significantly simplifies the exposition of the results, by
first revealing the connection to source coding with side information and then
introducing the key and the rate constraint.
Finally, it should be noted that, concurrently with the derivation of this work,
Weinberger and Merhav studied the Shannon cipher system with lossy commu-
nication [53] (i.e, the setup of the second part of this section), and independently
suggested the same secrecy metric we proposed. Furthermore, they allowed a
variable key rate. They derived the optimal exponent in general, as is done
here. However, the suggested scheme herein and its subsequent analysis are
significantly simpler. In particular, our scheme uses a traditional random cod-
ing construction followed by a separate key-based randomization.
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4.6.2 The Information Blurring System
In this section, we assume the transmitter and legitimate receiver must satisfy
the distortion constraint almost surely. That is, every realization of (Xn,Yn) satis-
fies d(Xn,Yn) ≤ D. Furthermore, letV be the alphabet associated with the eaves-
dropper. The latter, with an associated distortion function de : X × V → R+,
observes Yn and generates a guess Vn = g(Yn), aiming to have de(Xn,Vn) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 de(Xi,Vi) ≤ De for a given distortion level De.
It is assumed that the eavesdropper knows the source statistics and the pri-
mary user’s encoding function f . The secrecy metric we adopt is the probability
that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess, i.e., Pr(de(Xn,Vn) ≤ De). The
primary user’s objective is to minimize this probability. So, the problem can be
written as:
min
fn
max
gn
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
.
We characterize the highest achievable exponent of the probability of a suc-
cessful guess under assumptions (A1)-(A3) with the following update to (A3):
(A3) The distortion functions d and de are bounded, i.e., there exists Dmax and
De,max such that, for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, and v ∈ V, d(x, y) ≤ Dmax and de(x, v) ≤
De,max. Moreover, D ≥ Dmin, where Dmin = maxx∈Xminy∈Y d(x, y). Similarly,
De ≥ De,min, where De,min = maxx∈Xminv∈V de(x, v).
We denote the optimal exponent by E(P,D,De), where P is the source distri-
bution, i.e.,
E(P,D,De) = lim
n→∞max{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
. (4.14)
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The existence of the limit will be seen later.
We will show that the problem is related to source coding with side informa-
tion, where Yn acts as side information for the eavesdropper. Therefore, the pri-
mary user’s job is to provide the “worst” side information subject to a distortion
constraint of his/her own. To this end, we denote the conditional rate-distortion
function as:
R(PXY ,De) = min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V)]≤De
I(X;V |Y), (4.15)
and define the quantity R(PX,D,De) as:
R(PX,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
R(PXY ,De). (4.16)
Roughly speaking, when the joint type of Xn and Yn is PXY , the eavesdropper can
restrict the guessing space to 2nR(PXY ,De) reconstruction sequences, knowing that
at least one of them must satisfy the distortion constraint. The maximization
in (4.16) corresponds to the primary user’s goal of maximizing that quantity.
We prove the following properties of R(PXY ,De) and R(PX,D,De) in Ap-
pendix C.1.
Proposition 7 In the following statements, the domains of D and De are [Dmin,+∞)
and [De,min,+∞), respectively.
(P1) For fixed PXY , R(PXY ,De) is a finite-valued, non-increasing convex function of De.
Furthermore, R(PXY ,De) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (PXY ,De).
(P2) For fixed PX, R(PX,D,De) is a finite-valued function of (D,De). Moreover, for
fixed De, R(PX,D,De) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (PX,D).
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(P3) Re(PX,De) − R(PX,D) ≤ R(PX,D,De) ≤ Re(PX,De), where R(PX,D) and
Re(PX,De) are the rate-distortion functions corresponding to the distortion con-
straints d and de, respectively.
Our main result is the characterization of the optimal exponent as follows:
Theorem 15 Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), for any DMS P, and distortion functions
d and de with associated distortion levels D ≥ Dmin and De ≥ De,min, corresponding
respectively to the primary user and the eavesdropper:
E(P,D,De) = min
Q
D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De), (4.17)
where Q ranges over all probability distributions on the source alphabet, and R(Q,D,De)
is as defined in (4.16).
Remark 9 We do not require any -backoff for D or De to characterize the associated
exponent.
An interesting feature of Theorem 15 is the emergence of mutual informa-
tion as part of the solution in (4.17), even though the setup does not include
any rate constraints. Moreover, an interesting contrast can be seen between the
expression in (3.27) for the expected number of guesses metric and the expres-
sion in (4.17) for our metric. Indeed, the former evaluates the performance of a
given scheme asymptotically by a weighted best-case scenario, whereas the latter
evaluates it by a weighted worst-case scenario.
As an application of the theorem, we compute the perfect secrecy exponent,
which we define as the best achievable exponent when the primary user is not
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subject to any constraint and denote it by E0(P,De). To this end, we intro-
duce a trivial distortion function: d(x, y) = 0, for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Then,
R(Q,D) = 0, for all Q and all D ≥ 0. It then follows from (P3) of Proposition 7
that R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) for all Q. Therefore,
E0(P,De) = min
Q
D(Q||P) + Re(Q,De). (4.18)
The next two subsections are devoted to proving Theorem 15. We first pro-
pose a scheme for the primary user and show that the induced exponent is
lower-bounded by the right-hand side of (4.17). From the eavesdropper’s point
of view, this is a converse result. Similarly, we propose a scheme for the eaves-
dropper and show that the induced exponent is upper-bounded by the right-
hand side of (4.17), which establishes the desired result.
Achievability
Let E−(P,D,De) = lim inf
n→∞ max{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
. (4.19)
We will show that E−(P,D,De) ≥ minQ D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De).
The primary user will operate on the source sequences on a type-by-type
basis. For each type QX ∈ QnX, we create a rate distortion code CQX to cover
each sequence in TQX as follows. We associate with QX a joint type QXY from
QnXY(QX,D):2
QnXY(QX,D) = {PXY ∈ QnXY : PX = QX, EPXY [d(X,Y)] ≤ D}. (4.20)
The code is then constructed from TQY as given by the following lemma, which
bounds the size of the code.
2Assumption (A3) guarantees that QnXY(QX ,D) is nonempty for any QX .
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Lemma 8 Given  > 0, there exists n0 (, |X|, |Y|) such that for any n ≥ n0, for each
joint type QXY ∈ QnXY, there exists a code (yn1, yn2, · · · , ynN) such that N ≤ 2n(IQXY (X;Y)+),
and for all xn ∈ TQX , there exists i satisfying (xn, yni ) ∈ TQXY .
We later prove a stronger result, Lemma 15, in Appendix C.5.
Remark 10 One might be tempted to use an optimal rate-distortion code for each type
QX, presuming that this choice is best at preserving secrecy since it achieves optimal
compression, i.e., it only sends the necessary information. However, the problem is
more subtle since the “redundancy of information” depends on the eavesdropper’s dis-
tortion constraint de. The optimal choice of QXY will be revealed when analyzing the
eavesdropper’s optimal strategy.
Now, fix  > 0 and let n be at least as large as n0 in Lemma 8. We will de-
note by CnQX the rate distortion code associated with type QX. Thus, the function
f of the primary user is as follows: each sequence xn is mapped to a sequence
yn ∈ CnQxn satisfying Qxnyn = QXY (where QXY is associated with Qxn) and subse-
quently d(xn, yn) ≤ D.
To determine the eavesdropper’s optimal guess, we define BDe(v
n) = {xn ∈
Xn : de(xn, vn) ≤ De}. Then, for each observed yn, the optimal rule is given by
g(yn) = argmax
vn∈Vn
∑
xn∈BDe (vn)
p(xn|yn).
This can be understood as the MAP rule, and we denote in the remainder by3
go (where “o” stands for optimal). To upper-bound the probability of a correct
3The MAP rule depends on f and thus should be denoted by go, f . Since this is obvious, we
drop the subscript f for notational convenience.
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guess, we consider a genie-aided rule that is aware of the type of the transmitted
source sequence. That is, the genie-aided MAP rule yields
go(yn,QX) = argmax
vn∈Vn
∑
xn∈BDe (vn)∩QX
p(xn|yn, Xn ∈ TQX ).
Remark 11 One should not expect the upper bound to be loose since there are only
polynomially many types in n, so that the exponent is not affected.
For a given yn, let f −1QX (y
n) = {xn ∈ TQX : f (xn) = yn} be the set of sequences in
TQX that are mapped to it. Then, the observation of yn implies that Xn ∈ f −1QX (yn),
and the genie-aided MAP rules makes a successful guess if Xn ∈ BDe (go(yn,QX)).
Therefore, we will derive an upper bound on the maximum possible size of the
intersection of these two sets. First, note that, xn ∈ TQX and f (xn) = yn implies
that Qxnyn = QXY , where QXY is the joint type associated with QX. So f −1QX (y
n) ⊆
TQX|Y (y
n) , {xn ∈ TQX : (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY }. Now, consider any vn ∈ Vn,∣∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂ f −1QX (yn)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂TQX|Y (yn)∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
∑
PXYV∈QnXYV:
PXY=QXY
EPXYV [de(X,V)]≤De
PYV=Qynvn
∑
xn:
(xn,yn,vn)∈TPXYV
1
(b)
=
∑
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PYV=Qynvn
|TPX|V,Y (vn, yn)|
≤ (n + 1)|X||Y||V| max
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PYV=Qynvn
|TPX|V,Y (vn, yn)|
(b)≤ (n + 1)|X||Y||V| max
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De):
PYV=Qynvn
2nHPXYV (X|V,Y), (4.21)
where
(a) follows from the fact that (xn, yn, vn) ∈ TPXYV ⇒ PYV = Qynvn .
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(b) follows from the definition of Qn(QXY ,De) as:
Qn(QXY ,De) = {PXYV ∈ QnXYV : PXY = QXY , EPXYV [de(X,V)] ≤ De}. (4.22)
(b) follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [11].
Therefore, for large enough n, we get
max
vn∈Vn
∣∣∣∣BDe(vn)⋂ f −1QX (yn)∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxPXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De) 2n(HPXYV (X|V,Y)+). (4.23)
Let P?n (QXY) be the joint type achieving the max in (4.23), where the dependence
on De is suppressed since it is fixed throughout the analysis. We can now upper-
bound the probability that the eavesdropper makes a successful guess as fol-
lows:
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go( f (Xn))
)
≤ De
)
≤ Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go ( f (Xn),QXn)
)
≤ De
)
.
=
∑
xn∈Xn
P(xn)1
{
xn ∈ BDe
(
go
(
f (xn),Qxn
))}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
yn∈CnQX
∑
xn∈TQX :
f (xn)=yn
P(xn)1
{
xn ∈ BDe
(
go
(
yn,QX
))}
(a)≤
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
yn∈CnQX
2n(−D(QX ||P)−HQX (X))2n
(
HP?n (QXY )(X|V,Y)+
)
(b)≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2n
(
IQXY (X;Y)+−D(QX ||P)−HQX (X)+HP?n (QXY )(X|V,Y)+
)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
2n
(
−D(QX ||P)−HQXY (X|Y)+HP?n (QXY )(X|V,Y)+2
)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n
(
D(QX ||P)+IP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y)−2
)
, (4.24)
where
(a) follows from (4.23).
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(b) follows from Lemma 8.
To interpret the exponent in (4.24), note that P?n (QXY) minimizes I(X;V |Y)
over Qn(QXY ,De) (follows readily from (4.23)). Therefore, IP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y) is
roughly R(QXY ,De). The eavesdropper’s scheme can then be seen as picking a
codeword from an optimal rate-distortion code that uses side information gen-
erated according to QY |X.
Since QXY is the choice of the primary user, who is interested in maximizing
the exponents in (4.24), we define for each QX ∈ QnX:
Q?(QX) = argmax
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D)
IP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y),
where we have again suppressed the dependence on D and De in the notation.
Remark 12 The maximization does not depend on the source statistics, and conse-
quently neither does the proposed encoding function f .
With a slight abuse of notation, we rewrite P?n (Q?(QX)) as P?n (QX) to get
IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y) = maxQXY∈QnXY(QX ,D)
IP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y) = maxQXY∈QnXY(QX ,D)
min
QXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
IQXYV (X;V |Y). (4.25)
We can now rewrite (4.24) as
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, go( f (Xn))
)
≤ De
)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n
(
D(QX ||P)+IP?n (QX )(X;V |Y)−2
)
≤ (n + 1)|X| max
QX∈QnX
2−n
(
D(QX ||P)+IP?n (QX )(X;V |Y)−2
)
= (n + 1)|X| exp
{
−n
(
−2 + min
QX∈QnX
[D(QX ||P) + IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y)]
)}
. (4.26)
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Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is arbitrary, we get
E−(P,D,De) = lim inf
n→∞ max{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
≥ min
Q
D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De), (4.27)
where the last inequality follows from the following proposition, the proof of
which is given in Appendix C.2.
Proposition 9
lim
n→∞ minQX∈QnX
[D(QX ||P) + IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y)] = minQ D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De).
Converse
Let E+(P,D,De) = lim sup
n→∞
max
{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
. (4.28)
We will now show that E+(P,D,De) ≤ minQ D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De). This means
that the eavesdropper can achieve the exponent in (4.17) for any function f the
primary user implements.
We propose a two-stage scheme for the eavesdropper. In the first stage, ob-
serving yn, s/he tries to guess the joint type of xn and yn by choosing an element
uniformly at random from the set QnXY(Qyn ,D), where
QnXY(QY ,D) = {PXY ∈ QnXY : PY = QY , EPXY [d(X,Y)] ≤ D}. (4.29)
The correct joint type must fall in this set since the restriction d(Xn,Yn) ≤ D is
imposed on each realization of (Xn,Yn). We denote the function corresponding
to this stage by g1 : Yn → QnXY .
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Table 4.1: Summary of the defined sets.
Set Notation Description
QnXY(QX,D) PXY ∈ QnXY : PX = QX, EPXY [d(X,Y)] ≤ D.
QnXY(QY ,D) PXY ∈ QnXY : PY = QY , EPXY [d(X,Y)] ≤ D.
Qn(QXY ,De) PXYV ∈ QnXYV : PXY = QXY , EPXYV [de(X,V)] ≤ De.
Remark 13 We differentiate between QnXY(QY ,D) and QnXY(QX,D) by their first argu-
ment. A summary of the defined sets is given in Table 4.1.
The eavesdropper then proceeds assuming g1(yn) is the correct joint type.
S/he randomly chooses a sequence from a set that covers TQX|Y (y
n). To this end,
we associate with each joint type QXY a joint type QXYV from Qn(QXY ,De) (cf.
Table 4.1), and generate a sequence uniformly at random from TQV |Y (y
n), where
QV |Y is the conditional probability induced by QXYV . We denote the function
corresponding to this stage by g2 : Yn × QnXY →Vn. Thus, g(yn) = g2(yn, g1(yn)).
Remark 14 The above strategy does not depend on the specifics of the function f im-
plemented by the primary user, i.e., it only uses the fact that d(Xn, f (Xn)) ≤ D. It is also
independent of the source statistics.
The following lemma lower-bounds the probability that g2(yn,QXY) generates
a sequence Vn satisfying de(xn,Vn) ≤ De, for a given pair (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY , i.e.,
assuming the eavesdropper guesses the joint type correctly.
Lemma 10 Given joint type QXYV ∈ QnXYV and (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY , if Vn is chosen uni-
formly at random from TQV |Y (yn), then Pr
(
Vn ∈ TQV |X (xn)
)
≥ cn2−nIQXYV (X;V |Y), where
cn = (n + 1)−|X||Y||V|.
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Proof:
Pr
(
Vn ∈ TQV |X (xn)
)
≥ Pr
(
Vn ∈ TQV |X,Y (xn, yn)
)
=
∣∣∣TQV |X,Y (xn, yn)∣∣∣∣∣∣TQV |Y (yn)∣∣∣ ≥ cn2
nH(V |X,Y)
2nH(V |Y)
= cn2−nI(X;V |Y).
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1.2.5 in [11]. 
Since the eavesdropper is interested in maximizing this probability, s/he will
associate, with each QXY , the joint type achieving the maximum:
P?n (QXY) = argmin
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
I(X;V |Y). (4.30)
Note that this is the same joint type achieving the maximum in (4.23).
We can now lower-bound the probability that xn ∈ BDe(g(yn)), for a given pair
(xn, yn) satisfying d(xn, yn) ≤ D.
Lemma 11 Given (xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn satisfying d(xn, yn) ≤ D, Pr (xn ∈ BDe(g(yn))) ≥
c′n2
−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y), where c′n = (n+1)−|X||Y|(|V|+1), QXY = Qxnyn , and g is as described above.
Proof:
Pr(xn ∈ BDe(g(yn))) =
∑
Q′XY∈QnXY (Qyn ,D)
p(g1(yn) = Q′XY)p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(yn,Q′XY)
))
≥ p(g1(yn) = Qxnyn)p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(yn,Qxnyn)
))
≥ (n + 1)−|X||Y|p
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g2(yn,QXY)
))
≥ (n + 1)−|X||Y|(|V|+1)2−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 10. 
We now show that the above described scheme indeed achieves the expo-
nent in (4.17). Consider any possibly random function f implemented by the
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primary user (and satisfying the distortion constraint), and denote by P f the
induced joint probability on (Xn,Yn). Now, consider the following chain of in-
equalities.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g( f (Xn))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
P(xn)P f (yn|xn)p (xn ∈ BDe(g(yn)))
(a)≥ c′n
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
P(xn)P f (yn|xn)2−nIP?n (Qxnyn )(X;V |Y)
≥ c′n
∑
xn∈Xn
P(xn)
∑
yn∈Yn
P f (yn|xn) min
QXY∈QnXY(Qxn ,D)
2−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y)
= c′n
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
P(xn) min
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D)
2−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y)
(b)
= c′n
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
2−n(D(QX ||P)+HQX (X))2−nIP?n (QX )(X;V |Y)
(c)≥ c′n(n + 1)−|X|
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n
(
D(QX ||P)+IP?n (QX )(X;V |Y)
)
≥ c′n(n + 1)−|X| max
QX∈QnX
2−n
(
D(QX ||P)+IP?n (QX )(X;V |Y)
)
= c′n(n + 1)
−|X| exp
{
−n
(
min
QX∈QnX
[D(QX ||P) + IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y)]
)}
, (4.31)
where
(a) follows from Lemma 11.
(b) follows from (4.30) and (4.25).
(c) follows from Lemma 1.2.3 in [11]
(
|TQX | ≥ (n + 1)−|X|2nHQX (X)
)
.
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we get
E+(P,D,De) = lim sup
n→∞
max
{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn))
)
≤ De
)
≤ min
Q
D(Q||P) + R(Q,D,De), (4.32)
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where the last inequality follows from Proposition 9.
Combining (4.32) and (4.27) yields that the limit in (4.14) exists and is equal
to the expression given in (4.17), thus establishing Theorem 15.
4.6.3 The Shannon Cipher System
We now consider the setup of the Shannon cipher system with lossy communi-
cation, as in Section 4.2. We assume again that the distortion constraint for the
primary user is imposed almost surely.
The message M is overheard by the eavesdropper who knows the statistics
of the source and the encoding and decoding functions f and h. However, s/he
does not have access to the common randomness K.
As before, the relevant secrecy metric is the probability of a successful guess,
i.e., a guess Vn = g(M) satisfying de(Xn,Vn) ≤ De. The optimal guess is deter-
mined, again, by the MAP rule go.
Let
−→
D = (D,De) and
−→
R = (R, r). For a given DMS P, distortion vector
−→
D,
rate vector
−→
R , and reliability exponent α, we denote the optimal exponent by
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α), i.e.,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = lim
n→∞max{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
, (4.33)
where { fn} is restricted to the class of functions ensuring the feasibility of
the primary user’s problem. Similarly to (4.33), we define E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) and
E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) using the lim inf and lim sup, respectively.
We extend the definition of R(PX,D,De) to account for the rate constraint as
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follows. For a given distribution PX satisfying R(PX,D) ≤ R,
R(PX,R,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
I(X;Y)≤R
R(PXY ,De). (4.34)
Extending the properties of R(PX,D,De), we prove the following properties of
R(PX,R,D,De) in Appendix C.3.
Proposition 12 In the following statements, D ≥ Dmin, De ≥ De,min, and a given pair
(PX,R) satisfy R ≥ R(PX,D).
(P4) For fixed PX, R(PX,R,D,De) is a finite-valued function of (R,D,De). Moreover,
for fixed De, R(PX,R,D,De) is continuous in the triple (PX,R,D) over the set
S = {(PX,R,D) : PX ∈ PX,D ≥ Dmin,R > R(PX,D)}.
(P5) Re(PX,De) − R(PX,D) ≤ R(PX,R,D,De) ≤ R(PX,D,De) ≤ Re(PX,De).
The main result is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 16 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any DMS P, distortion functions d
and de with associated distortion levels D ≥ Dmin and De ≥ De,min, corresponding re-
spectively to the primary user and the eavesdropper, and reliability exponent α:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = min
{
E0(P,De), r + min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De)
}
. (4.35)
Remark 15 The minimization over Q is due to the imposition of an exponentially de-
caying probability of violating the distortion constraint. If we replace it instead by
Pr (d(Xn,Yn) > D) ≤ δ, for some small δ, then the second term of (4.35) would collapse
to r + R(P,R,D,De).
85
Remark 16 We can recover Theorem 15 by setting α = +∞, r = 0, and R = log |Y|.
Weinberger and Merhav’s result [54, Theorem 1] can also be recovered by noting that
the leniency assumption implies R(Q,R,D,De) = 0 for all Q. Moreover, for any
De > minv∈V EP[d(X, v)] and r > 0, E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) > 0. Indeed, the first condition
implies Re(P,De) > 0, hence E0(P,De) > 0. This refines Schieler and Cuff’s obser-
vation [40] that any positive key rate drives the distortion at the eavesdropper to its
maximal expected value with high probability.
A straightforward but useful corollary of Theorem 16 is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition on the key rate for the achievability of the perfect secrecy ex-
ponent. In particular,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = E0(P,De) if and only if r ≥ E0(P,De) − min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De).
(4.36)
Let r0 be the minimum rate needed to achieve E0(P,De). The condition in (4.36)
is interesting in that it allows r0 to be strictly less than E0(P,De), which itself
satisfies E0(P,De) ≤ Re(P,De).
Remark 17 One might suspect that r ≥ maxQ:D(Q||P)≤α R(Q,D) is sufficient to achieve
E0(P,De), since we can use good rate-distortion codes for each type and the number of
available keys is large enough to completely “hide” the source sequence within a type
class. This is, indeed, true as it implies the condition in (4.36):
D(Q||P) + Re(Q,De) − D(Q||P) − Re(Q,De) + R(Q,D) = R(Q,D),
⇒ min
Q′
[D(Q′||P) + Re(Q′,De)] − D(Q||P) − Re(Q,De) + R(Q,D) ≤ R(Q,D),
By Property (P5): ⇒ min
Q′
[D(Q′||P) + Re(Q′,De)] − D(Q||P) − R(Q,R,D,De) ≤ R(Q,D),
⇒ E0(P,De) + max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
[−D(Q||P) − R(Q,R,D,De)] ≤ max
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
R(Q,D).
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The converse of Theorem 16 is based on the following analysis. To achieve
the second exponent in (4.35), the eavesdropper tries to guess the value of the
key and then applies the scheme suggested in the previous section. Taking into
consideration the rate constraint, the term R(Q,D,De) which appears in (4.17)
is replaced by R(Q,R,D,De). Also, taking into account the modified distortion
constraint, the minimization over all Q’s which appears in (4.17) is replaced
by a minimization over Q’s satisfying D(Q||P) ≤ α. The first exponent is the
perfect secrecy exponent (given in (4.18)), which the eavesdropper can achieve
even in the absence of any observation. The fact that one of these two schemes
achieves the optimal exponent implies that the eavesdropper does not benefit
from guessing only part of the key. Either s/he guesses the entire key correctly
and proceeds, or s/he makes a completely blind guess. Interestingly, a similar
observation has been made by Schieler and Cuff [41] in the context of minimum
expected distortion over a list.
To describe the achievability result, it is helpful to rewrite (4.35) as:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = min
{
min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + min{r + R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,De)}, (4.37)
min
Q:D(Q||P)≥α
D(Q||P) + Re(Q,De)
}
.
The primary user will operate as follows. For low-probability types Q, par-
ticularly Q’s with D(Q||P) > α, the transmitter will send a dummy message.
This is feasible because we allowed some probability of violating the distor-
tion constraint. For such Q’s, the eavesdropper receives no information. There-
fore, the guessing exponent conditioned on TQ is given by Re(Q,De), yielding
the second term of (4.37). For Q’s satisfying D(Q||P) ≤ α, let E(−→D,−→R ,Q) =
min{r + R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,D)}. This can be understood as the exponent con-
ditioned on Xn ∈ TQ. For each such Q, we associate a joint type induced by a
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PY |X that achieves the maximum in (4.34). Similarly to Section 4.6.2, we use this
joint type to generate a rate-distortion code. This roughly corresponds to the
term R(Q,R,D,De). To take advantage of the secret key, we in fact produce 2nr
such codes, and use the key to randomize the choice of the code, yielding the
additional r term. Since the eavesdropper can always guess blindly and achieve
the exponent Re(Q,D), we get min{r + R(Q,R,D,De), Re(Q,D)}. We will show in
Lemma 15 that such random construction fails to achieve the desired exponent
with only doubly exponentially small probability.
As mentioned earlier, the code construction for each type depends on the
conditional PY |X achieving the maximum in (4.34). A natural question arises:
under what conditions does the optimal test channel (which we will denote
by P?Y |X) achieve that max? One can readily verify that this holds when
R(Q,R,D,De) = 0 (e.g., the eavesdropper’s constraint is more lenient than that
of the legitimate receiver). We further investigate this question by consider-
ing special cases of Theorem 16. In the following, assume α = +∞. Hence,
R > maxQ R(Q,D).
Perfect Reconstruction at the Eavesdropper
Suppose V = X, and the eavesdropper is required to reconstruct the source
sequence perfectly, i.e., the secrecy metric is Pr(Vn = Xn). In our formulation,
this is equivalent to setting de to be the Hamming distance and De to 0. Then,
for each Q, we get
R(Q,R,D, 0) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
I(X;Y)≤R
R(PXY , 0) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
I(X;Y)≤R
H(X|Y) = HQ(X) − R(Q,D).
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Note that the maximum is achieved by the optimal test channel, and the expo-
nent is given by
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) = min
Q
D(Q||P) + min{r + HQ(X) − R(Q,D), HQ(X)},
where we have used the equivalent form (4.37). Note that, in contrast to
R(Q,R,D,De) = 0, this case corresponds to a more lenient constraint at the le-
gitimate receiver, which leads us to our next example.
Binary Source with Hamming Distortion and De ≤ D
Suppose X = Y = V = {0, 1}, d and de are both the Hamming distance, and
De ≤ D < 1/2. We prove the following lemma in Appendix C.4.
Lemma 13 If De ≤ D < 1/2,
R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D) =

0, H(Q) ≤ H(De),
H(Q) − H(De), H(De) ≤ H(Q) ≤ H(D),
H(D) − H(De), H(Q) ≥ H(D).
It follows from property (P5) of Proposition 12 that
R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D)⇒ R(Q,R,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D).
Therefore, the exponent is given by:
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) = min

min {D(Q||P) : H(Q) ≤ H(De)} ,
min {D(Q||P) + H(Q) − H(De) : H(De) ≤ H(Q) ≤ H(D)} ,
min {D(Q||P) + min{r + H(D) − H(De),H(Q) − H(De)} : H(Q) ≥ H(D)} .
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If X ∼ Ber(1/2), then D(Q||P) = 1 − H(Q), and the minima corresponding to the
first two cases reduce to 1 − H(De). The third minimum can be computed as
follows:
min
Q:
H(Q)≥H(D)
1 − H(De) + min{r + H(D) − H(Q), 0} = 1 − H(De) + min{r + H(D) − 1, 0}.
Therefore,
E(P,
−→
D,
−→
R ) =

1 − H(De), r ≥ 1 − H(D),
r + H(D) − H(De), r < 1 − H(D).
The resulting expression when r < 1 − H(D) admits a simple geometric ex-
planation, shown in Figure 4.3 below. Upon observing the public message, the
Figure 4.3: The dots represent sequences in a type class TQ. Each of the 2nr
non-dashed circles represents a Hamming-distortion ball of ra-
dius D, corresponding to a possible reconstruction at the legit-
imate receiver. Thus, dots within the circle (in blue) represent
candidate source sequences. The dashed circle represents the
distortion ball of radius De around the eavesdropper’s recon-
struction, and it fits entirely in a non-dashed circle.
candidate source sequences are clustered into 2nr balls. Each ball corresponds
to a possible value of the key K, and has volume 2nH(D) since it is the pre-image
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of a possible reconstruction at the legitimate receiver. For the eavesdropper, the
maximum volume of the ball that s/he can generate to “engulf” candidate se-
quences is 2nH(De). Due to the structure of Hamming distortion, this maximally-
sized ball can fit entirely into any one of the clusters, so that the probability
of a successful guess is 2nH(De)2−n(r+H(D)). Note that the geometric interpretation
assumed that we are using good rate-distortion codes (to get pre-images of vol-
ume 2nH(D)). The described structure is also reminiscent of successive refine-
ment [15]. These can be explained by the following lemma.
Lemma 14 If R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D), then the optimal test channel P?Y |X
achieves the maximum in (4.16). Moreover, Q is successively refinable from D to De.
Proof: Consider the proof of the lower bound in (P3) of Proposition 7.
R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D) implies that (C.1) is an equality. Hence, P?Y |X
achieves the maximum. Moreover, (C.2) becomes an equality. Let P(1)V |XY be the
minimizer in (C.1), and P(2)V |XY the minimizer in (C.2). Then, HP?XYP(1)V |XY (X|V) ≤
HP?XYP(2)V |XY (X|V) = HP?XYP(1)V |XY (X|V,Y) ≤ HP?XYP(1)V |XY (X|V). Therefore, P
(1)
V |XY satisfies
E[de(X,V)] ≤ De and HP?XYP(1)V |XY (X|V,Y) = HQP(1)V |X (X|V), i.e. the Markov chain X−V−Y
holds. Finally, note that I(X;V) = I(X; (V,Y)) = I(X;Y)+ I(X;V |Y) = Re(Q,De), im-
plying that Q is successively refinable from D to De. 
Proof of the Lower Bound
We show that E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) ≥ min{E0(P,D), r + minQ:D(Q||P)≤α D(Q||P) +
R(Q,R,D,De)} by demonstrating an encoding-decoding strategy for the primary
user that achieves the given exponent.
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As before, the primary user will operate on the source sequences on a type-
by-type basis. The result is driven by the following lemma, which is based on
the analysis of Schieler and Cuff [41] and the proof of which is given in Ap-
pendix C.5.
Lemma 15 Let  > 0, n ∈ N,QXY ∈ QnXY be given. Let N be an integer such that
2n(IQXY (X;Y)+2/3) ≤ N ≤ 2n(IQXY (X;Y)+). Generate a code Cn = (Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnN) by choos-
ing N elements independently and uniformly at random from TQY .
1. Covering: For xn ∈ TQX , define
C(xn) = {m ∈ [N] : (xn,Ynm) ∈ TQXY }, (4.38)
Nxn = |C(xn)|, (4.39)
and the event
E = {Cn : there exists xn ∈ TQX such that Nxn = 0
or Nxn > 22n
}
. (4.40)
Then, there exists n1(, |X|, |Y|) (independent of QXY) such that, for all n ≥ n1,
Pr(E) ≤ e−2n/7 . (4.41)
2. Guessing—single code: Suppose Xn ∼ Unif(TQX ) and Cn < E. Let PCM|Xn be
as follows. Given xn, M is chosen uniformly at random from C(xn). Then, for all
n ≥ n1, for all vn ∈ Vn and all m ∈ [N],
Pr(de(Xn, vn)≤De|M=m,Cn)≤2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4), (4.42)
and
E[Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cn)|Ec] ≤ 2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4), (4.43)
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where the probabilities are computed with respected to the randomness in PCM|Xn ,
and the expectation with respect to the distribution of the code Cn.
3. Guessing—multiple codes: Let K be uniform over K = [2nr], r > 0, and
independent of Xn (which is uniform over TQX ). For each k ∈ [2nr], generate Cnk as
described above. Define P{C
n
k }k
M|Xn,K as follows. Given k, if Ck ∈ E, then M is chosen
uniformly at random from [N] independently of Xn. If Cnk < E, then M is chosen
uniformly at random from Ck(Xn). Let,
E˜ =
{
{Ck}2nrk=1 : there exists m ∈ [N] such that
max
vn∈Vn
Pr
(
de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1
)
> 2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(QXY ,De)}−8)
}
,
(4.44)
where the probability is computed with respect to P{C
n
k }k
M|Xn,K . Then, for all n ≥ n1,
Pr(E˜) ≤ e−2n/9 , (4.45)
where the probability is computed with respected to the distributions of the codes
{Cnk}k. 
The first part of the Lemma asserts that if we generate the codebook ran-
domly, then each xn ∈ TQX will be covered by a small number of codewords
(the probability that this event does not occur is doubly exponentially small).
Therefore, if we encode xn by choosing a codeword uniformly at random from
its cover, the induced PXn |Yn(.|yn) will be roughly uniform over the set TQX|Y (yn) =
{xn : (xn, yn) ∈ TQXY }. Consequently, given a codeword index m and vn ∈ Vn,
the second part bounds the probability that vn covers Xn, and also bounds the
expectation (over the choice of the codebook) of that probability.
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Finally, the third part considers generating 2nr codebooks and the induced
distribution PXn |M, where M is the index of a chosen codeword. This distribu-
tion roughly corresponds to generating 2nr elements uniformly at random from
TQY , revealing the chosen elements to the adversary, then choosing one of them
uniformly at random and generating Xn uniformly at random from TQX|Y (Y
n).
This setup is similar to the one studied by Schieler and Cuff [41, Theorem 4].
Equation (4.45) states that, for most realizations of the codebooks, the proba-
bility that the adversary generates a successful guess, given a codeword index,
is upper-bounded by 2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(QXY ,De)}. The implication is that the best
the adversary could do is 1) either ignore the index and guess Xn blindly, 2) or
guess which codebook is being used (i.e., guess the value of the key K) and use
the scheme suggested in the previous section.
Now, fix δ > 0 such that Rα+δ = maxQ:D(Q||P)≤α+δ R(Q,D) < R. Note that such δ
exists since limδ→0 Rα+δ = Rα (which follows from Proposition 23 in Appendix C.1
and the fact that D(Q||P) is convex). Fix R′ such that Rα+δ < R′ < R, and  > 0
such that  < R − R′. Let
QnX(α, δ) = {Q ∈ QnX : D(Q||P) ≤ α + δ}. (4.46)
Let n be large as given by Lemma 15. For each type QX ∈ QnX(α, δ), we as-
sociate a joint type QXY and generate 2nr codebooks {Ck}2nrk=1 ∈ E˜c where the size
of each codebook is upper-bounded by 2n(IQXY (X;Y)+) (the existence of such codes
follows from (4.45)). Since the primary user wants to minimize the probability
of a successful guess by the eavesdropper, but must also satisfy a rate constraint,
the associated type is chosen as follows:
Q?R′(QX) ∈ argmax
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R′
R(QXY ,De). (4.47)
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The encoding function f is as follows. Given a source sequence xn satisfying
Qxn ∈ QnX(α, δ), and a realization of the key k, a reconstruction sequence is chosen
uniformly at random from Ck(xn) (cf. (4.38)). The associated message is then
given by:
• dlog |QnX|e bits to describe QX.
• dlog |Cnk |e bits to describe the index of the reconstruction.
The legitimate receiver uses the first part of the message and the key to de-
termine which codebook is being used, and then uses the second part of the
message to recover the reconstruction Yn. Finally, all sequences xn such that
Qxn < QnX(α, δ) are mapped to an arbitrary message m0.
Remark 18 One can check that this encoding is feasible by noting that the required
number of bits satisfy:
dlog |QnX|e + dlog |Cnk |e ≤ |X| log(n + 1) + 1 + n
(
IQ?R′ (QX)(X;Y) + 
)
+ 2
≤ n
(
R′ +  +
|X|
n
log(n + 1) +
3
n
)
< nR,
for n large enough. Moreover, it satisfies the excess distortion probability constraint,
since
Pr(d(Xn,Yn) > D) ≤
∑
QX<Qn(α,δ)
P(QX)
≤
∑
QX<Qn(α,δ)
2−nD(QX ||P)
≤ (n + 1)|X|2−n(α+δ) < 2−nα,
where the last inequality holds for large enough n.
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To analyze the performance of the eavesdropper, note that when s/he ob-
serves a message m , m0, then the induced distribution PXn |M=m is exactly the
setup studied in part three of Lemma 15. Indeed, the message m indicates the
type of the transmitted sequence and the index of the reconstruction (among
2nr possible codebooks). For m = m0, i.e., for sequences of type outside Qn(α, δ),
the performance can still be analyzed in light of Lemma 15 by considering the
associated QXY to be of the form QXQY (i.e., X and Y are independent), in which
case min{Re(QX,De), r + R(QXY ,De)} = min{Re(QX,De), r + Re(QX,De)} = Re(QX,De).
Now, consider the following chain of inequalities.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g0( f (Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
m∈M
P(xn)P f (m|xn)1 {xn ∈ BDe (g0(m))}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
P(QX)
∑
m∈M
∑
xn∈TQX
P f (m|TQX )P f (xn|m,TQX ) · 1
{
xn ∈ BDe (g0(m))
}
=
∑
QX∈QnX
P(QX)
∑
m∈M
P f (m|TQX ) maxvn∈Vn P f
(
de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|m,TQX
)
(a)≤
∑
QX∈QnX
P(QX)
∑
m∈M
P f (m|TQX )2−n(min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(Q?R′ (QX),De)}−8)
≤
∑
QX∈QnX
2−n(D(QX ||P)+min{Re(QX ,De),r+R(Q
?
R′ (QX),De)}−8)
≤ (n + 1)|X| max
QX∈QnX
exp
{
− n (D(QX ||P) + min{Re(QX,De), r + R(Q?R′(QX),De)} − 8) }
= (n + 1)|X| exp
(
− nmin
{
min
QX∈QnX(α,δ)
D(QX ||P) + min{Re(QX,De), r + R(Q?R′(QX),De)},
min
QX<QnX(α,δ)
D(QX ||P) + Re(QX,De)
}
+ 8n
)
= (n + 1)|X| exp
(
−nmin
{
min
QX∈QnX(α,δ)
D(QX ||P) + r + R(Q?R′(QX),De),
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P) + Re(QX,De)
}
+ 8n
)
, (4.48)
where (a) follows from (4.44) of Lemma 15 and the fact that the codebooks
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{Ck}2nrk=1 < E˜ by construction. Therefore,
E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = lim inf
n→∞ max{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
≥ min
{
E0(P,D), r + min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α+δ
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R′,D,De)
}
− 8,
where the inequality follows from the following proposition, the proof of which
is given in Appendix C.6.
Proposition 16
lim
n→∞ minQX∈QnX(α,δ)
D(QX ||P) + R(Q?R′(QX),De) = minQ:D(Q||P)≤α+δD(Q||P) + R(Q,R
′,D,De).
Now, note that  is arbitrary, and
lim
R′→R minQ:D(Q||P)≤α+δ
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R′,D,De) = min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α+δ
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De),
(4.49)
since R(Q, R˜,D,De) is uniformly continuous in (Q, R˜) over the set {(Q, R˜) :
D(Q||P) ≤ α + δ,R′ ≤ R˜ ≤ R} by Proposition 12. Finally, it follows from Proposi-
tion 12 and Proposition 23 (to follow in Appendix C.1) that
lim
δ→0
min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α+δ
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De) = min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De) (4.50)
As such,
E−(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) ≥ min
{
E0(P,D), r + min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De)
}
.
Proof of the Upper Bound
We now prove that E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) ≤ min{r + minQ:D(Q||P)≤α D(Q||P) +
R(Q,R,D,DE), E0(P,De)}. We have already shown, following Theorem 15, that
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the perfect secrecy exponent E0(P,De) is achievable by the eavesdropper even in
the absence of any observation. It follows immediately that
E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) ≤ E0(P,De). (4.51)
So we only need to demonstrate a strategy that achieves the first exponent.
The strategy is based on the one suggested in Section 4.6.2. We will add an initial
stage in which the eavesdropper tries to guess the value of K, by choosing an
element uniformly at random from {1, 2, · · · , 2nr}. The eavesdropper’s guess,
denoted by K˜, is equal to K with probability 2−nr (This will correspond to the
r term in (4.35)). Then, s/he generates Y˜n = h(M, K˜). Next, the eavesdropper
implements the same stages suggested in Section 4.6.2, where Y˜n plays the role
of Yn. We denote the strategy by g′.
Remark 19 If h is stochastic, it can be replaced by a deterministic h that still satis-
fies the reliability constraint. Since this does not change the conditional PXn |M, we can
assume, without loss of generality, that h is deterministic.
Now, consider any functions f and h implemented by the primary user (and
satisfying the distortion constraint). Let P f denote the induced joint probability
of (Xn,M,K), and PK denote the distribution of K. To analyze the performance of
g′, note that, unlike Section 4.6.2, not every realization of Y˜n necessarily satisfies
the distortion constraint. To that end, define
MD(xn, k) = {m ∈ M : d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D}, xn ∈ Xn, k ∈ K , (4.52)
andA = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : d(xn, yn) > D}. (4.53)
The distortion constraint implies that
P f (A) ≤ 2−nα. (4.54)
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Moreover, the analysis of g′ should take into account the rate constraint R. The
following Lemma by Weissman and Ordentlich [55] will be instrumental.
Lemma 17 ( [55, Lemma 3]) Let Yn(.) be an n-block code of rate ≤ R. Then, for every
Q ∈ QnX and η > 0, if Xn is uniformly distributed over TQ,
Pr
({
xn ∈ TQ : IQxnYn(xn)(X;Y) > R + η
})
≤ (n + 1)|X||Y|+|X|2−nη. (4.55)
Remark 20 This is not the exact statement found in [55], but it is a straightforward
modification.
So, define for every η > 0, xn ∈ Xn, and k ∈ K ,
MR(xn, k, η) = {m ∈ M : IQxnyn (X;Y) ≤ R + η,where yn = h(m, k)}, (4.56)
MD,R(xn, k, η) =MD(xn, k) ∩MR(xn, k, η), (4.57)
and B(η) = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : IQxnyn (X;Y) > R + η}. (4.58)
Finally, fix  > 0, δ > 0 and η > 0, and consider the following chain of inequali-
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ties.
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g′( f (Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
P(xn)PK(k)P f (m|xn, k)P f
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g′(m)
))
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P(xn)PK(k)P f (m|xn, k)P f
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g′(m)
))
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P(xn)PK(k)P f (m|xn, k)
∑
k˜∈K
PK
(
K˜ = k˜
)
P f
(
xn ∈ BDe
(
g(h(m, k˜))
))
≥ 2−nr
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P(xn)PK(k)P f (m|xn, k)P f (xn ∈ BDe (g(h(m, k))))
(a)≥ c′n2−nr
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P(xn)PK(k)P f (m|xn, k)2−nIP?n (Qxnyn )(X;V |Y)
(b)≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQ
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈MD,R(xn,k,η)
P(xn)PK(k) · P f (m|xn, k) min
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R+η
2−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y)
= c′n2
−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
min
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R+η
2−nIP?n (QXY )(X;V |Y)P f (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ)
(c)≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX(α,−δ)
min
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R+η
2−n(R(QXY ,De)+)P f (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ)
≥ c′n2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX(α,−δ)
2−n(R(QX ,R+η,D,De)+)P f (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ), (4.59)
where
(a) follows from Lemma 11 and (4.52): m ∈ MD(xn, k) guarantees that
d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D so that Lemma 11 is applicable.
(b) follows from (4.57): m ∈ MD,R(xn, k, η) allows us to restrict the minimum to
QXY ∈ QXY(QX,D) satisfying IQXY (X;Y) ≤ R + η.
(c) follows from Proposition 24 in Appendix C.2.
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Now, note that
P f (A|TQ) ≤ P f (A)P(TQ) ≤ (n + 1)
|X|2−n(α−D(Q||P)). (4.60)
Moreover, by Lemma 17,
P f (B(η)|TQ) ≤ (n + 1)|X||Y|+|X|2−nη. (4.61)
Combining (4.60) and (4.61) yields, for every QX ∈ QnX(α,−δ),
P f (Ac ∩ Bc(η) ∩ TQ) = P(TQ)P f (Ac ∩ Bc(η)|TQ)
≥ P(TQ)(1 − P f (A|TQ) − P f (B(η)|TQ))
≥ P(TQ)(1 − (n + 1)|X|2−nδ − (n + 1)|X||Y|+|X|2−nη)
≥ P(TQ)/2, (4.62)
where the last inequality holds for large enough n. Continuing from (4.59), we
get
Pr
(
de
(
Xn, g′( f (Xn,K))
)
≤ De
)
≥ (c′n/2)2−nr(n + 1)−|X|
∑
QX∈QnX(α,−δ)
2−n(D(QX ||P)+R(QX ,R+η,D,De)+)
≥ (c′n/2)(n + 1)−|X| exp
{
−n
(
 + r + min
QX∈QnX(α,−δ)
D(QX ||P) + R(QX,R + η,D,De)
)}
.
(4.63)
Therefore, taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that , δ, and η are
arbitrary, we get
E+(P,
−→
D,
−→
R , α) = lim sup
n→∞
max
{ fn}
min
{gn}
−1
n
logPr
(
de
(
Xn, gn( fn(Xn,K))
)
≤De
)
≤ lim
δ→0
lim
η→0
r + min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α−δ
D(Q||P)+R(Q,R + η,D,De)
= r + min
Q:D(Q||P)≤α
D(Q||P) + R(Q,R,D,De), (4.64)
where the last equality follows similarly to equations (4.49) and (4.50). Combin-
ing (4.51) and (4.64) yields our result.
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CHAPTER 5
LEARNING COMPLEXITY
This chapter investigates the complexity of estimatingL(X→Y), i.e., the num-
ber of samples needed to estimate L(X→Y), which we equivalently denote by
L(PX; PY |X). To this end, an estimator is defined as a function f : (X × Y)? → R,
which maps a sequence of samples drawn from a joint distribution to an esti-
mate of its maximal leakage. Given a desired level of accuracy δ, and a proba-
bility of error , the sample complexity of an estimator f is defined as:
S δ,(|X|, |Y|)[ f ] = min{n : PXY
(∣∣∣L(PX; PY |X) − f (Xn,Yn)∣∣∣ > δ) < , for all PXY ∈ PX×Y},
(5.1)
where PXY ∈ PX×Y is the set of all probability distributions on X×Y, and (Xn,Yn)
are drawn independently from PXY . Then, the sample complexity of maximal
leakage is defined as:
S δ,(|X|, |Y|) = inf
f
S δ,(|X|, |Y|)[ f ]. (5.2)
We show that S δ,(|X|, |Y|) turns out to be infinity. This is mainly due to the
discontinuity of maximal leakage in the support of X. Therefore, we assume we
have a known lower bound θ on the minimum strictly positive probability of an
element in X, and we define
PθX×Y = {PXY ∈ PX×Y : minx∈X:PX(x)>0 PX(x) ≥ θ}, (5.3)
S δ,(|X|, |Y|, θ) = inf
f
min{n : PXY
(∣∣∣L(PX; PY |X)− f (Xn,Yn)∣∣∣> δ)< , for all PXY ∈PθX×Y}.
(5.4)
We prove the following upper and lower bounds in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 respec-
tively.
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Theorem 17 For all θ ∈ (0, 1), discrete alphabets X and Y, δ > 0, and  ∈ (0, 1),
S δ,(|X|, |Y|, θ) ≤ 8(log(5/) + |Y| log |X|)
θ
(
(2 − e−δ) log(2 − e−δ) + e−δ − 1) . (5.5)
Note that, for small δ, the denominator behaves as δ2. If θ is of the order of
1/|X|, we get S (θ, δ, ) ≤ O
(
|X|(|Y| log |X| + log(1/))/δ2
)
.
Theorem 18 Given  ∈ (0, 1/3) and η > 0, there exists c,η > 0 (depending only on
 and η) and δη > 0 (depending only on η) such that for all θ ∈ (0, 1), for all discrete
alphabets X, and for infinitely many choices of |Y| with Y discrete,
S δη,(|X|, |Y|, θ) ≥ c,η
|Y|1−η
θ
. (5.6)
If θ → 0, the bound goes to infinity, which justifies our earlier claim that
S δ,(|X|, |Y|) is +∞.
Remark 21 In terms of the dependence on the alphabets, the upper and lower bounds
are within sub-polynomial factors of each other.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 17
Let
M(PX; PY |X) := exp{L(PX; PY |X)} =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X:
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x). (5.7)
It is straightforward to verify that a (1 − e−δ)-multiplicative estimator for
M(PX; PY |X) translates to a δ-additive estimator for L(PX; PY |X), where a δˆ-
multiplicative estimator means that |M − Mˆ| ≤ δˆM. Therefore, in the remainder,
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we will analyze multiplicative estimators of M. Now, consider n ∈ N, and let N ∼
Poi(n). (We consider Poisson sampling because it simplifies the analysis, and
we connect it later to fixed-length sampling.) Let (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . . , (XN ,YN) be
N independent samples drawn from a distribution PXY . For each x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y, let Nx denote the number of times x appears, Ny the number of times
y appears, and Nx,y the number of times (x, y) appears in the sequence. Then,
Nx ∼ Poi(nPX(x)), Ny ∼ Poi(nPY(y)), and Nx,y ∼ Poi(nPXY(x, y)). Now, let θ′ = θ/4.
The estimator works as follows:
1. For each x ∈ X with Nx > 0, generate a random variable N˜x ∼ Poi(nθ′). If
Nx = 0, set N˜x = 0.
2. For each x ∈ X with Nx > 0, keep only the first N˜x samples containing x
and disregard the rest.
(a) If there are not enough samples for some x (i.e., N˜x > Nx), then let
Mˆ = 1.
(b) Otherwise, let
Mˆ =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y
nθ′
, (5.8)
where N˜x,y is the number of times (x, y) appears in the truncated se-
quence.
To analyze the above estimator, we consider a slightly modified setting.
In particular, suppose the estimator has access to an infinite sequence
(X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . . Then, Nx = +∞ with probability 1 for each x ∈ supp(X). In
this case, for each (x, y) with PX(x) > 0, N˜x,y ∼ Poi(nθ′PY |X(y|x)). Now, consider
the following lemma, which is an application of the Chernoff bound to Poisson
random variables. The proof is straightforward and omitted.
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Lemma 18 Consider δ ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and let N ∼ Poi(λ).
Pr(N ≥ (1 + δ)λ) ≤ exp{λ(δ − (1 + δ) log(1 + δ))}, (5.9)
and
Pr(N ≤ (1 − δ)λ) ≤ exp{λ(−δ − (1 − δ) log(1 − δ))}. (5.10)
Remark 22 It is a simple exercise to check that the exponents are negative for all δ ∈
(0, 1).
For each y ∈ Y, let x(y) ∈ argmaxx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x). Let δˆ = 1 − e−δ, and consider the
following:
Pr
(
Mˆ − M ≤ −δˆM
)
= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y/nθ′ ≤ (1 − δˆ)M

= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y ≤ (1 − δˆ)Mnθ′

≤ Pr
∑
y∈Y
N˜x(y),y ≤ (1 − δˆ)Mnθ′

(a)
= Pr
(
Poi
(
nθ′M
) ≤ (1 − δˆ)Mnθ′)
(b)≤ exp
{
Mnθ′
(
−δˆ − (1 − δˆ) log(1 − δˆ)
)}
(c)≤ exp
{
nθ′
(
−δˆ − (1 − δˆ) log(1 − δˆ)
)}
, (5.11)
where (a) follows from the fact that N˜x,y’s are independent Poi
(
nθ′PY |X(y|x(y))), (b)
follows from Lemma 18, and (c) follows from the fact that M ≥ 1. Now consider
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the probability that Mˆ exceeds M by a factor of at least δˆM:
Pr
(
Mˆ − M ≥ δˆM
)
= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′

= Pr
 ⋃
(x1,...,x|Y|)∈X|Y|
∑
y∈Y
N˜xy,y ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′


= Pr
 ⋃
(x1,...,x|Y|)∈X|Y|
Poi
nθ′∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y|xy)
 ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′


(a)≤ |X||Y|Pr
(
Poi(nθ′M) ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′
)
(b)≤ |X||Y| exp
{
Mnθ′
(
δˆ − (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)
)}
(c)≤ |X||Y| exp
{
nθ′
(
δˆ − (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)
)}
, (5.12)
where (a) follows from Lemma 19 below and the fact that for any (x1, . . . , x|Y|) ∈
X|Y|, ∑y∈Y PY |X(y|xy) ≤ M, (b) follows from Lemma 18, and (c) follows from the
fact that M ≥ 1.
Lemma 19 Consider λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 such that λ1 ≥ λ2, and let N1 ∼ Poi(λ1), and
N2 ∼ Poi(λ2). Then, for all k,
Pr(N1 ≥ k) ≥ Pr(N2 ≥ k).
Proof: Let λ3 = λ1−λ2, and N3 ∼ Poi(λ3) independent of N2. Then N2+N3 ∼ Poi(λ1).
Hence Pr(N1 ≥ k) = Pr(N2 + N3 ≥ k) ≥ Pr(N2 ≥ k). 
Let
n? =
log(5/) + |Y| log |X|
θ′
(
(1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ) − δˆ
) . (5.13)
For such a choice, we get by (5.11) and (5.12),
Pr
(
|Mˆ − M| ≥ δˆM
)
≤ 2/5. (5.14)
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Remark 23 For all δˆ ∈ (0, 1), δˆ + (1 − δˆ) log(1 − δˆ) ≥ (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ) − δˆ.
Note that the Poisson estimator behaves identically to the infinite-sequence es-
timator unless there exists x ∈ supp(X) for which Nx = 0 or N˜x > Nx. Therefore,
we need to compute the probability of that event.
Pr
(
there exists x ∈ supp(X) : N˜x > Nx
)
≤
∑
x∈X
Pr(N˜x > Nx)
≤
∑
x∈∈supp(X)
Pr
(
Poi(n?θ′) ≥ Poi (n?PX(x)))
(a)≤
∑
x∈∈supp(X)
exp
{
−
( √
n?PX(x) −
√
n?θ′
)2}
(b)≤
∑
x∈∈supp(X)
exp
{
−
(√
4n?θ′ − √n?θ′
)2}
= |X|e−n?θ′
(c)≤ /5, (5.15)
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound, (b) follows from the fact that for all
x ∈ supp(X), PX(x) ≥ θ = 4θ′, and (c) follows from the fact that (1+ δˆ) log(1+ δˆ)− δˆ <
2 log 2 − 1 < 1 for δˆ ∈ (0, 1). Similarly,
Pr
(
there exists x ∈ supp(X) : Nx = 0) ≤∑
x∈supp(X)
Pr(Nx = 0) =
∑
x∈supp(X)
e−n
?PX(x) ≤ |X|e−n?θ′
≤ /5. (5.16)
Finally, we compare fixed-length sampling with Poisson sampling. Consider
an optimal fixed-length estimator with 2n? samples. Then, a Poi(n?) estimator
can outperform it only if N > 2n?. However, by Lemma 18,
Pr(Poi(n?) > 2n?) ≤ e−n?(2 log 2−1) ≤ /5. (5.17)
By equations (5.14), (5.15), (5.16), and (5.17), there exists a fixed-length estimator
with δˆ multiplicative accuracy (i.e., δ additive accuracy) and  probability of
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error that uses 2n? samples only. Hence,
S δ,(|X|, |Y|, θ) ≤ 2 log(5/) + |Y| log |X|
θ′
(
(1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ) − δˆ
) .
Plugging in δˆ = 1 − e−δ and θ′ = θ/4 yields Theorem 17.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 18
Let |Y| = k. We will derive a lower-bound on complexity by considering a sub-
problem, i.e., we will restrict our attention to a subset of PθX×Y (cf. (5.3)). In
particular, consider PXY ∈ PθX×Y which satisfy: PX(x1) = θ ∈ (0, 1), and PY |X has
the following form:
PY |X =

p1 p2 · · · pk
1/k 1/k · · · 1/k
...
...
...
1/k 1/k · · · 1/k

, (5.18)
where pY = (p1, p2, · · · , pk) is some distribution over Y. Now, for any distribu-
tion pY over Y, define
h(pY) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
{
1
k
, py
} . (5.19)
Therefore,
L(PX; PY |X) = h(PY |X(.|x1)). (5.20)
Hence, estimating maximal leakage for this subproblem is the same as estimat-
ing a property of PY |X(.|x1). We further simplify the analysis by considering Pois-
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son sampling. In particular, let
S˜ δ,(|X|, |Y|, θ) = inf
f
min{n : N ∼ Poi(n), Pr
(∣∣∣L(PX; PY |X) − f (XN ,YN)∣∣∣ > δ) < ,
for all PXY ∈ PθX×Y}, (5.21)
and
S˜ hδ,(|Y|) = inff min{n : N ∼ Poi(n),Pr
(∣∣∣h(PY) − f (YN)∣∣∣ > δ) < , for all PY ∈ PY},
(5.22)
where PY is the set of all probability distributions on Y, and Yn is drawn inde-
pendently according to PY . Since sampling Poi(n) from PXY gives Poi(nθ) samples
from PY |X(.|x1), we get
S˜ δ,(|X|, |Y|, θ)) ≥ S˜ hδ,(|Y|)/θ. (5.23)
On the other hand, given N ∼ Poi(n),
inf
f
Pr
(∣∣∣L(PX; PY |X) − f (XN ,YN)∣∣∣ > δ) > 
⇒ inf
f
Pr
(∣∣∣L(PX; PY |X) − f (Xn/2,Yn/2)∣∣∣ > δ) > /2, (5.24)
when n > log(2/)/ log(e/2). It remains to show that, for each η > 0,
S˜ hδ,(k) ≥ Ω(k1−η). (5.25)
To that end, let Y1,Y2, · · · ,YN be N independent samples drawn from pY , where
N ∼ Poi(n). Since h(·) is symmetric, and the sampling is done i.i.d, the profile
Φ(YN) is a sufficient statistic, i.e., Φ = (Φ1,Φ2, · · · ) where Φl is the number of
elements y that appeared l times in the sequence YN . To get a lower bound on
S˜ hδ,(k), we will exhibit two distribution pY and qY such that
|h(pY) − h(qY)| > 2δ, (5.26)
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and when n ≤ O(k1−η),
‖pΦ − qΦ‖TV < , (5.27)
where pΦ and qΦ are the induced distributions on the profiles under Poisson
sampling by distributions pY and qY , respectively, and ‖.‖TV is the total variation
distance. If we can exhibit such distributions, then the probability of error is at
least 1/2 − /2 >  for  < 1/3. To that end, the following lemma, shown by
Valiant [48], will be useful:
Lemma 20 ( [48] [1, Theorem 19]) Given distributions p and q such that
max
y
max{py, qy} ≤ 40n , (5.28)
for Poisson sampling with N ∼ Poi(n), it holds that
‖pΦ − qΦ‖TV ≤ /2 + 5
∞∑
m=1
nm|Pm(p) − Pm(q)|, (5.29)
where Pm(p) =
∑
y pmy .
So we will construct distributions such that they satisfy (5.26) and their mo-
ments are equal up to an arbitrarily high degree. The following construction is
based on the work of Acharya et al. [1] on Renyi entropy estimation. Fix η > 0.
Let d be a fixed even integer satisfying d < 1/η, and let k = d` for some ` ∈ N.
Let v = (v1, v2, · · · , vd) ∈ Rd, and associate with v the following distribution:
pvi j =
|vi|
`‖v‖1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ `. (5.30)
Note that (by a simple calculation),
Pm(pv) =
1
`m−1
(‖v‖m
‖v‖1
)m
. (5.31)
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Now, let v = (1, 2, · · · , d). Consider the polynomial
p(z) = (z − 1)(z − 2) · · · (z − d), (5.32)
and let q(z) = p(z) − ∆, where ∆ is small enough so that q(z) has d positive roots.
Let w = (w1,w2, · · · ,wd) represent the roots of q(z). Since the sum of the first d − 1
powers of a root of a polynomial of dth order do not depend on its constant (by
the Newton-Girard identities [32]), then
‖v‖m = ‖w‖m, 1 ≤ m ≤ d − 1. (5.33)
By letting qw be the distribution associated with w (similarly to (5.30)), we get
by (5.31) and (5.33)
∞∑
m=1
nm|Pm(pv) − Pm(qw)| =
∞∑
m=d
nm
`m−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(‖v‖m
‖v‖1
)m
−
(‖w‖m
‖v‖1
)m∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (5.34)
Suppose n ≤ C,d`1−1/d for some constant C,d. Then,
∞∑
m=1
nm|Pm(pv) − Pm(qw)| =
∞∑
m=d
nm
`m−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(‖v‖m
‖v‖1
)m
−
(‖w‖m
‖v‖1
)m∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
m=d
(C,d`1−1/d)m
`m−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(‖v‖m
‖v‖1
)m
−
(‖w‖m
‖v‖1
)m∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∞∑
m=d
Cm,d
`m/d−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(‖v‖m
‖v‖1
)m
−
(‖w‖m
‖v‖1
)m∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ `
∞∑
m=d
(
C,d
`1/d
)m
=
Cd,d
1 −C,d/`1/d
≤ C
d
,d
1 −C,d
≤ /10, (5.35)
where the last inequality holds for the proper choice of C,d, which we will de-
note by Cˆ,d. Therefore, when (5.28) holds, ‖pΦ − qΦ‖TV ≤ . For (5.26), we will
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show that |h(pY) − h(qY)| is a non-zero constant independent of θ and `. To that
end, let pi = vi‖v‖1 , qi =
wi
‖v‖1 . Recall
h(pY) = log
∑
i, j
max
{
1
k
, pi j
} ,
and note that
pi j >
1
k
⇔ |vi|
`‖v‖1 >
1
`d
⇔ pi > 1d ⇔
i
d(d + 1)/2
>
1
d
⇔ i > d + 1
2
.
Then,
eh(p) =
d∑
i=d/2+1
∑`
j=1
pi j +
d/2∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
1/k =
d∑
i=d/2+1
pi +
d/2∑
i=1
1/d =
1
2
+
1
d(d + 1)/2
d∑
i=d/2+1
i
=
5
4
− 1
4(d + 1)
. (5.36)
To evaluate h(q), we will approximate wi − vi. First, note that∫ wi
vi
p′(z)dz = p(wi) − p(vi) = q(wi) + ∆ = ∆. (5.37)
Then, for small ∆, we get
(wi − vi)p′(vi) = ∆ + o(∆)⇒ wi − vi = ∆p′(vi) + o(∆). (5.38)
Now, note that
p′(z) =
d∑
i=1
∏
j,i
(z − j).
Then, for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d},
p′(i) = (i − 1)...(i − (i − 1)) · (i − (i + 1))...(i − d) = (−1)d−i d!
i
(
d
i
) . (5.39)
It follows from (5.38) and (5.39) that for ∆ small enough, pi > 1/d implies qi >
1/d, and similarly pi < 1/d implies qi < 1/d. (d was chosen to be even so that
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pi , 1/d for all i.) Then,
eh(q) =
d∑
i=d/2+1
∑`
j=1
qi j +
d/2∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
1/k
=
1
2
+
d∑
i=d/2+1
qi
=
1
2
+
1
d(d + 1)/2
d∑
i=d/2+1
[vi + (wi − vi)]
(a)
=
5
4
− 1
4(d + 1)
+
2∆
d(d + 1)
d∑
i=d/2+1
(
1
p′(i)
+ o(1)
)
=
5
4
− 1
4(d + 1)
+
2∆
d(d + 1)
d∑
i=d/2+1
(−1)d−i i
(
d
i
)
d!
+ o(1)

(b)
=
5
4
− 1
4(d + 1)
− 2∆
d(d + 1)
(−1)d/2
d(d + 2)
(
d
d/2+1
)
4(d − 1)(d!) + o(∆), (5.40)
where (a) follows from equations (5.36) and (5.38), and (b) follows from the
Lemma below (the proof of which is given in Appendix D). Note that (5.36)
and (5.40) imply h(p) , h(q), and the difference is independent of ` and 
i.e., (5.26) holds for small enough (constant) δ.
To sum up, if n ≤ Cˆ,d`1−1/d and (5.28) holds, then (5.27) holds and the prob-
ability of error subsequently exceeds . Since maxymax{py, qy} ≈ 2/(d`), (5.28)
holds when n ≤ d`/80. That is, we need n ≥ min{d`/80, Cˆ,d`1−1/d}. Hence,
n ≥ Ω(C˜,d`1−1/d) = Ω(C˜,dd1/d−1k1−1/d). (5.41)
Since d was arbitrary, we have established Theorem 18. 
Lemma 21 For d even, and 1 ≤ j ≤ d/2,
d∑
i=d/2+ j
(−1)d−i
(
d
i
)
i = (−1)d/2− j
(2 j + d − 2)(2 j + d)
(
d
d/2+ j
)
4(d − 1) .
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this thesis, we introduced maximal leakage as an operationally-defined
measure to quantify information leakage, particularly in side-channel problems.
The measure satisfies axiomatic properties of an information measure, is simple
to compute, and is robust to variations in its definition. Moreover, it is sand-
wiched between mutual information and local differential privacy (which is
known to be pessimistic).
Furthermore, we studied the Shannon cipher system using maximal leak-
age as a performance metric. Counter-intuitively, we showed that memoryless
schemes are strictly suboptimal, whereas quantization-based schemes achieve
optimality. A limitation of this study is that it allows for non-causal encoding.
Such an assumption is in many cases unrealistic. Even block coding can intro-
duce unacceptable delays, which is particularly true for the SSH example. We
propose then to consider causal encoding for the IBS (with a memoryless source).
We conjecture that the following causal scheme is optimal (and in fact matches
the non-causal performance): Let PY |X be the optimal test channel. Then for each
x ∈ X, choose a sequence YnPX(x)x from the typical set corresponding to PY |X=x. As
the source sequence arrives, for the ith appearance of symbol x, we output Yx(i).
Concurrently, we monitor the empirical type of the incoming source sequence:
this is an |X|-dimensional random walk. The distribution of PX implies that
there is a certain (small enough) ball in which the trajectory will reside with
high probability (e.g., the concentration at the endpoint is dictated by the law of
large numbers). If the empirical trajectory ever leaves that ball, we will output
junk for the remainder of the block. The intuition is that this will only happen
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for atypical sequences. Moreover, we propose to study a timing version of the
IBS, which most resembles the SSH side-channel. In this case, the input and
output are point processes, which can be handled by the general formula given
in Theorem 4, and the fidelity constraint is replaced with a maximum and an
average delay constraint. Additionally, maximal leakage can be used to revisit
other design problems for leakage mitigation, which have been studied under a
different leakage metric, such as the wiretap channel.
Our study of the sample complexity of estimating maximal leakage from
data suggests that, for mechanism design problems, it is better to restrict the
space of schemes to those that are amenable to mathematical analysis. Indeed,
the task of learning maximal leakage from data is infeasible unless we make a
certain assumption about the source distribution. Therefore, in the absence of
this assumption, it is infeasible to analyze a given scheme solely from simula-
tions.
Finally, we explored connections between maximal leakage and existing in-
formation metrics. In particular, we used the guessing framework to provide
operational definitions for commonly used leakage measures (such as mutual
information and local differential privacy). Such connections provide an inter-
esting area for further study. For instance, we noted that maximal leakage is
equal to Sibson mutual information of order infinity, which is a generalization
of Renyi entropy and Renyi divergence. However, there is no definition in the
literature for conditional Sibson mutual information, and as such, conditional
maximal leakage might inspire such a definition. It is also worth noting that
I∞(X;Y) has been recently proposed as a complexity measure in the communi-
cation complexity literature, and has appeared in the compression literature as
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the Shtarkov sum. The connection between the maximal leakage formula and
hypothesis testing suggests that it could be useful in the study of classification
and learning problems.
116
APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR SECTION 3.5
A.1 Proof of Theorem 11
To show (≤) direction, fix U, Uˆ and d, and consider:
inf
Uˆ:X−Y−Uˆ
E[d(U, Uˆ)] =
∑
y∈Y
min
uˆ
∑
u∈U
PUY(u, y)d(u, uˆ)
=
∑
y∈Y
min
uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)d(u, uˆ)
≥
∑
y∈Y
minuˆ ∑
u∈U
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
 minx˜∈supp(X) PY |X(y|x˜)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
min
uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)]
)
min
x˜∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|x˜).
For the reverse direction, let U = X, Xˆ = supp(X), and
d(x, xˆ) =

1
PX(x)
, x = xˆ,
0, x , xˆ.
(A.1)
Then,
min
xˆ∈supp(X)
E[d(X, xˆ)] =
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)d(x, xˆ) = min
xˆ∈supp(X)
PX(xˆ)d(xˆ, xˆ) = 1, (A.2)
and for a given y ∈ Y,
min
xˆ∈supp(X)
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)d(x, xˆ) = min
xˆ∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|xˆ), (A.3)
which concludes the proof. 
A.2 Proof of Corollary 6
In the following, assume X has full support.
117
1) The data processing inequality follows directly from the definition.
2) If PY |X is non-trivial and deterministic, then for each y such that PY(y) > 0,
there exists x ∈ supp(X) such that PY |X(y|x) = 0.
3) The “if” direction is straightforward. The “only if” direction follows from
the fact that, for each y, minx PY |X(y|x) ≤ PY(y). Thus, ∑yminx PY |X(y|x) = 1 ⇒
∀y,minx PY |X(y|x) = PY(y)⇒ X and Y are independent.
4) Local-differential privacy upper-bounds maximal cost leakage since:
1∑
yminx PY |X(y|x) =
∑
y PY(y)∑
yminx PY |X(y|x) ≤ maxy
PY(y)
minx PY |X(y|x) ≤ maxx,x′,y
PY |X(y|x′)
PY |X(y|x) .
Example 9 is an example of 5), and 6) is straightforward.
7) Convexity follows from the fact that minx PY |X(y|x) is concave in PY |X, and
(− log) is a non-increasing convex function.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 12
Without loss of generality, assume X and Y have full support. To show LHS ≤
RHS, fix any Xˆ, d and y ∈ Y, and consider:
min
uˆ∈Uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)|Y = y] = min
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
PU |Y(u|y)d(u, uˆ)
= min
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX|Y(x|y)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
= min
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
PY(y)
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
≥ min
uˆ∈Uˆ
minx′ PY |X(y|x′)
PY(y)
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
=
minx′ PY |X(y|x′)
PY(y)
min
uˆ∈Uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)].
The reverse direction follows by using the same d as in (A.1).
A.4 Proof of Corollary 7
To show that the left-hand side is upper-bounded by the right-hand side, note
that PY(y) ≤ maxx PY |X(y|x). For the reverse direction, consider the following.
Let y? be an element achieving the max of Ldp. Let x0 ∈ argminx PY |X(y?|x) and
x1 ∈ argmaxx PY |X(y?|x). Finally, for a given α > 0, let PX(x0) = 1−α and PX(x1) = α.
Then,
max
PX
Lrc(X→Y) ≥ log PY(y
?)
PY |X(y?|x0)
= log
(1 − α)PY |X(y?|x0) + αPY |X(y?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0)
α→1−−−→ log PY |X(y
?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0) = L
dp(X→Y). 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EQUATION (4.12)
Let PY |X =
1 −W10 W10W01 1 −W01
 (where the first column corresponds to y = 0,
the second to y = 1). Dropping the log, we can rewrite the problem as:
minimize max{1 −W10,W01} + max{W10, 1 −W01} (B.1)
subject to (1 − p)W10 + pW01 ≤ D, 0 ≤ W10,W01 ≤ 1.
Now note that
W10 + W01
(a)≤ 1 − p
p
W10 + W01 =
1
p
((1 − p)W10 + pW01)
(b)≤ D
p
(c)≤ 1, (B.2)
where (a) follows because p ≤ 1/2, (b) follows from the constraint in (B.1), and
(c) follows because D ≤ p. Using (B.2), we can rewrite (B.1) as
minimize 2 − (W10 + W01) (B.3)
subject to (1 − p)W10 + pW01 ≤ D, 0 ≤ W10,W01 ≤ 1.
Therefore, we need to maximize (W10 + W01). By (3), the sum is upper-bounded
by D/p. The upper bound can be achieved by setting
W?10 = 0 and W
?
01 = D/p, (B.4)
which clearly satisfies the constraint in (B.1). Therefore, for the optimal P?Y |X, we
get
L(X → Y?) = log(2 − D/p). (B.5)
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR SECTION 4.6
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7
C.1.1 Proof of Property (P1)
(P1): For fixed PXY , R(PXY ,De) is a finite valued, non-increasing convex function
of De. Furthermore, R(PXY ,De) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair
(PXY ,De).
Fix PXY . The minimization in (4.15) is over a compact set, which is non-
empty due to assumption (A3). Since I(X;V |Y) is a continuous function of PV |X,Y ,
the minimum is achieved. The monotonicity in De follows directly from the def-
inition. It is easy to check that I(X;V |Y) is convex in PV |X,Y for fixed PXY . Then,
the proof of the convexity of R(PXY ,De) in De follows similarly to the case of the
rate-distortion function with no side information (see Lemma 2.2.2 in [11]).
To show the uniform continuity in the pair (PXY ,De), consider the following
proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix C.7.1.
Proposition 22 Let N1 and N2 be in N, and let S andU be compact subsets of RN1 and
RN2 , respectively. Let ν be a non-negative continuous function defined on S × U, and
let ϑ be a real-valued continuous function defined on S × U. Suppose they satisfy the
following condition:
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(PA) If (s, u1) ∈ S×U satisfies ν(s, u1) = minu′∈U ν(s, u′), then there exists u2 such that
ϑ(s, u2) = ϑ(s, u1), and for all s′ ∈ S, ν(s′, u2) = minu′∈U ν(s′, u′).
Let t0 = maxs∈Sminu∈U ν(s, u), and let ϕ be a function on S× [t0,+∞) defined as follows:
ϕ(s, t) = min
u:ν(s,u)≤t
ϑ(s, u).
If for fixed s ∈ S, ϕ(s, t) is continuous in t, then ϕ(s, t) is continuous in the pair (s, t).
Remark 24 The proposition generalizes Lemma 2.2.2 in [11], which shows the conti-
nuity of the regular rate-distortion function, and the proof follows along similar lines.
The proposition yields immediately the continuity of R(PXY ,De) by identify-
ing S with PXY, U with the set of conditional probability distributions PV |XY ,
t0 with De,min, and the functions ν, ϑ, and ϕ with E[de(X,V)], I(X;V |Y), and
R(PXY ,De) respectively. It is easy to check that De,min = maxPXY minPV |XY E[de(X,V)]
so that we can identify it with t0. To see why E[de(X,V)] and I(X;V |Y) sat-
isfy (PA), note the following. For notational convenience, we write E[de(X,V)]
as de(PXY , PV |XY), and I(X;V |Y) as I(PXY , PV |XY). Suppose de(PXY , PV |XY) =
minPˆV |XY de(PXY , PˆV |XY) and let De(x) = minv∈V de(x, v) for x ∈ X. Then for all (x, v)
such that de(x, v) > De(x), PXV(x, v) = 0. Expanding PXV(x, v):
PXV(x, v) =
∑
y PXY(x, y)PV |XY(v|x, y) = 0 ⇒ for all y ∈ Y, PXY(x, y) = 0 or
PV |XY(v|x, y) = 0. Then, define P′V |XY as follows:
• If PXY(x, y) > 0, let P′V |(X=x,Y=y) = PV |(X=x,Y=y).
• If PXY(x, y) = 0, let P′V |(X=x,Y=y) satisfy P′V |(X=x,Y=y)(v|x, y) = 0 if de(x, v) > De(x).
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Then PXYPV |X,Y = PXYP′V |X,Y , thus I(PXY , PV |XY) = I(PXY , P
′
V |XY). Moreover, the defi-
nition of P′V |XY guarantees that de(x, v) > De(x) ⇒ P′V |XY(v|x, y) = 0 for all y. There-
fore, for any joint distribution P′XY , de(P
′
XY , P
′
V |XY) = minPˆV |XY de(PXY , PˆV |XY).
Finally, to prove uniform continuity, note that R(PXY ,De) = R(PXY ,De,max) for
all De ≥ De,max. Therefore, R(PXY ,De) is uniformly continuous on the set PXY ×
[De,max,∞). Since it is also uniformly continuous on PXY × [De,min,De,max], the
result is established. 
C.1.2 Proof of Property (P2)
(P2): For fixed PX, R(PX,D,De) is a finite-valued function of (D,De). Moreover,
for fixed De, R(PX,D,De) is a uniformly continuous function of the pair (PX,D).
Fix PX. The maximization in (4.16) is over a compact set, which is non-empty
due to assumption (A3). Since R(PXY ,De) is a continuous function of PXY , it is
also continuous in PY |X for fixed PX. Therefore, the maximum is achieved.
As for the continuity in (PX,D) for fixed De, we view R(PX,D,De) as a
function of (PX,D), and R(PXY ,De) as function of (PX, PY |X). In the terminol-
ogy of Proposition 22, we identify S with PX, U with the set of conditional
probability distributions PY |X, t0 with Dmin, and the functions ν, ϑ, and ϕ with
E[d(X,Y)], −R(PXY ,De), and −R(PX,D,De) respectively. Proving that E[d(X,Y)]
and R(PXY ,De) satisfy (PA) follows along the same lines as proving E[de(X,V)]
and I(X;V |Y) satisfy (PA) . Moreover, if continuity holds, uniform continuity
follows from the fact that R(PX,D,De) is constant for all D ≥ Dmax.
It remains to show that R(PX,D,De) is a continuous function of D for fixed PX
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and De. The result of Proposition 22 then applies immediately. To this end, con-
sider the following proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix C.7.2
Proposition 23 Let N be in N, and let T be a non-empty compact subset of RN . Let L
be a real-valued continuous function defined on T . Let T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇ · · · be a decreasing
sequence of non-empty compact subsets of T . Let T = ⋂i≥1 Ti. Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Tk
L(t) = max
t∈T
L(t).
Moreover, let S 1 ⊆ S 2 ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of non-empty compact subsets of
T . Let S = ⋃i≥1 S i (where the bar denotes closure of the set). Then
lim
k→∞
max
t∈S k
L(t) = max
t∈S
L(t).
Consequently, if T is also convex, and Lc is a real-valued convex and continuous func-
tion defined on T with s0 = mint∈T Lc(t), then
Lˆ(s) := max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t)
is continuous in s ∈ [s0,+∞).
It follows immediately then that R(PX,D,De) is continuous in D for fixed
PX and De, since E[d(X,Y)] is convex and continuous in PY |X, and R(PXY ,De) is
continuous in PY |X (for fixed PX).
C.1.3 Proof of Property (P3)
(P3): Re(PX,De) − R(PX,D) ≤ R(PX,D,De) ≤ Re(PX,De).
The upper bound is straightforward since R(PXY ,De), the rate-distortion
function with side information, is always upper-bounded by Re(PX,De). The
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lower bound is derived by considering a conditional P?Y |X that achieves the rate-
distortion function.
R(PX,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V)]≤De
I(X;V |Y)
≥ min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V)]≤De
HP?XY (X|Y) − HP?XYPV |XY (X|V,Y) (C.1)
≥ min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V)]≤De
HP?XY (X|Y) − HPXPV |X (X|V) (C.2)
= −HPX (X) + HP?XY (X|Y)+
min
PV |X,Y :
E[de(X,V)]≤De
HPX (X) − HPXPV |X (X|V)
= −R(PX,D) + Re(PX,De).
C.2 Proof of Proposition 9
First, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 24 For all  > 0, there exists n2(, |X|, |Y|, |V|), such that for all n ≥ n2,
for all De ≥ De,min, for each QXY ∈ QnXY ,∣∣∣∣ min
PXYV∈QnXYV (QXY ,De)
IPXYV (X;V |Y) − R(QXY ,De)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
Proof: It follows directly from the definition that
min
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
IPXYV (X;V |Y) ≥ R(QXY ,De).
So, we only need to show the other direction. To that end, let δ > 0 be small
enough such that
‖PXYV − P′XYV‖ ≤ δ⇒
∣∣∣IPXYV (X;V |Y) − IP′XYV (X;V |Y)∣∣∣ ≤ , (C.3)
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where ‖ · ‖ is used to indicate the L2-norm. Let n ≥ n2 ≥ |V|
√|X||Y||V|/δ. Fix
QXY ∈ QnXY, and let P?V |XY be the conditional distribution achieving the minimum
in R(QXY ,De). We construct a conditional distribution P′V |XY as follows. For each
(x, y) ∈ X × Y, we will choose P′V |X=x,Y=y from QnQXY (x,y)V , i.e., the set of rational
PMFs over V with denominator nQXY(x, y) (if QXY(x, y) = 0, then we can choose
P′V |X=x,Y=y to be any distribution). This guarantees that QXYP
′
V |XY is in QnXYV. Let
v(x) = argminv∈V de(x, v) for x ∈ X (if more than one v achieves the minimum,
choose one arbitrarily). We construct P′V |XY by rounding P
?
V |XY as follows. For
each (x, y) ∈ X × V, for v , v(x), we set P′V |XY(v|x, y) to be the largest integer mul-
tiple of 1/(nQXY(x, y)) that is smaller than P?V |XY(v|x, y), i.e., we round down with
resolution 1/(nQXY(x, y)) and denote this operation by b.cnQXY (x,y). Finally, we set
P′V |XY(v(x)|x, y) appropriately to make P′V |XY(.|x, y) a valid probability distribution.
It is easy to see that, for such a choice,
∣∣∣P′V |XY(v|x, y) − P?V |XY(v|x, y)∣∣∣ ≤ |V|nQXY(x, y) .
Moreover, this readily implies that
∥∥∥QXYP′V |XY − QXYP?V |XY∥∥∥ ≤ |V|√|X||Y||V|n ≤ δ. (C.4)
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Let P?XYV = QXYP
?
V |XY , and P
′
XYV = QXYP
′
V |XY . Now, note that
De ≥ EP?XYV [de(X,V)]
=
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY(x, y)P?V |XY(v|x, y)de(x, v)
=
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY(x, y)bP?V |XY(v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)de(x, v)
+
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY(x, y)
(
P?V |XY(v|x, y) − bP?V |XY(v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)
)
de(x, v)
≥
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY(x, y)bP?V |XY(v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)de(x, v)
+
∑
x,y
∑
v
QXY(x, y)
(
P?V |XY(v|x, y)− bP?V |XY(v|x, y)cnQXY (x,y)
)
de(x, v(x))
= EP′XYV [de(X,V)].
Therefore,
min
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
IPXYV (X;V |Y) ≤ IP′XYV (X;V |Y) ≤ IP?XYV (X;V |Y) +  = R(QXY ,De) + ,
where the second inequality follows from (C.3) and (C.4). 
Similarly, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 25 For all  > 0, there exists n3(, |X|, |Y|, de), such that for all n ≥ n3,
D ≥ Dmin, De ≥ De,min, and for each QX ∈ QnX,∣∣∣∣ max
PXY∈QnXY (QX ,D)
R(QXY ,De) − R(QX,D,De)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
The proof follows along the same lines as that of Proposition 24, and is thus
omitted. 
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By the previous two propositions, for any given  > 0, we can set n large
enough to satisfy ∣∣∣IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y) − R(QX,D,De)∣∣∣ ≤ ,
for all QX ∈ QnX. Therefore,
min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P) + R(QX,D,De) −  ≤ min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P) + IP?n (QX)(X;V |Y)
≤ min
QX∈QnX
D(QX ||P) + R(QX,D,De) + 
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is arbitrary, the proof
is concluded.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 12
C.3.1 Proof of Property (P4)
(P4): For fixed PX, R(PX,R,D,De) is a finite-valued function of (R,D,De). More-
over, for fixed De, R(PX,R,D,De) is continuous in the triple (PX,R,D) over the set
S = {(PX,R,D) : PX ∈ PX,D ≥ Dmin,R > R(PX,D)}.
Recall, for PX satisfying R(PX,D) ≤ R,
R(PX,R,D,De) = max
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y)]≤D
I(X;Y)≤R
R(PXY ,De).
For fixed PX, let S D,R =
{
PY |X : E[d(X,Y)] ≤ D, I(X;Y) ≤ R}. Then S D,R is compact,
and non-empty since D ≥ Dmin and R ≥ R(PX,D). Since R(PXY ,De) is a continu-
ous function of PXY (by Proposition 7), it is also continuous in PY |X for fixed PX.
Therefore, the maximum is achieved.
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To prove continuity of R(PX,R,D,De) in (PX,R,D), first consider the following
claims.
Claim 1: For fixed PX, De, and D, R(PX,R,D,De) is continuous in R, where
R ∈ [R(PX,D),+∞).
This follows from the third part of Proposition 23 in Appendix C.1 by iden-
tifying T with {PY |X : E[d(X,Y)] ≤ D} (which is compact, convex, and non-empty
since D ≥ Dmin), Lc with I(X;Y) which is convex and continuous in PY |X, s0 with
R(PX,D), L with R(PXPY |X,De), and Lˆ with R(PX,R,D,De).
Claim 2: For fixed PX, De, and R, R(PX,R,D,De) is continuous in D, where
D ∈ [D(PX,R),+∞) and D(PX,R) := minPY |X :I(X;Y)≤R E[d(X,Y)] is the distortion-rate
function.
This follows from a similar argument.
We are now ready to prove continuity in the triple (PX,R,D) over S =
{(PX,R,D) : PX ∈ PX,D ≥ Dmin,R > R(PX,D)}.
To that end, fix any (P,R,D) ∈ S and consider any sequence (Pk,Rk,Dk)
converging to (P,R,D). First, we show that lim infk→∞ R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De) ≥
R(P,R,D,De). Consider any  > 0. By continuity of R(P,R,D,De) in R (for fixed
P, D, and De), we can choose R′ such that R(PX,D) < R′ < R and R(P,R′,D,De) ≥
R(P,R,D,De)−/2. We now consider two cases depending on the value of D. Let
D0 = minPY |X E[d(X,Y)].
If D > D0: note that D(P,R) is non-increasing in R, therefore D′(P,R) ≤
0. Moreover, it is convex in R and R(P,D) does not achieve its minimum
(D(P,R(P,D)) = D > D0), hence D′(P,R(P,D)) < 0. Therefore, R > R(P,D) ⇒
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D(P,R) < D. Now choose D′ such that D(P,R) < D′ < D and R(P,R′,D′,De) ≥
R(P,R′,D,De) − /2. Let P?Y |X be a maximizer for R(P,R′,D′,De).
If D = D0: set D′ = D and P′Y |X be a maximizer for R(P,R
′,D,De). Let D(x) =
miny∈Y d(x, y) for x ∈ X. Then P′Y |X must satisfy the following property: for all
(x, y) such that d(x, y) > D(x), P(x) = 0 or P′Y |X(y|x) = 0. We can construct P?Y |X
such that d(x, y) > D(x) ⇒ P?Y |X(y|x) = 0, and P(x) > 0 ⇒ P?Y |X=x = P′Y |X=x. As such,
PP′Y |X = PP
?
Y |X.
We claim that P?Y |X is feasible for the maximization in R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De) for suf-
ficiently large k. Indeed, I(Pk; P?Y |X) → I(P; P?Y |X) ≤ R′ < R. Then for sufficiently
large k, I(P; P?Y |X) ≤ Rk. Moreover, if D > D0, then E[d(Pk, P?Y |X)] → E[d(P, P?Y |X)] ≤
D′ < D. Then for sufficiently large k, E[d(Pk, P?Y |X)] ≤ Dk. Similarly, if D = D0,
then E[d(Pk, P?Y |X)] = minPY |X E[d(Pk, PY |X)] ≤ Dmin ≤ Dk, where the first equality
follows from the construction of P?Y |X. So we get
lim inf
k→∞
R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De) ≥ lim inf
k→∞
R(PkP?Y |X,De)
= R(PP?Y |X,De)
= R(P,R′,D′,De)
≥ R(P,R,D,De) − ,
where the first equality follows from the continuity of R(PXY ,De) in PXY . Noting
that  is arbitrary, we get our first inequality.
On the other hand, let P(k)Y |X be a maximizer for R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De). Consider a
sequence of integers {k j} such that
R(Pk j ,Rk j ,Dk j ,De)→ lim sup
k→∞
R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De).
Let P(k j)Y |X be the corresponding subsequence of maximizers. Since the set of condi-
tional distributions {PY |X} is bounded, {P(k j)Y |X} has a convergent subsequence P
(k j` )
Y |X .
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Let P?Y |X be its limit. We have, I(P; P
?
Y |X) = lim`→∞ I(P; P
(k j` )
Y |X ) ≤ lim`→∞ Rk j` = R.
Similarly, E[d(P, P?Y |X)] = lim`→∞ E[d(P, P
(k j` )
Y |X )] ≤ lim`→∞ Dk j` = D. Therefore,
R(P,R,D,De) ≥ R(PP?Y |X,De)
= lim
`→∞
R(Pk j`P
k j`
Y |X,De)
= lim
`→∞
R(Pk j` ,Rk j` ,Dk j` ,De)
= lim sup
k→∞
R(Pk,Rk,Dk,De).
C.3.2 Proof of Property (P5)
(P5): Re(PX,De) − R(PX,D) ≤ R(PX,R,D,De) ≤ R(PX,D,De) ≤ Re(PX,De).
The upper bound follows straightforwardly from the definition and (P3).
The lower bound follows from the proof of (P3). Indeed, the bound in (P3)
was derived by considering a conditional P?Y |X that achieves the rate-distortion
function. As such, this choice is feasible since IP?XY (X;Y) = R(PX,D) ≤ R.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 13
Note that the second equality follows simply from the evaluation of Re(Q,De) −
R(Q,D). So we only need to show the first equality.
Note that (P3) asserts that R(Q,D,De) ≥ Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D), so we only need
to show the reverse direction. Moreover, if H(Q) ≤ H(D), R(Q,D) = 0. It then
follows from (P3) that R(Q,D,De) = Re(Q,De). It remains to show that, for Q
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satisfying H(Q) ≥ H(D),
R(Q,D,De) ≤ Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D).
Remark 25 The following proof was suggested by the reviewer, and it significantly
simplifies our previous proof.
To that end, let PY |X satisfy E[d(X,Y)] ≤ D, X˜ = X ⊕ Y , V˜ = V ⊕ Y and consider
min
PV |XY :E[d(X,V)]≤De
I(X;V |Y) = min
PV |XY :E[d(X⊕Y,V⊕Y)]≤De
I(X ⊕ Y;V ⊕ Y |Y)
= min
PV˜ |X˜Y :E[d(X˜,V˜)]≤De
I(X˜; V˜ |Y)
≤ min
PV˜ |X˜ :E[d(X˜,V˜)]≤De
V−X−Y
I(X˜; V˜ |Y)
≤ min
PV˜ |X˜ :E[d(X˜,V˜)]≤De
I(X˜; V˜) = [H(X˜) − H(De)]+
(a)≤ H(D) − H(De),
where (a) follows from the fact that Pr(X˜ = 1) = E[d(X,Y)] ≤ D. Therefore,
R(Q,D,De) = max
PY |X :E[d(X,Y)]≤D
min
PV |XY :E[d(X,V)]≤De
I(X;V |Y) ≤ H(D) − H(De)
= Re(Q,De) − R(Q,D),
as desired. 
C.5 Proof of Lemma 15
Proof of 1): For xn ∈ TQX , and m ∈ [N], let
Nxn,m = I{(xn,Ynm) ∈ TQXY }, so that Nxn =
N∑
m=1
Nxn,m.
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Note that, Nxn,m ∼ Ber(β), where
β = Pr((xn,Ynm) ∈ TQXY ) =
|TQY |X (xn)|
|TQY |
,
⇒ 2−n(IQXY (X;Y)+/2) ≤ β ≤ 2−n(IQXY (X;Y)−/2). (C.5)
Therefore,
Pr(Nxn = 0) = Pr(Nxn,m = 0,∀m ∈ [N]) (a)=
N∏
m=1
(1 − β) (b)≤ e−βN ≤ e−2n/6 , (C.6)
where (a) follows from the independence of Nxn,m for different m’s, and (b) fol-
lows from the fact that (1 − t)N ≤ e−tN . On the other hand,
Pr(Nxn > 22n) = Pr
 N∑
m=1
Nxn,m > 22n
 (a)≤ (eNβ22n
)22n
≤ (e2−n/2)22n , (C.7)
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound (cf. [41, Lemma 2]). Using equa-
tions (C.6) and (C.7) and the union bound, we get
Pr(E) ≤ |X|n
(
(e2−n/2)2
2n
+ e−2
n/6) ≤ e−2n/7 ,
establishing (4.41). 
Proof of 2): To show that (4.42) holds, consider Cn < E, and (xn,m) where
m ∈ C(xn),
PCXn |M(x
n|m) = P
C
M|Xn(m|xn)∑
xn∈TQX|Y (ynm) P
C
M|Xn(m|xn)
≤ 1
2n(HQXY (X|Y)−)2−2n
= 2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3). (C.8)
Then,
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cn) =
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
PCXn |M(x
n|m)
≤
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
(xn,ynm)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
(a)≤ max
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
2n(HPXYV (X|V,Y)+)2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
= max
PXYV∈Qn(QXY ,De)
2−n(IPXYV (X;V |Y)−4)
≤ 2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4), (C.9)
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where (a) follows from (4.23). It remains to show (4.43). To that end, note that,
given yn ∈ Yn and m ∈ [N],
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec) ≤ Pr(Y
n
m = y
n)
Pr(Ec) ≤
2−n(HQY (Y)−/2)
1 − e−2n/7 ≤ 2
−n(HQY (Y)−).
Therefore,
E[Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cn)|Ec]
=
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Cn|Ec)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cn)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Ynm = yn,Ec)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cn)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Ynm = yn,Ec)
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
PCXn |M(x
n|m)
(a)≤
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
Cn∈Ec
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec)Pr(Cn|Ynm = yn,Ec)
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec)
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
(xn,yn)∈TQXY
2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
=
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
∑
yn∈TQY |X (xn)
Pr(Ynm = y
n|Ec)2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
≤
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
∑
yn∈TQY |X (xn)
2−n(HQY (Y)−/2)2−n(HQXY (X|Y)−3)
≤
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
2nHQXY (Y |X)2−n(HQXY (X,Y)−7/2)
=
∑
xn:de(xn,vn)≤De
2−n(HQX (X)−7/2)
(b)≤ max
PXV∈QnXV
2n(HPXV (X|V)+/2)2−n(HQX (X)−7/2)
≤ 2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4),
where (a) follows from (C.8), and (b) can be shown analogously to (4.23). 
Proof of 3): For notational convenience, let E = min{Re(QX,De), r+R(QXY ,De)}.
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Note that,
Pr(E˜) ≤ Pr
 2nr⋃
k=1
Ek
 + Pr
E˜∣∣∣∣∣
 2nr⋃
k=1
Ek
c
 ≤ e−2n/8 + Pr
E˜∣∣∣∣∣ 2nr⋂
k=1
Eck
 , (C.10)
where the second inequality follows from the union bound and (4.41). Now, fix
{Cnk}2
nr
k=1 ∈ ∩2
nr
k=1Eck, m ∈ [N], and vn ∈ Vn, and suppose K = k0. Then,
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,K = k0, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1) = Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnk0)
≤ 2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4), (C.11)
where the inequality follows from (4.42). Furthermore,
E
Pr(de(Xn, vn)≤De|M= m,K= k0, {Cnk}2nrk=1)∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck
 (C.12)
= E
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnk0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck

= E
[
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnk0)|Eck0
]
≤ 2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4), (C.13)
where the last inequality follows from (4.43). Now, consider {Cnk}2
nr
k=1 ∈
(
∪2nrk=1Ek
)c
.
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1)
=
2nr∑
j=1
Pr(K = j|M = m, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1)Pr(de(X
n, vn) ≤ De|M = m,K = j, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1)
≤
2nr∑
j=1
2−n(r−2)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnj), (C.14)
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where the inequality follows from:
Pr(K = j|M = m, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1) =
Pr(K = j)Pr(M = m|K = j, {Cnk}2
nr
k=1)∑2nr
`=1 Pr(K = `)Pr(M = m|K = `, {Cnk}2nrk=1)
=
Pr(M = m|K = j,Cnj)∑2nr
`=1 Pr(M = m|K = `,Cn`)
=
∑
xn:
m∈C j(xn)
Pr(Xn= xn)Pr(M= m|Xn= xn,K= j,Cnj)
2nr∑`
=1
∑
xn:
m∈C`(xn)
Pr(Xn= xn)Pr(M= m|Xn= xn,K= `,Cn`)
(a)≤
∑
xn:m∈C j(xn) 1∑2nr
`=1
∑
xn:m∈C`(xn) 2−2n
(b)
= 2−n(r−2)
where (a) follows from the fact that 1 ≤ Nxn ≤ 22n , and (b) follows from the fact
that, for any j,
∑
xn:m∈C j(xn) 1 = |{xn :
(
xn, ynm(C j)
)
∈ TQXY }| = |TQX|Y (ynm(C j))| = |TQX|Y (yn)| for
any yn ∈ TQY .
Given
(
∪2nrk=1Ek
)c
, the terms in the summands of (C.14) are independent and
identically distributed random variables, with an upper bound given by (C.11),
and an expectation upper-bounded by (C.13). It follows from Chernoff’s
bound [41, Corollary 2] that
Pr
Pr(de(Xn,vn)≤De|M=m,{Cnk}2nrk=1)>2−n(E−8)∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck

= Pr
 2nr∑
j=1
2−n(r−2)Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnj) > 2−n(E−8)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck

= Pr
 2nr∑
j=1
Pr(de(Xn, vn) ≤ De|M = m,Cnj) > 2−n(E−r−6)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck

≤
(
e2nr2−n(Re(QX ,De)−4)
2−n(E−r−6)
) 2−n(E−r−6)
2−n(R(QXY ,De)−4)
≤
(
e2−n(Re(QX ,De)−E−4+6)
)2−n(E−r−R(QXY ,De)−6+4)
≤ 2−n22n , (C.15)
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that Re(QX,De) − E ≥ 0, and E −
r − R(QXY ,De) ≤ 0. By the union bound,
Pr
E˜∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2
nr⋂
k=1
Eck
 ≤ N2−n22n ≤ 2n(IQXY (X;Y)+−22n) ≤ 2n(log |X|+−22n) ≤ 2− 2n22n . (C.16)
Combining (C.10) and (C.16) yields
Pr
(
E˜
)
≤ e−2n/8 + 2− 2n22n ≤ e−2n/9 , (C.17)
as desired. 
C.6 Proof of Proposition 16
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 26 Given  > 0, β > 0, and R′ > maxQ:D(Q||P)≤β R(Q,D) =: Rβ, there
exists n4(, |X|, |Y|,R′, de) such that for all n ≥ n4, D ≥ Dmin, De ≥ De,min, and for each
QX ∈ QnX(β, 0) (cf. (4.46)) ,∣∣∣∣ max
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R′
R(QXY ,De) − R(QX,R′,D,De)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
Proof: Note that Proposition 25 is a special case in which β = +∞ and R ≥
maxQ R(Q,D). As such, the proof follows along similar lines as Propositions 25
and 24, but must account for the rate constraint R.
It follows directly from the definition that
max
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R′
R(QXY ,De) ≤ R(QX,R′,D,De).
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So, we only need to show the reverse direction. To that end, choose R′′ such
that Rβ < R′′ < R′. By Proposition 12, R(QX,R,D,De) is uniformly continuous in
(QX,R) over the set {(QX,R) : D(QX ||P) ≤ β,R′′ ≤ R ≤ R′}. Then let δ1 > 0 be small
enough such that, for all QX ∈ QnX(β, 0),
|R(QX,R′ − δ1,D,De) − R(QX,R′,D,De)| ≤ /2. (C.18)
Let δ2 > 0 be small enough such that
‖PXY − P′XY‖ ≤ δ2⇒|R(PXY ,De) − R(P′XY ,De)| ≤/2
and |IPXY (X;Y) − IP′XY (X;Y)| ≤ δ1. (C.19)
Let n ≥ n4 ≥ |Y|
√|X|/δ2. Fix QX ∈ QnX(β, 0) and let P?Y |X be the conditional dis-
tribution achieving the maximum in R(QX,R′ − δ1,D,De). We construct P′Y |X by
rounding the values of P?Y |X, as done in Proposition 24. Similarly to Proposi-
tion 24, this guarantees that QXP′Y |X ∈ QnXY,
‖QXP′Y |X − QXP?Y |X‖≤ δ2, and EQXP′Y |X [d(X,Y)] ≤D. (C.20)
Moreover, it follows from (C.19) and (C.20) that IQXP′XY (X;Y) ≤ IQXP?XY (X;Y) + δ1 ≤
R′. Therefore,
max
QXY∈QnXY(QX ,D):
IQXY (X;Y)≤R′
R(QXY ,De) ≥ R(QXP′Y |X,De)
≥ R(QXP?Y |X,De) − /2
≥ R(QX,R′,D,De) − ,
where the second inequality follows from (C.19) and (C.20), and the third in-
equality from (C.18). 
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The proposition yields
min
QX∈QnX(β,0)
D(QX ||P) + R(Q,R′,D,De) − 
≤ min
QX∈QnX(β,0)
D(QX ||P) + R(Q?R′(QX),De)
≤ min
QX∈QnX(β,0)
D(QX ||P) + R(Q,R′,D,De).
By taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and noting that  is arbitrary, the proof
is concluded.
C.7 Proofs of Propositions 22 and 23
C.7.1 Proof of Proposition 22
We restate the proposition.
Proposition 22: Let N1 and N2 be in N, and let S andU be compact subsets of
RN1 and RN2 , respectively. Let ν be a non-negative continuous function defined
on S × U, and let ϑ be a real-valued continuous function defined on S × U.
Suppose they satisfy the following condition:
(PA) If (s, u1) ∈ S × U satisfies ν(s, u1) = minu′∈U ν(s, u′), then there exists u2 such
that ϑ(s, u2) = ϑ(s, u1), and for all s′ ∈ S, ν(s′, u2) = minu′∈U ν(s′, u′).
Let t0 = maxs∈Sminu∈U ν(s, u), and let ϕ be a function on S × [t0,+∞) defined as
follows:
ϕ(s, t) = min
u:ν(s,u)≤t
ϑ(s, u).
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If for fixed s ∈ S, ϕ(s, t) is continuous in t, then ϕ(s, t) is continuous in the pair
(s, t).
First, note that, for all s ∈ S and all t ≥ t0, ν−1 (s, [0, t]) , {u : ν(s, u) ≤ t} is
closed by continuity of ν, so it is compact since it is also bounded. Moreover it
is non-empty since t ≥ t0. Since ϑ is continuous and the minimization is over a
compact set, ϕ is well defined.
Now fix (s, t) ∈ S × [t0,+∞), and consider any sequence (sk, tk) → (s, t). Let
ts = minu∈U ν(s, u) and consider any  > 0.
If t > ts:
By continuity of ϕ(s, t) as a function of t for fixed s, there exists δ > 0 such
that |t − t′| ≤ δ ⇒ |ϕ(s, t) − ϕ(s, t′)| ≤ . Let t′ = t − min{δ/2, (t − ts)/2}, and let
u′ ∈ argminu:ν(s,u)≤t′ ϑ(s, u). Then, ν(s, u′) < t and ϕ(s, t′) = ϑ(s, u′) ≤ ϕ(s, t) + .
If t = ts:
Let u′ be a minimizer for ϕ(s, ts) satisfying ν(s′, u′) = ts′ for all s′ ∈ S. Such
choice is possible by assumption (PA). Note that ϑ(s, u′) = ϕ(s, ts).
We claim that the choice of u′ is feasible for the minimization in ϕ(sk, tk), i.e.,
ν(sk, u′) ≤ tk for sufficiently large k. Indeed, if t > ts, ν(sk, u′) → ν(s, u′) = t′ < t,
then for sufficiently large k, ν(sk, u′) ≤ tk. If t = ts, then ν(sk, u′) = tsk ≤ t0 ≤ tk.
Moreover, by continuity of ϑ, ϑ(sk, u′) → ϑ(s, u′). Then, for sufficiently large
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k, ϑ(sk, u′) ≤ ϕ(s, t) + /2. So, we get
lim sup
k→∞
ϕ(sk, tk) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
ϑ(sk, u′) ≤ ϕ(s, t).
On the other hand, let uk be a minimizer for ϕ(sk, tk). Consider a sequence of
integers {k j} such that
ϕ(sk j , tk j)→ lim infk→∞ ϕ(sk, tk).
Let {uk j} be the corresponding subsequence of minimizers. SinceU is a bounded
set, then {uk j} has a convergent subsequence {uk j` }. Let u′ be its limit. By continu-
ity of ν, we have ν(s, u′) = lim`→∞ ν(sk j` , uk j` ) ≤ lim`→∞ tk j` = t. Therefore,
ϕ(s, t) ≤ ϑ(s, u′) = lim
`→∞
ϑ(sk j` , uk j` )
= lim
`→∞
ϕ(sk j` , tk j` )
= lim inf
k→∞
ϕ(sk, tk).

C.7.2 Proof of Proposition 23
We restate the proposition.
Proposition 23: Let N be in N, and let T be a non-empty compact subset of
RN . Let L be a real-valued continuous function defined on T . Let T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇ · · ·
be a decreasing sequence of non-empty compact subsets of T . Let T = ⋂i≥1 Ti.
Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈Tk
L(t) = max
t∈T
L(t).
Moreover, let S 1 ⊆ S 2 ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of non-empty compact
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subsets of T . Let S = ⋃i≥1 S i (where the bar denotes closure of the set). Then,
lim
k→∞
max
t∈S k
L(t) = max
t∈S
L(t).
Consequently, if T is also convex, and Lc is a real-valued convex and continuous
function defined on T with s0 = mint∈T Lc(t), then
Lˆ(s) := max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t)
is continuous in s ∈ [s0,+∞).
First, note that T is non-empty and compact since a countable intersection of
non-empty decreasing compact sets is non-empty and compact. Let
tk = argmax
t∈Tk
L(t) and t? = argmax
t∈T
L(t).
We need to show that L(tk)→ L(t?). Let Bδ(t) = {t′ ∈ T : ‖t′− t‖ < δ}, and consider
the following claim.
Claim 1: For all δ > 0, there exists k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, Tk ⊆ Bδ(T ), where
Bδ(T ) =
⋃
t∈T
Bδ(t).
We show first how the claim yields our result. Let  > 0 be given. By the
uniform continuity of L (continuity on a compact set), there exists δ > 0 such that
‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ ⇒ |L(t) − L(t′)| ≤ . Let k be large enough as guaranteed by the claim.
Then, for all t ∈ Tk, there exists t′ ∈ T such that ‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ, and subsequently
|L(t) − L(t′)| ≤ . In particular, there exists t′ ∈ T such that |L(tk) − L(t′)| ≤ . Then,
we get L(tk) ≤ L(t′) +  ≤ L(t?) + . Since L(tk) ≥ L(t?), we get |L(tk) − L(t?)| ≤ .
Therefore, L(tk) → L(t?). It remains to prove the claim to establish the first part
of the proposition.
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Proof of Claim 1: Fix δ > 0. Bδ(T ) is open in T by construction. Therefore,
Tk\Bδ(T ) is closed in T . Since T is closed in RN , then Tk\Bδ(T ) is also closed in
RN . Moreover, it is bounded, so it is compact. Since
⋂
i≥1
Tk\Bδ(T ) =
⋂
i≥1
Tk
 ∖Bδ(T ) = T\Bδ(T ) = ∅,
and Tk\Bδ(T ) is a decreasing sequence of compact sets, there exists k0 such that
for all k ≥ k0, Tk\Bδ(T ) is empty.
Similarly, to prove the second part of the proposition, let
sk = argmax
t∈S k
L(t) and s? = argmax
t∈S
L(t).
We need to show that L(sk)→ L(s?). To this end, consider the following claim.
Claim 2: For all δ > 0, there exists k1 such that for all k ≥ k1, S ⊆ Bδ(S k).
We show first how the claim yields our result. Let  > 0 be given. By the uniform
continuity of L, there exists δ > 0 such that ‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ⇒ |L(t)− L(t′)| ≤ . Let k be
large enough as guaranteed by the claim. Then, for all t ∈ S , there exists t′ ∈ S k
such that ‖t − t′‖ ≤ δ, and subsequently |L(t)− L(t′)| ≤ . In particular, there exists
t′ ∈ S k such that |L(s?) − L(t′)| ≤ . Then, we get L(sk) ≥ L(t′) ≥ L(s?) − . Since
L(sk) ≤ L(s?), we get |L(sk) − L(s?)| ≤ . Therefore, L(sk) → L(s?). It remains to
prove the claim.
Proof of Claim 2: Fix δ > 0. Bδ(S k) is open in T by construction. Therefore,
S \Bδ(S k) is closed in T . Then S \Bδ(S k) is closed in RN . Moreover, it is bounded,
so it is compact. Since
⋂
i≥1
S \Bδ(S k)=S
∖⋃
i≥1
Bδ(S k)
=⋃
i≥1
S i
∖
Bδ
⋃
i≥1
S i
=∅,
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and S \Bδ(S k) is a decreasing sequence of compact sets, there exists k1 such that
for all k ≥ k1, S \Bδ(S k) is empty.
Finally, consider Lˆ(s). If Lc is a constant function, then the statement is trivial.
If not, consider s ≥ s0, and let sk be a decreasing sequence converging to s. Then,
lim
k→∞
Lˆ(sk) = lim
k→∞
max
t:Lc(t)≤sk
L(t) = max
t:Lc(t)≤s
L(t) = Lˆ(s),
where the second equality follows from the first part of the proposition. There-
fore, Lˆ(s) is right-continuous. Now, consider s > s0, and let sk be an increasing
sequence converging to s. Note that,
⋃
k≥1
{t ∈ T : Lc(t) ≤ sk} = {t ∈ T : Lc(t) < s} .
Denote the above set by S − and let S = {t ∈ T : Lc(t) ≤ s}. The second part of the
proposition implies that
lim
k→∞
Lˆ(sk) = lim
k→∞
max
t:Lc(t)≤sk
L(t) = max
t∈S −
L(t).
So it suffices to show that S − = S . Clearly, S − ⊆ S since S is closed and S − ⊆ S .
It remains to show that any point t˜ satisfying Lc(t˜) = s is a boundary point of S −.
To that end, note that Lc(t˜) is not a local minimum since Lc(t˜) = s > s0 and Lc is
convex by assumption. Therefore, any neighborhood of t˜ intersects S −. As such
S − = S , and Lˆ(s) is left-continuous, as desired. 
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 21
We will proceed by induction on j. Let j = d/2. It is easy to check then
that the left-hand side and the right-hand side are both equal to d. Next, the
induction step shows that if the formula holds for j + 1, then it holds for j:
d∑
i=d/2+ j
(−1)d−ii
(
d
i
)
= (−1)d/2− j (d/2 + j)
(
d
d
2 + j
)
+ (−1)d/2− j−1
(2 j + d)(2 j + d + 2)
(
d
d/2+ j+1
)
4(d − 1) .
Note that (
d
d/2 + j + 1
)
=
(
d
d/2 + j
)
d/2 − j
d/2 + j + 1
.
Then, continuing,
d∑
i=d/2+ j
(−1)d/2−ii
(
d
i
)
=
(−1)d/2− j
(
d
d/2+ j
)
4(d − 1)
(
4(d − 1)(d/2 + j) − (2 j + d)(2 j + d + 2)(d/2 − j)
d/2 + j + 1
)
=
(−1)d/2− j
(
d
d/2+ j
)
4(d − 1) (2(d − 1)(d + 2 j) − 2(2 j + d)(d/2 − j))
=
(−1)d/2− j
(
d
d/2+ j
)
4(d − 1) (2 j + d)(2(d − 1) − 2(d/2 − j))
=
(−1)d/2− j
(
d
d/2+ j
)
4(d − 1) (2 j + d)(d + 2 j − 2),
as desired. 
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